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Abstract
This dissertation introduces a technique for testing proper failure mitigation
in safety-critical systems. Unlike other approaches which integrate behavioral and
failure models, and then generate tests from the integrated model, we build safety
mitigation tests from an existing behavioral test suite, using an explicit mitigation
model for which we generate mitigation paths which are then woven at selected
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According to Knight [93] safety-critical systems (SCSs) are systems whose failure
could cause harm of life, damage to the environment or important property damage.
Examples of safety-critical systems (SCSs) include medical devices, weapons, nuclear
systems, and aircraft flight control. Many current information systems are becoming
safety-critical due to financial loss and even harm of life can result from their failure.
Our aim is to develop a systematic model- based testing (MBT) approach to test
fail-safe behavior in SCSs that leverages a behavioral test suite, covers diverse types
of failures, improves scalability issues and avoids state space explosion by exploiting
behavioral test suites instead of integrating the behavioral model (BM) with a fault
model (FM) such as [49],[88],[81] - which have only been used for safety analysis,
not for test generation. In order to develop an MBT technique it is also necessary to
provide models for mitigation requirements for each failure type, testing criteria for
the models, techniques how to generate test paths through these mitigation models,
and rules how to weave mitigation test paths into behavioral tests at selected failure
points. Selecting failure points also needs systematic rules based on testing criteria.
This research proposes a way to do this using Fault Trees (FTs) as a Fault Model
and Communicating Extended Finite State Machines (CEFSMs) as a Behavioral
1
Model. Mitigation models are also suggested. Their types are inspired by exception
handling patterns developed for process modeling, e. g.[102]. The goal is to provide
an MBT technique for testing fail-safe behavior alongside behavioral testing that is
flexible, systematic, scalable, and shows potential of being extendable to other types
of behavioral models like the UML offers.
Unlike safety analysis, our focus is on testing proper mitigation where it is re-
quired. This is an important issue, since an empirical study [125] found that the
defect rate in exception handling modules exceeds 20% (i. e. 20% of exception
handling modules have defects), a rate, they conclude, is much higher than for non-
exception handling modules. Due to mitigation share similarities with exception
handling, it stands to reason that systematic mitigation testing is essential to re-
duce risks and possibly severe consequences of mitigation defects in SCSs.
Research Questions
1. Can we use a behavioral test suite in conjunction with failure processes and
mitigation requirements to generate fail-safe tests for SCSs?
2. What are feasible testing criteria? How effective and efficient are they?
3. Is the approach more scalable than integrating the models and then generating
tests?
4. Can the approach be applied to different application domains in safety-critical
systems?
5. Can the approach show that all mitigation model types exist?
6. Can the approach demonstrate position of all failures in behavioral test suite?
7. Can we build selective regression testing approach?
2
The remainder of this research is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains back-
ground and related work, relevant work in MBT, fault modeling and analysis, fault
injection, integration of safety analysis techniques and behavior models, MBT with
integrated models, mitigation models and regression testing. Chapter 3 describes
the steps in our approach in detail. Chapter 4 illustrates validation and applicability
case studies, comparison wrt effectiveness and efficiency against genetic algorithm
and end-to-end testing methodology for safety critical systems. Regression testing
is introduced in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 draws conclusion.
1.1 Contribution to Team Project
This dissertation is a part of a large project to test proper failure mitigation and
security. This project consists of the following:
• A (Ahmed Gario):
– Part 1 of the End-to-End Testing Methodology ( chapter 4. subsection
4.4.2 ).
– Common Work (we developed together):
∗ RCCS, behavioral model (section 4.5). I did mitigation model, weav-
ing rules, smts (subsection 4.5.3).
∗ development of applicability matrix in end-to-end testing methodol-
ogy (subsection 4.5.2).
• B (Salwa Elakeili): This part of the project is this dissertation. This part
of the project concentrates on testing the proper mitigation of safety-critical
system.
3
• C (Seana Hagerman):
– development of behavioral model and description for launch vehicle (sec-
tion 4.1), statement of mitigation requirements.
– my work (subsubsection 4.1.3.3, subsubsection 4.1.3.4) :
∗ apply coverage criteria.
∗ construct mitigation models.
∗ generate mitigation tests.
∗ develop weaving rules.
∗ generate smts.
∗ use of case studies in comparison (section 4.6).
• D (Mahmoud Abdelgawad): This portion emphasizes testing autonomous sys-
tem.
• E (Salah Boukhris):
– mitigation patterns (e.g. Figure 3.3) and informal explanation of weaving
rules.
– my work: formalization of weaving rules (section 3.5).
– adaption of patterns to SCSs and CEFSM rather than Web applications
and FSMWeb.
– comparison (section 4.3)
∗ use of concentenated test paths.
∗ simulator.
∗ running simulations.
– common work: Interpretation of simulation results (subsection 4.3.3).
4
Figure 1.1 illustrates how these parts of the overall large project are related, and





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.1 Model-Based Testing (MBT)
According to Nguyen et al.[121] MBT is an approach to generate test cases using
a model of the system under test (SUT). The model provides an abstract view of
the SUT by focusing on specific characteristics. Test cases are automatically created
from a formal and behavioral model of the SUT [133]. MBT relies on three important
technologies: model notations, the test generation algorithm, and the tools [39].
2.1.1 Process
It usually involves five steps [154][153][66][44][111]:
1. Build a model of the SUT from informal requirements or existing specification
documents. This model is called “test model” since the focus of the model
and abstraction level are directly connected to testing objectives. We need to
validate the model to ensure that requirements are consistent and complete.
2. Generate a test suite from the model using test coverage criteria. Test coverage
criteria may address functionality of the system or the structure of the model
8
(state coverage, transition coverage, etc). They can also focus on a well-defined
set of faults.
3. Transform test coverage criteria into test case specifications. A test case spec-
ification is a high-level depiction of a needed test case.
4. An executable test suite is generated with the goal of satisfying all test case
specifications.
5. Run test cases once the test suite is created. There are two stages for running
a test case.
• The first stage sends concrete test data to the SUT and records the SUT’s
output.
• The second stage validates the result by comparing actual and expected
output (verdict). The verdict can be pass, fail, and inconclusive. If actual
and expected results conform, the test passes. It fails if they do not, and
it is inconclusive when this decision cannot be made.
A test script is some executable code that executes a test case and validates
it.
2.1.2 Taxonomy
Utting et al. [154] provide a survey on MBT. They define six dimensions of MBT
approaches (a taxonomy): model scope, characteristics, paradigm, test selection
criteria, test generation technology and test execution. There are many different
modelling notations that have been used for modelling the behavior of systems for
test generation purposes [154][16].
9
1. State-Based (or Pre/Post) Notations. A system is modelled as a collection of
variables and operations that change those variables. Each operation is deter-
mined by a precondition and a postcondition. Examples for these notations
include Z, B, VDM, and JML.
2. History-Based Notations. These representations model a system by clarifying
the acceptable traces of its behavior over time. Different concepts of time can
be used (discrete or continuous, linear or branching, points or intervals). These
are graphical and textual notations for specifying sequences of interactions
between components. An example of this notation is message-sequence charts.
3. Functional Notations. These explain a system as a collection of mathematical
functions. The functions may be first-order, or higher-order. Algebraic spec-
ifications tend to be more abstract and harder to write than other notations,
so they are not widely used for model based testing.
4. Operational Notations. These express a system as a collection of executable
processes, executing in parallel. They are suited to expressing distributed
systems and communications protocols. An example is Petri Net notation.
5. Stochastic Notations. These express a system by a probabilistic model of the
events and input values and used to model environments instead of SUTs. For
example, Markov chains are employed to model expected usage profiles, so
that the generated tests use that usage profile.
6. Data-Flow Notations. These notations focus on the data instead of the control
flow, such as block diagrams of Matlab Simulink which used to model contin-
uous systems.
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7. Transition-based Notations. These describe the transitions between different
states of a system. They are graphical node-and-arc notations , such as Finite
State Machines (FSMs) and statecharts.
This research focuses on transition-based notations which are explained in
more detail in the next section.
2.1.3 Benefits and Drawbacks of MBT
1. Aided in uncovering of ambiguities in software specification and design.
2. Facilitated in the communication between the testing and development teams.
3. Reduced effort and cost for testing planning or execution.
4. Ability of automatically creating and running many of unique tests [133].
5. Ability to update test cases set when model changes (selective regression test-
ing).
6. Improved product quality
MBT technology starts from specification. Testers included early in the development
process with the developers. By constructing behavioral model and test interface,
testers can find desgin and specification errors before code exists. The model is the
test plan and it is easy to maintain. By using MBT technology, we can automate
generation and execution of test suite.
Even MBT provides a lot of benefits, there are some limitations although. Some
of the limitations of MBT are when informal requirements becomes out of date
and applies MBT, this will yield to build incorecct model. A practical drawback
of MBT is that some different skills are necessary compared to manual test design.
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The model designers must the able to abstract and design the models, and have
experience in application area. The most prominent problem for state models is
state space explosion [51].
Potential drawbacks of MBT include
1. MBT requires skills of testers. They must understand the model, its use,
limitations, and associated MBT tools, if available.
2. Testers must have expertise in tools and programming languages essential for
different tasks.
3. Model creation is subjective and poor models can make it difficult to test.
Must have enough detail to be test-ready.
4. The most noticeable problem for state models is state space explosion where
models of software functionality can grow unwidely even with tool support
[51].
2.2 MBT with Various Forms of Finite State Ma-
chines
These models concentrate on describing the transitions between various states of
a system. They are graphical node-and-arc representations. Examples of transition
based notations include Finite State Machines (FSMs), statecharts (e.g. UML State
Machines, Statemate statecharts and Simulink Stateflow charts), labelled transition
systems and I/O automata. Table 2.1 shows examples of MBT approaches based
on 6 types of models.
12





UML-Statechart [122, 36, 23, 140, 110, 77] 11
[90][85][134][48][111]
Sequence diagram [27][142][106][119][146] 5
Activity diagram [25][108][117][71][98][89] 12
[72][18][141][86][126][87]
Table 2.1: Model-Based Testing Papers
2.2.1 Finite State Machines (FSMs)
The earliest published literature on testing finite state machines dates back to the
50s. Activities in the 60s and early 70s were driven mainly by automata theory and
sequential circuit testing. FSMs are one of the most common modeling techniques
for MBT. They have been used to test systems in different application domains such
as sequential circuits, pattern matching and communication protocols [99]. A FSM
is defined as: [99] M = (I, O, S, δ, λ) where
• I = set of input symbols
• O = set of output symbols
• S = set of states
• δ : S × I → S is the state transition function
• λ : S × I → O is the output function.
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Papers Criteria Purpose Tools Applicability







Fujiware et al. Wp Test case No OSI





Natio et al. Transition Test No Fault in
[118] tour input memory cells
(TT) sequence in sequential
circuits
Chan et al. UIO Test No Communication
[31] /DS sequence protocols
generation
Dick et al. Transition Test VDM Triangle
[43] coverage generation tool set problem
Table 2.2: Testing with FSMs
When the machine is in a current state s in S and receives an input a from I it moves
to the next state specified by (s, a) and produces an output given by o ∈ O. Each
edge is labeled with the input and output associated with the transition ([3] [99]
[58]). FSMs use coverage criteria in test case generation. A wide choice of coverage
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criteria ( Chapter 2 in [3]) is available. Test generation methods based on FSMs
include transition tour (TT) method [118], W method [60], WP method [60], Distin-
guishing Sequence method (DS)[31] and Unique Input-Output method (UIO) [31].
While the use of the stronger coverage criteria hopes to increase software quality,
they are also more complex and costly. One restriction of traditional FSMs is that
they do not model essential behavioral aspects of software like its data flow ([55]
[74]). It is difficult to represent complex systems with FSM models. The methods
work well for simple systems, but don’t scale up to larger systems. FSMs are not
sufficient for depicting features such as parallelism and hierarchy. The scalability
issues of FSMs arise from two important problems: the flatness of the state model
and its lack of support for concurrency [47]. The most frequently cited papers of
FSMs for test case generation are shown in Table 2.2.
Chow [37] introduces the W-method as an approach for testing the correctness
of control structures that are modeled by an FSM. Two FSMs are required: a spec-
ification FSM and an implementation FSM. Edges of the FSMs are annotated with
inputs and expected outputs. A spanning tree is generated from the FSM and test
sequences are based on paths through this tree. Due to the ability to compare lan-
guages accepted by both FSMs, test sequences are guaranteed to expose any errors
(e.g operation errors, transfer errors, missing states) in the control structure based
on some assumptions (the machine is completely specified, minimal, and every state
is reachable). Testing criteria include “n-switch covers”, a generalization of branch
cover is defined. The testing method is applied to three systems in the area of com-
puter graphics, real-time process control, and telephone switching.
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Fujiwara et al.[60] introduce the “partial W method” (Wp), a variation of the
W method. The Wp-method checks that all states defined by the specification are
identifiable in the implementation. The (Wp) has full fault detection power, and
gives shorter test suites than the W method.
Naito et al.[118] introduce an algorithm for generating TransitionTours (TTs)
for sequential circuits from an FSM. The input sequence, when applied, results in
a transition-tour. [It causes a sequential machine to tour every transition path of
the transition diagram at least once.] Because random inputs are applied until the
machine has traversed every transition path, the sequence generated can contain
many redundant inputs. They illustrate that the fault-detection efficiency increases
as the number of states increases.
Chan et al.[31] propose the Unique Input/Output (UIO) and the Distinguishing
Sequence (DS) approaches for conformance testing of protocol implementations.
DS and UIO approaches do not always create identical fault coverage. An UIOs is
defined to be a sequence of I/Os unique to a particular state. The difference between
DSs and UIOs for a given FSM is that the input sequence of the DSs for all the
states in the FSM are identical, but each output sequence is different; hence, states
can be identified by the outputs they generate. For UIOs, the input sequence may
be different for different states so that these states can be identified according to its
inputs as well as its outputs. DSs can be seen as special cases of UIOs where all the
input sequences are identical. The authors’ aim is to show that certain test sequences
generated by the UIO approach are not capable of detecting all faults, specifically,
when UIOs and signatures are not unique in an implementation, they may not
detect erroneous final states in the implementation. They proposed a modification
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in the UIO approach to ensure these erroneous states are captured. The authors’
modified UIO by adding a verification procedure to the UIO approach to guarantee
that the UIO sequences are all unique in an implementation. The revision involves
replacing the use of a signature for a state, S, with a set of input/output sequences,
(S,K)s unique to S, each of which distinguishes S from at least one other state, K.
Verification is then applied to the (S,K)s.
Dick et al.[45] construct a finite state machine (FSM) from a specification by
using disjunctive normal form (DNF) partition analysis of state and operations.
Operations describe a partial relation between system states and are specified by
giving a logical expression, Spec-OP, which characterizes the relation. A partition
analysis reduces the specification of each operation into DNF used to construct a
FSM from which test suites are derived. The authors present four main aspects:(1)
The partition analysis of individual operations involves reducing the mathematical
expression defining an operation into a DNF. (2) The partition analysis of the sys-
tem state. The mathematical expression defining the system state as the pre- and
postconditions of operations, is reduced to DNF, which yields disjoint partitions of
state values which are used to construct a Finite State Automaton (FSA) from the
specification. (3) The scheduling of tests of different operations to avoid redundancy
in the testing process. This involves finding paths through the FSA which traverses
every transition (transition coverage) with the minimum number of repetitions. (4)
The generation of test values for use in the validation of the implementation. This
involves the selection of values relating to the operation input for each case. These
test values must satisfy the constraints imposed by the mathematical definition of
the specification in the given case. They use the test case generation tool written in
SEPIA Prolog integrated in the atmosphere VDM tool-set. The Triangle Problem
is used as an example for test-case generation.
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2.2.2 Extended Finite State Machines (EFSMs)
Papers Criteria Purpose Tools Applicability
Tahat et al. Constrained path Test generation No ATM system
[151] coverage
Chanson et al. Transition Test sequence No Communication protocol
[32] coverage and generation
all-du paths
El-Fakih et al. Transition Test generation No SCP
[50] coverage
Wong et al. Transition Test generation No ATM system
[158] coverage INRES
Kalaji et al. FTP Test generation No example of simple
[82] flight safety system
Batth et al. Transition coverage Test sequence No Railroad crossing
[15] generation system
Yano et al. Transition coverage Test generation SMC1 ATM
[161]
Kalaji et al. Transition coverage Test data No INRES initiator and
[84] input generation class 2 transport protocols
Derderian et al. Transition coverage Input sequence No INRES initiator and
[42] generation class 2 transport protocols
Kalaji et al. Transition coverage Test input No class 2 transport protocols
[83] data generation and Access point module
Yang et al. Transition coverage Test data No ATM system
[160] input generation INRES protocol,
class 2 transport protocols
Table 2.3: Testing with EFSMs
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Finite state machines have been used to model sequential circuits and control
portions of communication protocols. However, in practice, the usual specifications
of protocols include variables and operations based on variable values; ordinary
FSMs cannot model these. To model such systems, FSMs are extended with vari-
ables, predicates and instructions [99]. In an FSM, the transition is associated with
a set of inputs and a set of output functions, while in an EFSM model, the tran-
sition will be fired if the predicate conditions (guards) are all satisfied, moving the
machine from the current state to the next state and performing the specified data
operations (actions). An EFSM is defined as [100] 5-tuple = (S, I, O, T, V, A), such
that:
• S is a finite set of states,
• I is a set of inputs symbols,
• O is a set of output symbols,
• T is a set of transitions,
• V is a set of variables,
• A is a set of actions, and
State changes: The transition t in the set T is a 6-tuple:
t = T(st, s
′
t, it, ot, Pt) where,
• st is the current state,
• s′t is the next state,
• it is the input,
• ot is the output,
• Pt(~v) is predicates (guards) on the current variable values.
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An EFSM is a dominant model to represent more complex systems usually with
control and data parts such as communication protocols. However, testing from an
EFSM has many difficulties, such as [82] path feasibility and path test data gen-
eration. Due to the existence of guards and actions, a conflict may occur between
two or more transitions in a given transition path (TP). For instance, a transition’s
action may set a variable x=0 and the next transition guard checks if x > 0. Such
a path is infeasible and so it is impossible to find test data that can trigger it.
However, determining if a given path is feasible in advance is undecidable. There
are many methods [76] [155] that study these two problems (path feasibility and
path test data generation) by converting an EFSM to FSM for which many test
techniques are available. The conversion is conducted by either abstracting the
data away from an EFSM so it is an FSM or expanding the EFSM to become an
FSM [75]. While the first approach does not assure that the paths taken from the
FSM will be feasible in the corresponding EFSM, the other approach can lead to a
prohibitively large number of the states in the resulting FSM (state space explosion).
Tahat et al. et al.[151] present an approach of requirement-based selective test
generation. The approach takes a software specification as a set of distinct require-
ments written in textual and Specification Description Language (SDL) formats.
They automatically generate a system model (EFSM) from the distinct require-
ments. The EFSM model is then used to automatically generate test cases related
to distinct requirements. They used constrained path coverage to generate test
cases. In constrained path coverage each path in the model is traversed at least
once under the constraint that each transition is traversed at most n-times. This
is a modified version of path coverage. This approach is extended to generate re-
gression tests that are related to the requirement changes (add, delete, modify).
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Their approach reduces the number of test cases during requirement-based selective
testing as compared to complete system testing, while preserving the quality of the
test suite with respect to fault detection. A reduction in the number of test cases is
achieved by testing selected requirements. A simple ATM model is used to illustrate
the approach.
Chanson et al.[32] introduce a test generation approach that combines graph cov-
erage criteria like UIO,DS (transition coverage) methods and dataflow criteria. They
use a transition dependence graph (TDG) to represent both control and dataflow
implementation. An algorithm based on control and dataflow analysis creates test
cases called unified test sequence (UTS). Their final test sequence has the same fault
detection power as UIO, DS. The feasibility problem is addressed by using a con-
straint satisfaction technique to decide the consistency of all relevant constraints.
The authors show how to make an infeasible paths to be feasible by considering
self loops in paths. The self loops may change some variables in a constraint and
by executing the loop a number of times the constraint may become satisfiable. A
sample protocol written in Estelle is employed to demonstrate their approach.
El-Fakih et al.[50] highlight the problem of conformance testing of EFSM speci-
fications with respect to user defined types of faults. Given an EFSM specification
with a selected set of transitions defined by a user, they derive a test suite that is
complete with respect to output or with respect to transfer and output faults at
the selected transitions. Slices of the specification EFSM are employed to reduce
test derivation efforts . These slices are simpler than the specification EFSM. They
consider the Simple Connection Protocol (SCP) as a case study to illustrate their
method.
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Wong et al.[158] present a feasible transition path (FTP) generation approach
with minimum transition path length for testing EFSM. Modified breadth first
search (MBFS) is used as the path generation algorithm because of its potential
to find minimum transition length. MBFS (graph search algorithm to find the
shortest path between nodes in a graph) with a conflict checker is used to create a
set of minimum FTP for each transition in order to avoid infeasible path generation.
A conflict checker algorithm eliminates a conflict transition while MBFS is executed.
A C++ EFSM executable model is developed for algorithm modeling purposes and
verification as well as performance assessment. The proposed method is applied to
an ATM model.
Kalaji et al.[82] develop an approach that utilizes optimization algorithms to
test from EFSM models. The purpose of this approach is to overcome the path
feasibility and path test data generation problems. They propose a fitness metric to
estimate the probability of a given path being feasible. The fitness metric is based
on analyzing all the relations between the transitions of a path to assess its feasibil-
ity. The fitness function is used to guide the search for a suitable set of inputs. The
EFSM transition is a function where the function name and input parameters are
arised from the corresponding transition name and input parameters. Therefore, a
path test data is a set of inputs to be applied to a set of functions which are called
sequentially.
Batth et al.[15] test for timing faults. They use an EFSM model with timer vari-
ables. They enhance the timed EFSM model such that the test sequences generated
from the augmented model when applied to an implementation under test (IUT),
will identify timing faults. They generate a test sequence that can detect these
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timing faults by applying a Hit-or-Jump algorithm. In the Hit-or-Jump algorithm,
if a visited node satisfies the test purposes, it is said that a hit occurs; otherwise,
the algorithm randomly choses another node from the neighborhood graph, and
moves (jumps) to it. Then from this new node, it continues its search. To sum
up, including fault modeling in the Specification and Description Language (SDL)
specification guarantees the synchronization among the timing constraints of vari-
ous processes, and allows generation of test sequences. A railroad crossing control
system (RCCS) is used as an example for studying timing constraints in timed FSMs.
Yano et al.[161] present an approach to derive test sequences from an EFSM us-
ing an evolutionary algorithm (EA). An evolutionary algorithm is used to search for
solutions that cover a specific transition. To obtain feasible paths dynamically, the
authors use an executable model. The executable model implements the behavior
of the model in a programming language, like Java, that takes the produced test
sequence as input and generates a transition path triggered by the sequence. The
executable model only triggers a transition when the guard associated with it is sat-
isfied, considering the involved input parameters and/or variables in the condition.
As a result, only feasible paths are produced. They use a multi-objective evolution-
ary (M − GEOvsl) algorithm to search for a test sequence that covers a targeted
transition, and to minimize the length of this test sequence. Model slicing is utilized
to guide the search for a solution. The executable model is generated by the State
Machine Compiler (SMC1) tool. An ATM system is considered to illustrate their
approach.
Kalaji et al.[84] introduce a method that generates input test sequences for feasi-
ble paths in an EFSM model by using an evolutionary testing (ET)-based technique.
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The approach expresses the problem as looking for input parameters to be applied to
a set of functions to be called sequentially. A new fitness function is defined to deal
with the case when a test target requires calls to a set of transitions sequentially.
They evaluate the approach empirically using five sets of randomly generated paths
through two EFSM case studies: the INRES and the class 2 transport protocols.
Derderian et al.[42] describe an approach in which a fitness function is used to
estimate how to find an input sequence to trigger a given path through an EFSM.
Such a fitness function is used in a search-based approach (a genetic algorithm (GA))
in which they search for a path that accomplishes a test objective, such as execut-
ing a particular transition, and then search for an input sequence that triggers the
path. They search for another path and repeat the process if the second search fails.
The INRES protocol and a class 2 transport protocol are used to demonstrate the
proposed approach.
Kalaji et al. [83] introduce a fitness metric based on the analysis of interdepen-
dencies between guards and actions found in a given transition path (TP) in an
EFSM model to estimate the traversal complexity of this TP and hence its feasibil-
ity. The proposed fitness metric is computed and utilized to guide genetic algorithm
(GA) to find a set of feasible transition paths (FTPs) that achieves the transition
coverage. They use the class 2 transport protocol as a case study to illustrate the
proposed approach.
Yang et al.[160] introduce an approach to generate test cases for an EFSM model
using transition coverage. They integrate static analysis and dynamic analysis tech-
niques to handle the problems of infeasible path in the EFSM models. To generate
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test cases from an EFSM, the approach introduces two steps: (1) they produce a
a candidate set of paths with loops (including self-loops only one time) in order to
satisfy transition coverage criteria and then produce test data for selected paths with
the highest likelihood of feasibility. To detect the feasibility of paths, they extend
Kalajis dependencies analysis values[83] and present a metric to assess the feasibility
of a path. A dynamic analysis method, based on meta-heuristic techniques (Scatter
Search algorithm), is used to detect infeasible paths during test data generation.
In dynamic techniques, if the input sequences that traverses a target path has not
been found, the path will be considered infeasible. (2) they develop an executable
EFSM model via semantic analysis of expressions, therefore the runtime informa-
tion feedback refers to information that is obtained during test execution and the
Scatter Search algorithm can be used to guide the test data generation process di-
rectly. Also, the expected outputs associated with test data are also collected to
construct the test oracle automatically. Finally, test data and test oracles are com-
bined into complete test cases. An empirical study is conducted with four popular
EFSM models for an Automated Teller Machine (ATM), the INRES protocol, the
class 2 transport protocol, and the SCP protocol.
2.2.3 Communicating Extended Finite State Machines (CEF-
SMs)
CEFSM is an extension of EFSM with communication channels.
We select CEFSMs due to its capability to model behavior and their extension
with variables to model data, and their interaction channels to model communica-
tion. The strength of CEFSMs is that they can model orthogonal states of a system
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Papers Criteria Purpose Tools Applicability
Li et al. Transition Test generation No call ringing
[107] coverage feature in My PBX
Hessel et al. Transition Test generation UPPAAL Train gate, audio-control
[73] coverage protocol and WAP stack
Derderian et al. Transition Input sequence No No
[41] coverage generation
Bourhfir et al. Transition Test generation CEFTG
[19] coverage
Kovacs et al. Mutation analysis Test selection No INRES protocol
[95]
Table 2.4: Testing with CEFSMs
in a flat manner and shows interaction between different processess.
CEFSMs can be defined as a finite set of consistent and completely specified
EFSMs that are composed via communication channels that carry input and output
messages [99]: CEFSM = (S, s0, E, P, T, A, M, V, C), such that:
• S is a finite set of states,
• s0 is the initial state,
• E is a set of events,
• P is a set of boolean predicates,
• T is a set of transition functions such that T: S×P×E→S×A×M ,
• M is a set of communicating messages,
• V is a set of variables, and
• C is the set of input/output communication channel used in this CEFSM.
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State changes: The function T returns a next state, a set of output signals, and
action list for each combination of a current state, an input signal, and a predicate.
It is defined as:
T(si, pi, get(mi))/(sj, A, send(mj1,..., mjk)) where,
• si is the current state,
• sj is the next state,
• pi is the predicate that must be true in order to execute the transition,
• ei is the event that when combined with a predicate trigger the transition
function,
• mi1,..., mik are the messages, and
• A is the set of actions.
The communicating message mi is defined as:
(mId, ej, mDestination) where,
• mId is the message identifier
• ej is an event, and
• mDestination is the CEFSM the message is sent to.
CEFSMs communicate by exchanging messages through communication chan-
nels C that connect the outputs of one CEFSM to the input of other CEFSMs.
For full formal semantics see [21]. Communicating Extended Finite State Machines
(CEFSMs) have been used in modeling and testing distributed systems and network
protocols.
Li et al.[107] introduce a method to generate tests automatically from system
specifications modeled with CEFSMs. The method produces tests based on a mix-
ture of behavior, data, and communication specifications. They generate a flow
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diagram of the model, then compute the weight of each node in the diagram. They
mapped weights to the corresponding branches in the CEFSM model. This method
addresses behavioral transition coverage. The branch priorities are then used to
attendant the generation of tests so that as much coverage as possible can be ac-
complished with few tests. Their method uses a backward tracking method in test
generation. It selects a set of transitions to be reached before selecting a variable
value. After a sequence of transitions is selected, its feasibility needs to be validated
by forward checking. The validation of these transitions includes three types: (1)
The transitions require external inputs or variable initialization. (2) The transitions
require internal signals, i.e., the coordination with other EFSMs. (3) The transitions
require external signals with conditions. They used as an example the call-ringing
feature in a simplified private branch exchange system, My PBX, to illustrate their
method.
[73], Hessel et al. propose an algorithm that generates a test suite that covers
all feasible coverage items (a set of items to be covered) via reachability analysis.
The algorithm performs reachability analysis to generate and explore the state space
of a model in order to find a set of paths that meets the transition coverage crite-
rion. The reachability algorithm explores a state only if it might increase the total
coverage. For edge coverage, this involve that each state is never explored twice.
The algorithm is implemented in the test generation tool UPPAAL. They applied
the tool to a set of experiments such as train gate, audio-control protocol and WAP
stack.
Derderian et al. [41] present the problem of observing local transitions of individual
CEFSMs within a global transition (the interconnected transitions within the set of
CEFSMs) using genetic algorithm (GA) without the use of a product machine. A
28
list of all the local transitions are scanned and ranked according to how common
the input output pair is within the reminder of the transitions before the fitness
function can be used. They calculate the penalty of the input and output pair of a
transition. A unique input output pair have no penalty, whereas the most repeated
input output pair have the maximum cost. The ranking of the input output pairs
used in determining the fitness of a possible Constrained Identification Sequences
(CIS). They calculate the fitness of an input sequence by adding all the ranks of the
transitions involved.
In [19], Bourhfir et al. introduce automatic generation of test cases for systems
modeled by CEFSM. Test cases are generated for the global system ( set of several
CEFSMs) by performing a complete reachability analysis, that is, taking all transi-
tions of all CEFSMs into account to generate test cases for the reachability graph.
CEFTG (CEFsm Test Generator) are used to generate test cases for each CEFSM
individually. They compute partial product for one CEFSM by marking transitions
in all the paths which trigger the machine cn. If a transition in cn receieve or sends
a message from or to another CEFSM ci and because this message is sent by some
transitions in ci, they marked all transitions in these test cases. All marked tran-
sitions contribute in the generation of partial product. The algorithm terminates
when the coverage achieved by the generated test cases is fulfilled or after the gen-
eration of the test cases for the partial products of all CEFSMs.
Kovacs et al.[95] propose methods and mutation operators to enable the automa-
tion of test selection in a CEFSM model. They identify a set of mutation operators
for CEFSM models to allow the automated generation of mutant specifications.
They apply small syntactical changes or mutations to the Specification Description
Language (SDL) specification one at a time to generate a fault. If a test set can
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distinguish the specification from its mutants the test set is exercising the specifi-
cation adequately. They used the telecommunication systems INRES to investigate
their method.
All the previous works generate test cases using a model of system under test
using various techniques. Each technique has its advantages and drawbacks. Some
techniques used FSMs to check correctness of the control structure. Due to the
limitations of FSMs (don’t model data aspects), its hard to use them to represent
complex systems. Therefore, to avoid the limitations of FSMs, some techniques used
EFSMs to model system. However, testing from an EFSM has many difficulties as
well, such as path feasibility, path test data generation and EFSM does not show
interaction between behavior processes and failure processes. These limitations lead
to a state space explosion. We select CEFSMs to model desired behavior and their
extension with variables to model data, and their interaction channels to model
communication between various EFSMs. The strength of CEFSMs is that they can
model orthogonal states of a system in a flat manner. We adopt Bourhfir et al. [19],
technique to generate test cases for the global system by using reachability analysis
that means covering all local transitions first then all global transitions.
2.3 MBT with UML
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) [145] is a standardized general-purpose
modeling language in software engineering. UML diagrams depict two views of
a system model: static and dynamic. Static (or structural) diagrams highlight the
static structure of the system using objects, attributes, operations and relationships.
30
The structural diagrams comprise class diagrams and composite structure diagrams
etc. Dynamic (or behavioral) diagrams emphasize the dynamic behavior of the
system by showing cooperation between objects and changes to the internal states
of objects. These views include sequence diagrams, activity diagrams and state
chart diagrams. I will cover statecharts, sequence diagrams, and activity diagrams
in the following subsections.
2.3.1 Statecharts
When a large number of components in a system operate concurrently, the finite
state machines (FSMs) approach becomes difficult as the resultant number of states
will increase with the number of parallel components. State explosion generates a
severe limitation of the FSMs framework. To reduce the modeling complexity of the
state machine formalism while keeping many of its interesting features, a statechart
modeling framework is introduced by Harel [67]. It extends ordinary state-machines
by providing them with natural constructs of orthogonality, depth, broadcast syn-
chronization and many other sophisticated features that strengthen its modeling
[111]. Statecharts are extended state-transition diagrams with the notations of hi-
erarchy, concurrency and communication that are used to describe reactive systems
[57][130]. Statecharts are expressive where small diagrams can express complex be-
havior. Statechart diagrams in UML are used to model the dynamic behavior of
a system. It consists of states, transitions, events and actions. It shows a state
machine emphasizing the flow of control from state to state [68][85]. There are
three kinds of states in a statechart: OR, AND and Basic states. OR states have
substates that are associated with each other via ”exclusive-or,” and AND states
have orthogonal components that are connected via ”and.” States at the bottom of
31
the state hierarchy are Basic states. Transitions in a statechart are labeled with e[c]
\ a where e is the event that triggers the transition, c is a condition that has to be
true when e occurs to make the transition; a is an action that is performed when
the transition occurrs. All of these are optional [57][49].
Offutt et al. [122] introduce a technique for generating test inputs from state-
based specifications. The type of the event is used to derive test cases from UML
statecharts. They defined four kinds of events: call events, signal events, time events
and change events. Change events (A change event models an event that arise when
an explicit boolean expression becomes true due to a change in value of one or more
attributes or associations) is used as the basis for test generation. Test generation
handles four stages of test coverage: (1) Transition coverage, (2) Full predicate cov-
erage, (3) Complete sequence coverage and (4) Transition pair coverage. Each test
case includes an initial state, a sequence of states to reach the initial state, a se-
quence of testing steps, and a final state. A testing step is consists of the following
elements: (1) Action name: this is the name of the function(s) that is executed
when the transition is triggered. (2) Clause name and value tuples: a value is as-
signed to each clause in the predicate on the transition. (3) Attribute name and
value tuples: the before and after value of each attribute that is changed by the
execution of the transition is denoted. (4) The next state: the state which follows
the test step. Empirical results to evaluate the testing criteria are introduced. A
model of the cruise control in a car was implemented to demonstrate their technique.
A drawback of this paper is that it does not support all the transitions in statecharts.
Briand et al. [23] derive test data from UML statecharts using coverage criteria
such as all transitions, all transition pairs, full predicate, and all round-trip paths.
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They assume a test case to be in the form of a feasible sequence of transitions. There
are two problem to derive test data. The first problem is to derive test constraints
on system states and arguments of events and actions for a given Transition Test
Sequence (TTS). The second problem is to generate actual test data values that
satisfy these test constraints. The procedure is to take each test path separately
and derive test data. This requires to determine the system state involved for each
event/transition that is part of the path to be tested and the input parameter values
for all events and actions associated with the transitions. They introduce a number
of algorithms to show how to generate test constraints automatically. The algo-
rithms contain (1) creating the Invocation Sequence Tree (IST), to show all possible
sequences of actions triggered by a Transition Test Sequence (TTS) from the model
information, (2) performing normalization of Object Constraint Language (OCL)
expressions, and (3) deriving test constraints on the system state and event/action
arguments based on the analysis of invocation conditions and operation contracts
for events and actions. They applied the methodology to two case studies: a Video
Store System (VSS) that contains a class cluster whose behavior is described by a
statechart, and a container class implementing a data structure that has a state-
based behavior.
Samuel et al.[140] present a novel approach to automatically generate test cases
based on UML state models. They used edge coverage criteria to generate test cases.
They traverse the state machine graph and select the predicates on every transition.
Then these predicates are transformed and a function reduction technique is ap-
plied to generate test cases. The generated test cases are used to test class as well
as cluster-level state-dependent behaviours. They implemented the method for gen-
erating test cases automatically from UML state charts in a prototype tool, UML
behavioural test case generator (UTG). Their approach can handle change events,
33
time events and transitions with guards. The maximum number of test cases is de-
termined by the number of predicates in a state diagram. Their method works with
integer and boolean data types. The authors assumed that the necessary constraints
are available in notes instead of class/ object diagrams and data types of attributes,
or constraints from class/ object diagrams are not extracted. Prefix path condition
is considered for each predicate for test data generation. They used an ice cream
vending machine to illustrate their approach.
Chevalley et al.[36] introduce a statistical testing technique for the generation
of test cases from UML specifications. They used transition coverage as the testing
criterion to generate test cases from UML state diagrams. This includes generating
both the input values and the expected outputs. The authors present a functional
distribution algorithm. The algorithm enables the authors to rise the occurrence of
changes that may trigger one of the enabled outgoing transitions, that is, one of the
outgoing transitions of the current active state of the model: the algorithm selects
the enabled transition that was the least triggered by the previous test case input
values. To automate the test case generation in the Rose RealTime environment,
the authors propose to extend the UML model representing the program under test
with two capsules. The generator capsule is responsible for the generation of the in-
put values. The collector capsule collects transition coverage measures and supplies
them to functional distribution algorithm implemented in the generator capsule for
identifying and selecting the least triggered enabled transition. The authors have
not flattened state charts to use testing criteria.
Li et al.[110] propose a method to automatically generate and select test cases
from UML statecharts in the context of object orientation, which will early detect
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errors to improve software quality. They convert UML statecharts into FSMs and
use the Wp-method to construct the set of test cases. To handle hierarchy states in
the statecharts, every sub state is treated as one sub state machine. Then, a set of
test cases for the main state machine is constructed, where every direct sub state
is regarded as one atomic state. Thus, the design information is preserved and the
changes can be traced during the development.
Hong et al. [77] introduce a method for the selection of test sequences from stat-
echarts. They find a normal form specification (NFS) for a statechart via flattening
the hierarchical and concurrent structure on states and removing the broadcast com-
munications in the statechart. In the presented approach an EFSM is called a NFS
of a statechart if the behaviour of the statechart is kept in the resulting EFSM,
means each run of the statechart is also a run of the EFSM. There are an unlimited
number of EFSMs that are normal form specifications for a given statechart. They
use reachability graph of the statechart under the assumption that each variable of
the statechart has a finite domain to obtain a NFS for statechart. The approach
avoids the data explosion by obtaining a NFS without expanding the values of vari-
ables of statecharts. Then they convert an EFSM into a flow graph, enable the
association of a flow graph with a statechart that models the flow of both control
and data in the statechart. Each variable occurrence in the flow graph is categorized
as being a definition, computation use or predicate use. They identified associations
between definitions and uses of each variable on the flow graph. Then a set of paths
satisfying all-uses criterion is selected from the flow graph. Each selected path is
mapped into a test sequence of the given statechart. They used a sequence of in-
puts of a statechart as a test sequence. Kim et al. [90] discuss the application of
state diagrams in UML to class testing. They propose a transformation method
from state diagrams into EFSM and flow graphs. The transformation consists in
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flattening the hierarchical and concurrent structure of states and removing broad-
cast communications, while keeping both control and data flow in the UML state
diagrams. They showed that conventional control and data flow testing criteria
can be applied to the transformed models. The approach addresses unit testing of
classes. A coffee vending machine is used as a case study to illustrate their approach.
Kansomkeat et al.[85] propose a technique that can automatically generate and
select test cases from UML statechart diagrams. First, they transform the diagram
into a diagram, called Testing Flow Graph (TFG), which obviously defines flows of
UML statechart diagrams. Second, from TFG they generate test case using state
and transition coverage criteria. Finally, the effectiveness of test case is measured
on the basis of their fault detection abilities using mutation analysis.
Riebisch et al. [134] introduce an approach for generating system-level test cases
based on use case models refined by state diagrams. These models are transformed
into usage models to describe both system behavior and usage. The test case genera-
tion method is organized in five steps: First, they refine use cases manually. Second,
the refined use cases are transformed into state diagrams. Third, the generated state
diagrams are transformed into usage graphs. A usage graph is a directed graph with
a single start, a single final node, and several usage states. The usage states are
connected with transitions labelled with the causing user actions. In the fourth
step, the usage graphs are transformed into usage models. Finally, the test cases
are produced from the usage models by using state and edge coverage. Riebisch
et al. intend to determine the reliability of the system under test. The method is
intended for integration into an iterative software development process model and
is supported by an XML-based tool for model transformation. A library system is
used to illustrate their approach.
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Chartchai et al. [48] propose a framework for generating test data from a UML
state diagram. The quality of generated test data is measured by the number of
transitions which are fired using the test data. The better the quality of test data
is obtained by fire more transitions. The number of fired transitions is a fitness
value of each test data. The test data is a sequence of triggers represented by a
genetic algorithm’s (GA’s) chromosome. Genetic algorithms (GAs) are selected for
searching the best test data. Since their approach focuses on finding a set of triggers
to fire as many transitions as possible, a chromosome in their genetic algorithm is a
sequence of triggers itself. Four case studies were done through a set of experiments
using a model of a coffee vending machine, a course enrollment system, a class
management system and a telephone system.
Lochau et al. [111] define a model-based approach to generate test cases that
aim at feature interaction analysis. A feature is a chain of related system artifacts
that collaborate in some way in order to affect the environment in a way that is
noticeable by the user. They use statecharts as a behavioral model and path coverage
criteria to generate test cases. The approach is based on modelling the functional
architecture and behavioral specifications using statecharts. They use a car door
controlling system as a case study to illustrate their approach.
2.3.2 Sequence Diagram
Sequence diagrams model the cooperation of objects relying on a time sequence.
They show how objects interact with others in a particular scenario of a use case.
They capture the invocation of methods from each object, and also the order in
which they occur. A sequence diagram consists of [27]
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• Object: It is a primary element involved in the diagram. Object is represented
by a rectangle.
• Message: The communications between various objects in a sequence diagram
are represented as messages. A message is indicated by a directed arrow and
the notation differs depending on the message type. For check and assignment
statements use a complete arrow, identifying the nature of the operation as a
comment, a normal arrow is used instead for the activation of an operation.
Sequence diagrams are sometimes called event diagrams, event scenarios, and
timing diagrams[1] [58].
Cartaxo et al.[27] present a systematic procedure for test case generation from
UML sequence diagrams based on the derivation of Labeled Transition System (LTS)
internal model. The LTS offers a global, solid description of the set of all possible
behaviors of the system; a path on the LTS can be taken as a test sequence. A
path obtained, using the Depth First Search method (DFS), by traversing an LTS
starting from the initial state. They use state and transition coverage criteria to
generate test cases. The proposed approach assures that all functionalities depicted
in the model will be tested because of state and transition coverage criteria. The
transformation from UML sequence diagram to LTS is done by Unified Modeling
Language All pUrposes Transformer (UMLAUT) tool and the test case generation
by Test Generation with Verification technology (TGV) tool. The procedure is
targeted to feature testing of mobile phone applications whose requirements are
specified by sequence diagrams, including loops and alternative flows. A complete
coverage of an LTS model is achievable since mobile phone applications are usually
of small size, even though complex, leading to reasonable size LTS models.
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Sarma et al.[142] introduce a method of generating test cases from a UML se-
quence diagram by transforming a UML sequence diagram into a graph called the
Sequence Diagram Graph (SDG). Each node in the SDG stores necessary infor-
mation for test case generation. This information is collected from the use case
template, class diagrams, and data dictionary represented in the form of object
constrained language (OCL), which are associated with the use case for which the
sequence diagram is considered. The SDG is traversed and test cases are generated
using all message path sequence coverage criteria. To generate test cases that sat-
isfy the criteria, they first enumerate all possible paths from the start node to a
final node in the SDG. Each path then would be visited to generate test cases. To
illustrate their method, they use an ATM system as an example.
Li et al.[106] introduce a test cases generation approach which relies on UML
sequence diagrams and Object Constraint Language (OCL). They build a tree rep-
resentation of sequence diagrams by constructing a scenario tree (ST) from the
sequence diagram SD. They find the scenario path from the tree ST. In the next
step, they generated test cases achieve message path coverage and constraint at-
tribute coverage of all objects which relate to the message. They iteratively select
all messages from SD; then, they use OCL to describe the pre and post conditions.
For each selected attribute of the related classes, they record the test cases and the
next attribute is selected for test generation. For each selected attribute, the trans-
form attribute step and the generate test data step are repeated and the process
continues till all attribute are considered for test generation. They use order-ticket
system to illustrate their approach.
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Nayak et al.[119] introduce an approach of synthesizing test data from the in-
formation embedded in model elements like class diagrams, sequence diagrams and
OCL constraints. They develop a sequence diagram with attribute and constraint
information derived from the class diagram and OCL constraints and map it onto
a Structured Composite Graph (SCG). The test specifications (test paths) are then
generated from SCG using all message criteria. For each test specification, they
follow a constraint solving system to generate test data. The proposed approach
assume that initially all test paths are feasible. If a path cannot be exercised by
any set of input data, then the path becomes infeasible. An infeasible path exists
because contradictory constraints are required to be satisfied to execute the path.
They illustrate the test data synthesis approach using an example called the Trading
House Automation (THA) system.
Shanthi et al.[146] introduce an approach for prioritization of test cases derived
from the sequence diagram using Sequence Dependence Table (SDT) and Genetic
algorithm (GA). For generating the test case from the sequence diagram, they first
extract information from the diagram and generate an SDT which is used to gen-
erate test paths. A GA generates highest priority test cases. Their method for test
case generation inspires the developers to improve the design quality, find faults in
the implementation early, and reduce software development time. The case study
uses the sequence diagram of a banking system.
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2.3.3 Activity Diagram
A UML activity diagram defines the sequential or concurrent control flow among
activities. It is used for business modeling, control and object flow modeling, and
complex operation modeling. It is employed to model the dynamic behavior of a
group of objects, or the control flow of an operation. It consists of nodes and edges
where nodes depict processes or process control, including activity states, action
states, decisions, swim lanes, forks, joins, objects, signal sender and receivers. The
edges represent the occurring sequence of activities, objects involving the activity,
including control flows, message flows and signal flows[108][98][58][148].
An activity diagram is defined as [117] D = (A,T,F,C, aI , aF ) where
• A={a1,a2, . . . , am} is a finite set of activity states;
• T={t1, t2, . . . ,tn} is a finite set of completion transitions;
• C={c1, c2, . . . ,cn} is a finite set of guard conditions, and ci is in correspon-
dence with ti; F ⊆ {A× C × T} ∨ {T × C × A} is the flow relation between
the activities and transitions; aI ∈ A is the initial activity state, and aF ∈ A
is the final activity state.
Linzhang et al. [108] introduce a method to generate gray-box test cases from
UML activity diagram. They derive test scenarios from the activity diagram. They
traverse an activity diagram from the initial activity state to the final activity state
by Depth First Search method (DFS), and they restrict that the loops be exe-
cuted at most one time, and all action states and transitions be covered. Thus
they can get all basic paths. Then input/output sequence and parameters, the
constraint conditions and expected object method sequence is extracted from each
test scenario. Finally, all values for input/output parameters are generated via the
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category-partition method. A limitation of the paper is that the authors did not
completely address fork-join structures: any fork node has only two exit edges; this
limits the applicable scope of the proposed algorithm. They developed UMLTGF
tool to support their process. They use an ATM to illustrate their method.
Mingsong et al.[117] automate test case generation for UML activity diagrams.
The approach first randomly generates many test cases for a JAVA program under
test. Then, they run the program with the generated test cases to get the cor-
responding program execution traces. Last, comparing these traces with the given
activity diagram according to the simple path coverage criteria , to obtain a reduced
test case set which fulfills the criteria. To calculate all the paths of an activity dia-
gram, they adopt the depth-first search (DFS) algorithm. The existence of the loops
will result in the multi-occurrence of some activities in a path.
Kundu et al.[98] present an approach of generating test cases from activity dia-
grams. They considered activity diagrams at a higher level of abstraction without
capturing the details of individual activity. The approach requires three steps. First,
they augment the activity diagram with essential test information. Second, they
convert the activity diagram into an activity graph (a directed graph where each
node in the activity graph depicts a construct (initial node, flow final node, decision
node, guard condition, fork node, join node, merge node etc.), and each edge depicts
the flow in the activity diagram). Third, they generate test cases from the activity
graph by using activity path coverage criterion. The test cases generated using the
approach are capable of detecting more faults like synchronization faults, and loop
faults. The authors concentrated only on activity diagram of a single use case at
a time. Registration cancellation is used as an example to investigate their approach.
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Kim et al.[89] propose a method to generate test cases from UML activity dia-
grams. Their aim are to reduces the number of test cases generated using basic path
coverage criterion. Their method first constructs an input/ output (I/O) explicit
activity diagram, which is an abstraction found from the original activity diagram
by showing only external inputs and outputs from a regular UML activity diagram.
The advantage of using this intermediate model is that the input/output activity
diagram (IOAD) models let them constrate only on noticeable behavior so that only
and all the behavior relevant for testing is preserved in the model. Then, they trans-
form it into a directed graph, from which test cases for the initial activity diagram
are derived. This transformation is achieved based on the single stimulus principle,
avoiding the state explosion problem in test generation for a concurrent system.
To increase efficiency of system testing, they traverse nodes (without revisiting the
same node) based on basic path coverage criterion. This method avoids the state
explosion problem that can occur when trying to derive a set of test cases with
thorough coverage for concurrent system. They used an order processing system as
an example to demonstrate their method.
Heinecke et al.[72] propose an approach to generate high-level acceptance test
plans automatically from business processes. These processes are modeled as UML
Activity Diagrams (ACD). First, the user interaction steps within the workflow are
marked. A user interaction step is any input a user states to the system or any
output a user can expect from the system. In a second step, transform the UML
Activity Diagrams into an Interaction Flow Diagram (IFD). Thirdly, the IFD is
transformed into an Interaction Flow Graph (IFG). The IFG is directed graph that
contains all paths of the IFD. The IFG is free of any cycle to ease the tree traversal.
The absence of any cycle in the IFG is achieved by applying a modified Depth-
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First-Search (DFS) algorithm, which ensures that each cycle and each combination
of cycles, if there are any nested cycles, are executed only once. In the fourth step,
the test cases are generated using all-path coverage criterion and assembled to test
plans. A test plan contains all test cases to test the system. Each test case contains
the proper instructions for a tester to execute it step by step. Furthermore, the test
plan contains the inputs a tester has to provide to the system and the corresponding
outputs to be expected from the system.
Biswal et al.[18] propose an approach to generate test cases from activity dia-
gram, sequence diagram and class diagram. They used gray-box testing method.
They use activity diagram as a behavioral model and generate the test scenarios
which satisfy the path coverage criteria. Each loop present in the activity diagram
is executed at most once covering the corresponding activity states and transitions.
Then they generate the corresponding sequence diagram, and class diagrams for
each scenario. Then analyze the sequence diagram to find the interaction categories
and then use the class diagrams to find the settings categories. After analyzing each
category, its significant values and constraints are generated and respective test
cases are derived. ATM system is used as a case study to illustrate their approach.
Samuel et al.[141] propose a method to generate test cases automatically by dy-
namic slicing of UML activity diagrams. They use flow dependence graph (FDG)
of an activity diagram to generate dynamic slices. Dynamic slices are created us-
ing an edge marking method which involves marking and unmarking the unstable
edges appropriately as and when dependencies arise and cease at run time. Slices
are constructed corresponding to each conditional predicate on activity edges and
test cases are automatically generated with respect to each slice. Their generated
test cases satisfy path coverage criterion. They select a conditional predicate on an
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activity edge during the execution of an activity diagram with a random input set.
For generating test data automatically, they transform the predicates to a predi-
cate function and use function minimization on it. They use alternating variable
method for finding the minimum of the predicate function. They implemented their
method for generating test cases automatically from UML activity diagrams in a
prototype tool named UML behavioral Test case Generator (UTG). They illustrate
their approach by using ATM as an example.
Kansomkeat et al.[86] introduce the condition-classification tree method (CCTM)
for generating test cases from activity diagrams. First, an activity diagram is ana-
lyzed to gather control flow information based on decision points and guard condi-
tions. Then, this information is used to derive condition-classification trees (CCT).
Finally, the trees are used to generate a test case table and then test cases. Classi-
fications are criteria for partitioning the input domain of the program to be tested,
and classes are the disjoint subsets of values for each classification. Identify all pos-
sible combinations of classes from the test case table. Each combination of classes
represents one test case. They used mutation analysis to introduce faults into the
Java classes. Two small applications, Payment and Car Parking are used to evaluate
CCTMs ability to generate test cases. Experimental data show that tests generated
by the CCT method have strong ability to detect faults. They implemented a test
case generation tool that supports CCTM.
Patel et al.[126] propose an approach for generating test cases using UML ac-
tivity diagrams by applying activity path coverage. The activity path is a method
to calculate all the possible paths from the activity diagram (not considered the
infinite loop if found in the diagram). The activity path coverage criterion aims to
cover more faults, such as synchronization faults and faults in a loop. They focus
only on UML activity diagrams based on a single use case.
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Kaur et al.[87] introduce a method for prioritizing test scenarios generated from
a UML activity graph based on path complexity. An activity diagram is converted
into a control flow graph(CFG) and then test scenarios are derived from it using ba-
sic path coverage. The methodology adopted for prioritizing test scenarios is based
on path complexity using the concept of path length, an information flow metric,
predicate node and multiple condition coverage. Number of nodes traversed by a
path is a measure of path length, total weight which is calculated using information
flow metric is a measure of path complexity whereas the number of predicate nodes
and number of logical conditions traversed by a path is a measure of multiple condi-
tion coverage. They illustrated their approach by applying it to an activity diagram
of a shipping order system.
Most of previous decribed techniques used statcharts, sequence diagrams, and
activity diagrams to generate test cases using various types of coverage criteria.
These techniques transform the UML representation into graph-based notation to
be able to generate test cases. For example, some methods transform statecharts
into EFSM to be able to generate test cases. Having composite and concurrent
substates in a statecharts makes them hard to test and generate test cases. In
order to apply state-based coverage criteria, such as state and edge coverage, it is
necessary to remove all hierarchy and concurrency in the statecharts. The results are
flat statecharts where every state is depicted by a node and all possible transitions
are shown explicilty. This research uses CEFSM to model dynamic behavior of
system under test because it is expressive (has variables values), flat and has a
communication channels to allow multiple CEFSM to communicate with each other.
By using CEFSM, we do not need to do any kind of transformations. We use CEFSM
to show the interaction between behavior processes and failure processes.
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2.4 Fault Modeling and Analysis
To make systems low risk and fail-safe, software for safety critical systems (SCSs)
must deal with the hazards identified by safety analysis [131].
2.4.1 Safety Related Terminology
Error. An incorrect internal system state. Errors could be inaccuracy in require-
ments, design, or test. These errors might appear in the design and development
process. Some of these errors may spread to the following stage and be visible during
operation as faults [116] [115] [17, 152].
Fault. It is the cause of the failure. A fault may be a physical flaw in hardware, a
defect in software or incorrect operator input. Faults can have their source within
the system boundaries (internal faults) or in the environment (external faults) [115]
[17].
Failure. An incident where a system or subsystem component does not show the
expected external behavior. The expected system behavior and the environmental
conditions under which it must be appeared should be demonstrated in the require-
ments specification [115] [17]. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE) [97] defines :
Risk. Is the combination of the probability of an irregular failure, and the conse-
quence(s) of failure to a systems components, users, or environment [105].
Hazard. Is a possible condition that can lead to a mishap [105].
Mishap. Is an unintended event or series of events that cause death, injury, occu-
pational illness, or loss equipment or property, or damage to the environment.
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Safety. “Is the freedom from those conditions that can result in injury, death,
occupational illness, or damage of equipment or property” [105].
2.4.2 Standards and Safety Life Cycle
The safety Life Cycle are considered to “form an adequate framework to identify,
allocate, structure, and control safety-related requirements”.[92]
Another definition of Safety Life Cycle (SLC) is “ An engineering process designed to
optimize the design of the safety instrumented system (SIS) and to increase safety”.
The purpose of SIS is to reduce risk from hazardous processes to a tolerable level[2].
The SLC concept has been included in many international standards, such as IEC
61508 and IEC 61511. The standard IEC 61508 focuses on the minimization of
systematic failures which can occur in Electric/Electronic/programmable electronic
safety-related systems (E/E/PES-SRS). The purpose of the IEC standard is to sup-
ply proper specification of safety requirements, design and development, installation
and operations of E/E/PE-SRS. Nevertheless, to properly specify safety require-
ments, we must take into account the hazard and risk analysis. The overview of the
lifecycle-based safety standard IEC 61508 is shown in the Figure 2.1 which illustrate
three phases of SLC . The first is the analysis part, the second is the realization part
and the final part is system operation [2][20][101].
The overall safety life cycle for IEC 61508 consists of sixteen phases as can be seen
in the Figure 2.1
• Analysis Part (phases 1-5)
This part focuses on identifing and estimating possible risks and hazards,
possible consequences, and availability of a layer of protection. It documents
all in the safety requirement specifications(SRS). The aim of the SRS is “ to
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Figure 2.1: Overall Safety Lifecycle [2]
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develop the specification requirements and safety integrity requirements, for
the E/E/PES safety related systems, other technology safety-related systems
and external risk reduction facilities, in order to achieve the required functional
safety”.[101].
• Realization Part (phases 6-12)
The first task of this part is to select the safety instrumented system technology
and architecture needed to meet the specification requirements. Developing
maintenance and test schedules to ensure that any possible failure can be
detected and repaired is an essential part of this planning step. The final
part of the realization phase is planning and executing systems installation,
commissioning and validation. This phase is the most resource-intensive part
of the overall SLC.
• Operation Part (phases 13-16)
This phase starts with validation of the design. The most important part
of this phase is maintenance and testing of the SIS. A suitable testing and
maintenance starts with good planning and relies on concrete documentation.
Effective management of change and decommissioning are also important in
this part. This part is considered the longest phase of SLC.
2.4.3 Common Hazard Analysis Techniques
Hazard analysis (HA) fits into the first phase of the SLC, the analysis phase.
In this phase, preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), failure modes effect analysis
(FMEA), fault tree analysis (FTA), and hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP)
would be performed along with layers of protection analysis to know the types of
hazards and their severity and how they occur. There are over 100 different HA
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techniques in existence. The most common analysis methods for SCSs are shown in
Table 2.5 and 2.6: [105][53]. These techniques aid in the detection of safety flaws,
design errors, and weaknesses of technical systems [144].
Bruns et al. [26] present the idea that fault trees can be used to check the validity
of safety-critical system models by comparing a system model with its fault trees
to aid in validating the failure behavior of the model. They express the meaning of
fault trees with temporal logic. The essential feature of their technique is that it
enables models and FTs to be compared even if some events in the FT are not found
in the system model. They use model checkers to check the consistency condition.
They employ a simple boiler system as an example to illustrate the technique.
Xiang et al. [159] introduce a formal fault tree construction method to avoid
limitation of traditional FTs which suffer from lack of formal semantics to check
correctness or consistency of the descriptions. They employ temporal logic with
real time restrictions to depict the events in fault trees. By finding and confirming
domain rules, they propose a fault regression method to deduce the sub events step
by step; temporal logic is used to prove the correctness of their method. Their
method is useful for building formal fault trees correctly, and for finding hidden
domain rules and overlook design defects at the design stage, giving the designers
the opportunity to correct their system design. A radio-based railroad crossing
control system is used to demonstrate their technique.
Gowen [65] introduces several techniques for dynamically verifying safety-critical
software systems by using fault trees and event trees as oracles for developing test
cases; moreover, these techniques focus only on the critical aspects of the system,
thus allowing developers to use their limited amount of testing resources efficiently
for verifying the critical aspects of the system. These techniques force developers to
specify testable events when building fault and event trees. They provide develop-
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Table 2.5: Common Analysis Techniques for SCSs [9, 105]
Type of Technique Explanation
Preliminary Hazard List Analysis
(PHL)
used for identifying and listing hazards and
mishaps in exist system. It is performed
during conceptual or preliminary design and
it is the starting point for all subsequent
HA. Every hazard identified on the PHL




describes the possible hazards of the sys-
tem. The safety risk associated with each
hazard is then evaluated by assessing the
probability and severity of events that could
result from the hazard. The next step in
addressing hazards is to define hazard con-
trols. Hazard controls are any design fea-




provides a methodology for analyzing in
greater depth the causal factors for hazards
previously identified by PHA. The SSHA
helps derive detailed system safety require-
ments for incorporating design safety meth-
ods into system design.
Hazard and Operability Analysis
(HAZOP)
used for identifying and analysing hazards
and operational concerns of system. It is
a very organized, structured for performing
hazard identification analysis of a system
from concept phase through decommission-
ing. This technique uses key guide words
(such as, more,no,less,etc.) and system dia-
grams to identify system hazards.
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Table 2.6: Continue: Common Analysis Techniques for SCSs [9, 105]
Type of Technique Explanation
Fault Tree Analysis(FTA) Falls under the system design hazard anal-
ysis type. It is a deductive safety analysis
technique which applied during the design
phase. A fault tree has a root which rep-
resents catastrophic failure or hazard. For
each hazard, the system is analyzed to re-
veal the possible causes of this failure. The
goal of the analysis is to find the minimal
cut set, which represents the basic events
that will cause the system to fail and which
cannot be reduced in number. The analysis
of a FT could be done either qualitatively or
quantitatively. Quantitative analysis com-
putes the probability of the occurrence of
the root node (hazard) from the probabil-
ity of the basic nodes. Qualitative analysis
shows the set of failures that should occur
together in order for the root node to occur
[49].
Failure Mode and Effects Analy-
sis (FMEA)
is a systematic process aimed at identifica-
tion and elimination of failure modes for
reliability improvement. It has to iden-
tify, rank, and compensate for known failure
modes of critical functions. It is bottom-Up
evaluation technique.
Failure Modes, Effects, and Crti-
cality Analysis (FMECA)
is performed during the conceptual design
phases of the system to guarantee that all
possible failure modes are considered and
the proper actions have been made to re-
move these failures. It is a technique used
to identify, prioritize, and eliminate possible
failures. The C in FMECA shows that the
criticality (or severity) of the various failure
effects are considered and ranked.
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ers a means for quantifying the testing of safety-critical systems via coverage of the
respective trees. Lastly, these techniques apply at the system level, the hardware
level, and the software level where fault trees or event trees are useful. Gowen uses
a microwave oven as an example.
Leveson et al. [28] present a technique for verifying the safety of complex, re-
altime software using Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA). SFTA forces the pro-
grammer to consider what the software is not supposed to do. It also starts from a
separate specification (the system fault tree) and therefore find errors in the software
requirements specification. They used Ada because it contains complex, real-time
programming facilities. The templates for Ada are presented along with an example
of applying the technique to an Ada program. The templates were designed by ex-
amining the statement semantics as defined in the Ada Language and by analyzing
the causes of errors. In each template, it is assumed that the statement caused
the critical event, and the tree is constructed by considering how this might have
occurred.
Liu [109] proposes an approach to applying fault tree analysis to verify satisfia-
bility, consistency, completeness, and accuracy properties of formal process specifi-
cations. He suggests three steps to be taken for the verification: (1) the derivation
of fault tree analysis from the specification, (2) the verification of all the leaf events,
and (3) the decision on whether the top event is definitely caused by its sufficient
leaf events based on the fault tree logic.
Cheng et al. [35] introduce a method for medical device assessment by using fail-
ure modes, mechanisms, and effects analysis to identify the root causes and failure
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mechanisms, which can enhance the designs and reliability of medical devices. Their
method aid medical device manufacturers to create an internal evaluation reports
for medical device evaluation.
Steinke et al. [149] propose that Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) should
be a standard component in the testing of software in medical devices that can have
life threatening consequences. The food and drug adimintration (FDA) require med-
ical devices manufacturers to use FMEA during the development of medical devices.
Cichocki et al. [38] present application of FMEA to a software intensive safety
related system. One of their aims is to extend FMEA in such a way that it can be
applied to software without significant changes in the overall method. The main of
the proposed extension is to base the FMEA process on formalised object oriented
specifications. By doing this they can better address the problems that are software
specific. Another aim is to fit the proposed method into the railway signalling sys-
tems developer.
Tribble et al.[152] use safety analysis techniques such as FTA and FMECA to
identify the properties of the software that are related to safety. They build the
model logic of a flight guidance system and Then, they used model checker to illus-
trate that all of the safety properties are mathematically verifiable properties of the
model.
Gofuku et al. [64] introduce automatic generation algorithms to generate FTA
trees and failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) sheets from the Multi-Level Flow
Modeling (MFM) models with the aim of assessing the MFM models. The multi-
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Level Flow Modeling (MFM) is a functional modeling technique that models dia-
grammatically a system . The MFM depicts models of a system in two dimensions.
The relations between system goals, sub-goals, and system functions to achieve
goals/sub-goals are represented by a means-end dimension . Automatic FTA/FMEA
makes the quality of FTA/FMEA stable and easy to update FTA/FMEA results in
system reconstruction and improvement. The authors confirmed the applicability
and the effects of the techniques through the development of a fuel injection system
of a launcher of middle-size space rockets.
We select these papers to show how it is essentail to include safety analysis
techniques in the begining of conceptual design. These techniques used to analyze
safety requirements of safety critical systems. They are introduced in the first part
of safety life cycle, analysis part. Using these techniques aids in detection of safety
flaws and design error.
2.5 Fault Injection
Fault injection provides a method of evaluating the dependability of a system
under test (SUT) by involving adding faults into a system and watching how a
system behaves in response to a fault. Fault injection aims to find whether the
response of the system matches its specifications, in the presence of a defined range of
faults. Normally, faults are injected in chosen system states, previously determined
by an initial system analysis. Fault injection techniques provide a way for fault




A fault is a deviation in a hardware or software component from its aimed
function. Most faults that arise before full system deployment are determined and
removed during testing. Faults that are not eliminated can reduce a systems de-
pendability.
Hardware/Physical Faults that produce during system operation are classified
into [163]:
• Permanent faults: Caused by irreparable component damage.
• Transient faults: Caused by environmental conditions. These faults are harder
to detect.
• Intermittent faults: Results from unstable hardware or varying hardware
states. They can be fixed by replacement or redesign.
Hardware faults of almost all types are easily injected by the devices available for
the task.
Software Faults are always the consequence of incorrect design, at specification or
at coding time. Many of these faults occur in the code and appear only during op-
eration. Most computer failures are results from either software faults or permanent
hardware faults. Faults can be created in every step during the process of software
development and these faults can be classified into: [163]
• Function faults: Incorrect or missing implementation that requires to correct
design change.
• Algorithm faults: Missing or incorrect implementation that can be repaired
without the need of design change.
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• Timing/serialization faults: Missing or incorrect serialization of shared re-
sources.
• Checking fault: Missing or incorrect validation of data, or incorrect loop, or
incorrect conditional statement.
• Assignment fault: Values assigned incorrectly or not assigned.
2.5.2 Fault Injection Techniques
Fault injection techniques are recognized as essential to validate the depend-
ability of a system [163]. Fault injection is used to test fault-tolerant systems or
components. Fault injection tests fault detection, fault isolation, reconfiguration
and recovery capabilities[78]. There are five categories of the techniques shown in
Table 5.3 along with their advantages and disadvantages.
2.5.3 Benefits of Fault Injection Techniques
• An understanding of the impacts of real faults and the associated behavior of
the target system in terms of functionality and performance.
• An evaluation of the efficacy of the fault tolerance techniques built into the
target system and thus feedback for their improvement correction.
• Estimating the failure coverage of fault tolerance mechanisms.
• Discovering the impacts of various workloads (different input profiles and en-
vironments) on the effectiveness of fault tolerance mechanisms.
• Identifying weak links in the design: For example parts of the system within
which a single fault could lead to severe consequences.
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Figure 2.2: Summary of main Advantages and Disadvantages of Fault Injection Tech-
niques [163]
• Studying the behavior of a system in the presence of faults [163].
Rimn et al. [135] present fault injection techniques for verifying, and validating
safety-critical distributed control systems. All producers of safety-critical systems
should be possible users of fault injection techniques. Examples of such producers
are found in the automotive, medical equipment and machine control industry. They
presented a fault model containing a set of five practical faults they injected into a
Controller Area Network (CAN)-based distributed control system.
Arlat et al. [11] compared and analyzed three physical techniques (heavy-
ion radiation, pin-forcing, and electromagnetic interferences) and one software-
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implemented technique (preruntime software-implemented fault injection (SWIFI))
to evaluate the fault tolerance features of the MARS fault tolerant distributed real-
time system. Their aim were to assess the coverage of the fail-silent assumption and
to assess the efficiency (i.e., the detection coverage) of the different built-in error
detection mechanisms (EDMs) aimed at supporting the fail silence property for the
distributed computing nodes of the MARS architecture. Fault tolerance in MARS
is based on fail-silent nodes operating in active redundancy and on sending identi-
cal messages on two redundant real-time buses. Fail silence is aimed to define the
behavior of a computer that fails cleanly by just stopping to send messages in case
a failure occurs. The evaluation of the fault injection techniques is supported by
using the EDMs in a MARS node as observers to describe the inaccurate behaviors
made by the faults injected by the techniques considered.
By using fault injection techniques, we can assess the safety of our model. We can
use these techniques to inject faults for mitigation testing. We use software-based,
and simulation-based techniques to show how a system behaves in the presence
of faults. We use software faults which results from incorrect design to show the
behavior of a system when fault is injected at some a behavioral states in a behavior
model. Therefore, by determining where the fault occurs (position of failure) and
the type of failure, we can use some of the mitigation patterns to mitigate these
failure and avoid adverse effects.
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2.6 Integration of Safety Analysis Techniques and
Behavior Models
Several approaches have tried to bridge the gap between fault tree and system
modeling.
Kaiser et al.[81] provide an approach to integrate behavioral states and events
into fault trees, which are called State/Event Fault Trees (SEFTs). SEFT adopts
the state/event concept to represent system behavior, and the fault tree concept to
describe the faults which are connected to states or events. Their technique allows
to integrate finite state models with FTs. Phenomena like temporal order of events
can be expressed by SEFTs, as are gates with memory (e.g. priority AND). The
component concept improved for component fault trees (CFTs) has been further
developed for SEFTs: each system may be decomposed into subcomponents. Using
ports to connect components (state ports or event ports). They transform com-
ponents into Deterministic and Stochastic Petri Nets (DSPNs) and combine them.
This enables quantitative probabilistic analysis of SEFTs. When the system is large
or complex, building SEFT can be difficult, time consuming and error-prone. The
technique also suffers from state-space explosion because they do not use any state-
space reduction. The resulting DSPN is not really readable. They used a fire alarm
system as an example to illustrate their approach. Iwu et al. [80] illustrate an
approach to developing SCSs by integrating Practical Formal Specification (PFS)
into the UML with various forms of safety analysis. PFS is useful for capturing
ideal behaviour and addressing component failures. It validates design information
against safety requirements. They decompose the system design into three model
views: architectural model, dynamic model and functional model . The architec-
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tural model describes the relationships between the components used in the system.
The dynamic and functional models describe the behaviour of individual compo-
nents. Their aim is to show the advantages of using the PFS method in modelling
the discrete aspects of software used in control systems. Another aim is to show how
parts of the three model views may be used as a basis for safety analyses. Safety
properties are expressed as PFS assumptions either as pre-and post-conditions of
a PFS contract. This way they integrate UML, safety analysis, and formal meth-
ods. To ensure consistency between models, healthiness conditions are generated
and proven by mathematical reasoning. An aircraft engine thrust reversal system
is used as an example to demonstrate their approach. Miguel et al. [40] introduce
a model driven development approach and the use of a platform-independent lan-
guage to bridge the gap between safety analyses (FTA and FMECA) and software
development languages such as UML. To support the direct application of safety
analysis to software architectures for the verification of safety requirements, they
used metamodels, model transformations and language refinements. The proposed
approach considers the following steps: (1) In a conceptual model, they identify the
main abstractions of architectures and the safety concepts that complement them
(2) The representation of these architectures in UML requires the identification of
UML modelling elements that support architectural concepts, and some UML exten-
sions to represent specific safety notions. (3) The same concepts must be depicted
in terms of safety analysis models. Thus define rules for the representation of archi-
tecture and safety concepts in models. Conceptual models depict the intermediate
internal models to support the mappings from annotated architectural models to
safety analysis models. If the failure of a function impacts critical safety goals, a
more disciplined process for this function is needed to limit the probability of devel-
opment faults. The advantages of their approach are: (1) include safety engineers in
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the architecture design from the beginning, increasing safety quality and reducing
cost (2) safety information is stored in a way that can be used not only for safety
analysis (3) data consistency management when changes in the architecture design
are translated into safety analyses, and safety properties are annotated in architec-
ture designs and (4) analysis automation. A flight plan system is used as an example
to illustrate their approach. Reif et al. [132] integrate FT and statecharts to ana-
lyze dependability of a radio-based level railroad crossing control system. They use
statemate, a toolset that supports modeling with activity-charts and statecharts.
The activity-charts depict the components of the system and the data flow among
these components. The statecharts define the functional behavior of these compo-
nents in terms of states and transitions. The analysis of the FT helped to identify
safety critical components and revealed a timing error in the model. Three benefits
result from combinating both techniques: (1) formal methods benefit from FTAs
systematic technique to build safety requirements. (2) FTA benefits from a formal
model due to its preciseness, and the option to formally prove correctness and com-
pleteness properties of fault trees. (3) The resulting system specifications fulfill two
related aspects of safety: correct functioning and fault tolerant design.
Ortmeier et al. [124] present a systematic approach to formally model failure
modes. The approach is combined with formal safety analysis. They construct a
model of the intended behavior of the system and then extend this model to also
capture failure modes. During the extension, modelling of failures is split into mod-
elling of occurrence patterns and of direct effects of failure modes. This allows to
uniformly model a large class of occurence patterns of failure modes (like transient,
persistent etc.). They provide construction rules which ensure that the initial func-
tional behavior is preserved. They use statemate statecharts to model the system.
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They analyze the system by using deductive cause-consequence analysis (DCCA).
DCCA is integrated into the presented failure model. In summary, they integrate
failure modes into the model of the functional system by first modeling how and
when the failure occurs. They model the direct, local effects of the failure. The
occurrence pattern of a failure mode describes under what situations a failure mode
arises. The most basic pattern is a transient failure mode, which can appear and
disappear completely random. Another common pattern is a persistent failure which
can occur randomly, but will stay forever once it has occurred. Failure charts (FCs)
are used to model occurrence patterns in a uniform manner. They apply the method
to a real world case study: a radio-based railroad crossing control system.
Ariss et al.[49] introduce an approach that integrates fault trees and statecharts
via a set of transformation steps that maintain semantics of both models. They
presented a set of conversion rules that transform gates of fault trees into statechart
notation. The proposed method consists of four steps for integrating one fault tree
into a system statechart. First, deduce the semantics of the FT. Second, define leaf
nodes in the FT. Third, deal with the semantic differences of the fault trees and
statecharts models by building a semantic table. Finally, transform the FT into
a statechart representation and then merge the failure with the system specifica-
tion. The integrated model (integrated functional and safety specification (IFSS),
shows how systems behave when a failure occurs. It aids in the determine system
constraints in order to mitigate failures or correct functional and safety specifica-
tions. The integrated model eliminates the difficulties that one can face through
use of separate models. Their approach helps to include safety into the software
design process at an early stage to facilite the automation process. Their approach
integrates one fault tree at a time. This helps to detect possible conflicts and in-
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consistencies between fault trees. In certain cases, the order in which fault trees are
integrated might produce different or incorrect IFSS models. This is the case only
when two or more failures cause a conflict to the system behavior. The integrated
model detects these conflicts and prevents inconsistencies in the system behavior.
The scalability of their technique relies on the scalability of FTs and statecharts.
A Gas burner example demonstrates their approach. Kim et al.[88] present rules
and algorithms to bridge the gap between hazard analysis and system specification
by transforming hazards from FTs to a state diagram. The method helps the engi-
neer to develop the primary events of the FT by matching them with elements of
the statechart, provides transformation rules, and deals with implicit transitions of
the statechart. They develop three steps for transforming the hazards: (1) identify
the types of primary events in the fault tree related to statechart. (2) develop the
rules to map the primary events and gates to UML statechart notation, and (3)
extracte information from the statechart that deals with properties (e.g., hierarchy
or orthogonality) of the diagram. The integrated model focuses on the causes of the
hazard and shows direct paths to the causes which helps to identify test scenarios.
They use a microwave oven as an example to illustrate their approach. The authors
of [49] and [88] both propose an approach to integrate fault trees and statecharts.
They differ in how integration is done. In addition, in [49] the authors consider FT
notations involving time or counters. In [88] each transformed state machine dia-
gram captures both explicit and implicit causes that trigger a hazard with respect
to normal behavior. Both have scalability issues.
Lu et al. [112] illustrate that by employing UML stereotypes in conjunction
with component-based software development techniques, safety related elements are
integrated into UML, to handle safety analysis during architecture design. The
elements in hazard analysis techniques are modeled by UML components. Safety
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related parameters are assigned to components as tagged values and constraints.
They show that an adoption of HazOp and FTA to UML component models may
provide a useful technique for hazard analysis and increase the chances of identify-
ing critical behavior to be analyzed, identifying which failures are most severe and
which components are the most critical. The advantages of their technique: (1)
The adaptation of HazOp and FTA to UML component models permits qualitative
and quantitative analyses at an early design stage, thereby increasing the chances
to identify critical behaviour to be analysed (2) A systematic determination which
hazards and failures are most serious, which components are the most critical ones
or which set of components requires a more detailed safety analysis, and which con-
sequences of the considered deviations are dangerous. They illustrate their method
by using a railroad crossing control system.
These techniques show how to combine safety models with functional modeling
for safety analysis purposes only, but not for testing. Many of the techniques that
integrate behavioral models with fault models have scalability issues or become
overly complex when faults can occur in many behavioral states, or many FTs need
to be integrated. Additionally, since some fault models are far less formal than the
behavioral models, compatibility issues can arise. They do not consider mitigation
modeling in a systematic way.
2.7 MBT with Integrated Models
Zimmermann et al. [164] present a method that generates test cases for risk-
based testing of safety critical systems. This is performed through the systematic
construction or enhancement of risk-based test models. They built a model of the
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system with all possible inputs and the expected output at a high level of abstrac-
tion by implementing the technique Sequence-Based Specification (SBS). By this
way, they derived a black-box model of the system under test (SUT) which de-
picted as a deterministic Mealy machine whose stimuli define the system inputs and
whose responses define the systems expected outputs. This model works as input
for constructing a usage model that defines the stimulation of the test object by
its enviroment from the viewpoint of the test object. Usage models have specific
states for the initialization and finalization of test cases. In this paper, they employ
Model-based Statistical Testing as model-based test technique. Statistical testing
employs markov chain test models to define the stimulation and usage profile of the
SUT. A Markov chain usage model is then created by annotating each model tran-
sition with a probability of occurring. This Markov chain represents a probability
distribution for all possible stimulus sequences. Random test cases are developed
from it according to this distribution. Only critical test cases are generated from re-
fined test models. An alarm system used as an example to demonstrate the method.
Also, they show and evaluate their model on the test model for a railway crossing
control system (RCCS). Two safety requirements result from an FMEA identifying
train collisions as the main system hazard. The limitation of their method is that
they do not present how to rank the critical transition in the test models.
Sanchez et al. [57] propose an approach to generate test cases based on inte-
grating FT with statecharts. They use FTA to describe how component failures
or subsystems can combine to affect system behavior. They integrate the results
of the analysis expressed in terms of Duration Calculus with a statechart. As a
result, they obtain a testing model that shows the way the system behave when
failures occur. The construction of the testing model is done by calculating the cut
sets that can lead to the failure state from a FT. For each cut set, they construct
67
a testing model by using statecharts and conversion rules. Conversion rules are
used to transform the duration calculus (DC) formula into statecharts. Then, they
derive test cases using this statechart based model. This integrated models tend
to be large. Hence they attempt to reduce the statechart using slicing techniques.
First, they construct an abstract syntax tree from statechart as input for the slicing
algorithm. The slicing algorithm is performed by a traversal the tree, that begins
at the node of interest, and then traverses and marks the branches that represent
sequences that need to be included in the slice. A slice includes all states and transi-
tions present in a given cut set by analyzing a formula that describes a cut set, then
perform the marking of the statechart. They mark all states and all target states
of all transitions created, modified or referred to in a formula. Finally, they apply
the slicing algorithm based on the marking, and obtain a statechart that includes
the portions that contribute to reach hazard. Then, they transform the state dia-
grams into Extended Finite State Machines (EFSM) and use state coverage criteria
to obtain the test sequences. The limitation of this method is that they integrate
only one cut set with statecharts to determine how the system behaves when a fault
occurs. Furthermore, they cannot guarantee to have FT that is complete which
means that it includes all possible causes of the hazard. By integrating the FT with
statecharts, they can face the problem of heterogeneous mismatching. Transforming
the statechart into EFSM makes the system grow very fast (Scalability issue). A
Gas Burner example illustrates their approach.
Kloos et al. [91] present an approach to test the implementation of safety func-
tions in a safety-critical software system. They focus on the derivation of test cases
from the combination of fault trees and base model of a system. They use the results
of FTA during the construction of test models, such that test cases can be derived,
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selected and prioritized according to the severity of the identified risks and the
number of basic events that cause it. They classify the basic events into forceable,
controllable, recognizable, and observable. To build test model, they used stimulus
or sequence of them. They provide a description of how the new input can be added
to the base model if the input corresponding to the event are not part of the model .
This description contains rules about which states the stimulus may occur and how
to handle the stimulus. The advantage of the technique is that the safety function
is tested in various states of operation. The limitation of their technique is that the
number of event sets in a fault tree is large. As results, it is hard to derive test cases
for each single event set. In addition, they would face the problem of state space
explosion because they add states and transitions for combinations of inputs that
don’t occur during normal operation.
Nazier et al. [120] present an approach for generating risk-based test cases by
integrating FTA into statecharts. Risk information derived from FTA (basic events
and minimal cut sets), are incorporated into system statecharts. The basic events
are stored in the Mapping Table, a user-filled table that explain the meaning of
the basic events. By categorizing the basic events and associating with the state-
chart elements, the tester has the essential information needed for the integration
process. Classifications of basic events avoids ambiguity of basic events by defining
their events boundaries and complexity. Relevant elements of the FT are defined,
evaluated, and mapped to elements of the behavior model. Finally, once the ta-
ble is filled, the Risk-based Test Model is created. It depicts the system regular
and critical behaviors. Then the newly generated model is checked for correcttness,
completeness and consistence using a model checker. The derivation of test cases is
done by using special queries. These queries check if the system likely in a critical
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state. The queries performed by the model checker are either provided manually by
the tester or built by the method. The model checker offers traces which are used
as Risk-based Test Cases. Several challenges arise as safety analysis and system be-
havior models have heterogeneous annotations. The first problem is the difference
of safety analysis and system behavior model representations. Secondly, it is hard
to interpret and map safety analysis elements to elements of the system behavior
model. Thirdly, safety analysis elements can be ambiguous (e.g. when a valve is bro-
ken, it could be opened while it is actually closed or vice versa). They demonstrate
the approach using a gas burner system.
All previous works propose techniques to generate test cases for safety-critical
systems (SCSs) by building the test model. The test model either results from
integrating safety analysis techniques such as FTA with a behavioral model (BM),
such as statecharts, or use the results of FTA during construction of test models.
These techniques face compatability issue since some fault models are far less formal
than the behavioral models. These techniques face state space explosion (scalability
issue) due to the integrating. They do not consider mitigation modeling at all.
However, my technique is used to test safety critical systems with respect to both
regular functionality and fail-safe behavior. Its advantages include:
• It leverages existing behavioral test suites.
• It systematically constructs safety mitigation models based on commonly oc-
curring mitigation patterns.
• It defines failure coverage criteria.
• It provides mechanisms to construct safety mitigation tests.




Safety critical systems (SCSs) have requirements that require safety faults have
to be identified, removed and mitigated. Mitigating failures allows a system to
continue operations at a reduced level rather than failing completely. Since our
objective is MBT for SCSs, we need to provide test ready models for mitigation be-
haviors. Many mitigations follow a common pattern, like a safety-shutdown, trying
alternatives, and omitting functionality that has become dangerous,etc. While no
work on mitigation models for SCSs exists, exception handling patterns have been
defined for process modeling.
2.8.1 Exception handling Patterns
Process modeling enables for analysis and enhancement of processes that inte-
grate people and tools working together to perform a mission. Process modeling
usually concentrates on the normative process, that is, how the collaboration works
when everything goes as wished. A complete analysis of a process should also detail
what to do when exceptional situations rise.
Lerner et al. [102] found that there are patterns that capture the relationship
between exception handling mission and the normative process. He identifies sev-
eral, like presenting other alternatives, inserting behavior, skipping some tasks, or
aborting the current processing. They focus on the composition of the exception
handling tasks with normal tasks to identify higher level patterns. Exception han-
dling is a common approach for fault tolerance in software systems.
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Avizienis et al.[12][13] classify faults into eight classes as shown in Figure 2.3. Their
taxonomy of error handling and fault handling (fault tolerance) includes techniques
such as rollback, rollforward, and compensation as shown in Figure 2.4.
 
Figure 2.3: Fault Taxonomy [12][13]
Ye et al.[162] describe a systematic approach to allow the selection of suitable
mitigation strategies (to make the system fail safe) according to a taxonomy of com-
ponent failure types. With their approach, an unreliable component can be employed
within a critical application with increased confidence. Eles et al. [52] consider
hard real-time safety-critical applications in distributed embedded systems. They
consider two different fault-tolerance techniques: process-level checkpointing with
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Figure 2.4: Fault Tolerance Techniques [12][13]
rollback recovery, which provides time-redundancy, and active replication, which
provides space-redundancy. They address transient faults. Fault tolerant schedules
are created based on a conditional process graph representation. They state that
in order to reduce cost of hardware replication, other techniques are used such as
software replication, recovery with checkpointing, and re-execution.
2.8.2 Safety Critical Systems
2.8.2.1 Automotive Systems
Ermagan et al.[54] define a base failure taxonomy for reactive systems in gen-
eral and automotive systems in particular as shown in Figure 2.5. They categorize
failure types into software failures or hardware failures,permanent versus temporary
failures and nonoccurrence behavior versus unexpected behavior of the system.
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They added detection and mitigation strategies to make the system capable of ad-
dressing failures. A Central Locking System (CLS) is used as a case study to demon-
strate the efficacy of their models in developing a fail-safe automotive system.
 
Figure 2.5: A Taxonomy of Automotive Failure [54]
Donmez et al.[46] introduce a taxonomy of mitigation strategies for driver dis-
traction as a framework to handle the driver distraction problem systematically.
They organize strategies in categories that focus on critical design tradeoffs that
should be taken into account in their implementation. Medikonda et al.[115] in-
troduce a framework for software safety based on McCalls software quality model
that defines software safety criteria in safety critical applications. Redundancy and
diversity are the main ways to remove hazards in systems. Hardware detection and
control contains mechanisms such as fail-safe designs, self-tests, exception handling,
warnings to operators or users, and reconfigurations. Their framework is applied to
railroad crossing control system (RCCS). The aim of the design was to mitigate the
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hazards defined in the preliminary system-level hazard analysis. Another purpose
was avoid possibility of single point failure. This was accomplished by using a re-
dundant controller that captures control of the system if the main controller fails
unexpectedly. Chaaban et al. [29] propose the development of an embedded archi-
tecture for a safety steer-by-wire system using a Flexray-based ECU network. They
identify the system architecture, redundancy of Electronic Control Unit (ECU), sen-
sors, actuators and their implementation. Safety analysis considers hardware and
software failures. Reliability, is considered by employing multiple redundancy in
the system. They use dynamic reconfiguration to modify the configuration of the
system during run time. Krishnamurthy et al. [96] describe widely used fault tol-
erant design techniques in automotive systems. They investigate how fault tolerant
techniques help to enhance the overall dependability of the system. They presented
common design techniques that are used in the design of fail-safe sensors and actua-
tors. Steer-by-wire is used as a case study. Manzone et al. [114] present an overview
of the techniques and structures used in the automotive environment to guarantee a
good degree of fault tolerance both for complete systems and for integrated circuits.
Chakraborty [30] presents general concepts employed in designing reliable fault tol-
erant system. He defines a fault tolerant fail-safe system elaborated for the Indian
Railway Signalling System.
2.8.2.2 Medical Devices
Subramanian et al. [150] present patterns of safety fault mitigation in medi-
cal devices which propose appropriate fault mitigation processes and techniques for
diverse safety situations. They classify the patterns into two categories, Process
Patterns, and Technique Patterns. They also discuss the process of mitigation and
factors affecting the usage of these patterns. Fechter et al.[56] use Failure Mode Ef-
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fect Analysis (FMEA) to reduce the risk connected with health care delivery. They
conducted FMEA for the use of infusion pumps at UCSF medical center. The use
of infusion pumps was identified as the area of highest risk. They defined sixteen
possible failure modes, including their possible causes and effects, and assigned a
risk priority number to each based on their severity, probability, and detectability of
the failure. They perform cause analyses and propose recommended actions (mitiga-
tion) for each failure mode. Cheng et al.[35] introduce a technique for medical device
assessment by employing failure modes, mechanisms, and effects analysis (FMMEA)
to identify the causes and failure mechanisms, which can enhance the designs and
reliability of medical devices. This technique can also help medical device manufac-
turers to create internal assessment reports for medical device evaluation. FMEA
or failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) methodologies outline
procedures to define and assess the possible failure of a product and its effects and
to identify actions (mitigations) that could remove or reduce the possibility of the
failure to occur. FMMEA is a tool to support physics-of-failure based design for
reliability. FMMEA improves the value of traditional FMEA methods by determin-
ing the high priority failure mechanisms to create an action plan to mitigate their
effects. Steinke et al.[149] recommend that Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FEMA)
as a standard component in the testing of software in medical devices that can have
life threatening consequences. FMEA finds important errors and troubles earlier on
in the system development process and should be part of the process before medical
devices are approved by the FDA. FMEA is a successful risk mitigation tool and it
provides for a assessment of the most serious failures and hazards.
Fu et al. [59] shows that problems in medical device software result from a fail-
ure to apply systems techniques, mainly during specification of requirements and
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analysis of human factors. Fu states a set of recommendations to increase the reli-
ability of medical devices.
All previous work talks about fault tolerance techniques and how to mitigate
failures in SCSs to reduce risks and let systems to contionue operation at reduce
level rather than failing completely. However, they did not address how to construct
and apply the mitigation in a system. There are no mitigation models described.
In my researh, explicit mitigation model for which we generate mitigation paths
which are then woven at selected failure points into the original test suite to create
failure-mitigation tests (safety mitigation test) is described.
2.9 Regression Testing
When a software is modified, a testing process have to be applied which is called
regression testing (RT). It entails retesting all or part of a software system after
it is modified, depending on different regression testing strategies. Retest all and
selective regression testing strategies are the two basic approaches for regression
testing. The set of tests running through a regression test is the regression test
suite [156]. A retest all strategy tests the system all over again, assuming that
changes could have affected and introduced errors anywhere in the code. However,
a selective regression testing strategy assumes that only parts of the software could
have been affected by modifications; therefore, a subset of the original test suite
needs to be selected for regression testing. The aim of selective regression testing
is to reduce the effort and time of regression testing while maintaining the efficacy
of the test suite in revealing faults [156]. For either strategy, the tester may need
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to develop new tests to exercise new features of software that are not covered by
existing tests. A typical selective retest technique proceeds as follows according to
Rothermerl and Harrold [139]:
1. Identify changes that occur in a system.
2. Determine which of the existing test cases will remain valid for the new version
of the software (eliminate all tests that are no longer applicable this results
in a set of tests T’, a subset of the original test suite T).
3. Test the modified software with T’.
4. Generate new test cases T” to test parts of the software that are not tested
adequately with T’. What it means to test adequately depends on the test
criterion chosen.
5. Execute the modified software with T”.
Steps 2 and 3 test if the changes have broken any existing functions. Steps 4 and 5
test whether the modifications work. T’ is determined based on the categorization
of existing test cases and the regression testing approach.
There are two types of regression testing: code-based and specification based
regression testing. These techniques complement each other. Most regression test
techniques are code-based (i.e. these techniques select test cases using source code
of the original and modified programs.) Code-based regression test selection is good
for unit testing, but it has a scalability problem [33]. There exists limited research
on specification-based regression testing techniques. Most of these techniques select
regression tests using only the modified system specification [94]. Selective testing
strategies are classified as Minimization, Coverage, and prioritization approaches
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according to Rothermel and Harrold [138][137] . This classification is based on how it
is determined which parts of the software have been affected by changes and to what
extent and how they have to be retested. In minimization approaches [33, 70, 123]
the goal is to reduce the size of test suites by determining and removing redundant
test cases. Coverage approaches [14, 22, 69, 104, 129, 136, 156] rely on coverage
criteria, but do not require minimization. Instead, they assume that a second but
equally important goal of regression testing is to rerun tests that could produce
different output, and they use coverage criteria as a guide in selecting such tests.
Prioritization approaches schedule test cases for execution in an order that attempts
to increase the chance of early fault detection[137]. Prioritization techniques let
testers arrange their test cases so that those test cases with the highest priority,
are executed earlier in the regression testing process than lower priority test cases.
There are many goals of prioritization such as [137]:
1. raise the rate of fault detection of a test suite-that is, the likelihood of revealing
faults earlier in a run of regression tests using that test suite.
2. increase the coverage in the system under test at a faster rate.
3. raise confidence in the reliability of the system under test.
4. increase the rate at which high-risk faults are detected by a test suite.
5. increase the chance of revealing faults related to specific code changes earlier
in the regression testing process.
Rothermel and Harrold [138] introduce a framework to compare and evaluate
regression test selection techniques. They analyze each test selection method based
on five properties ( inclusiveness, precision, efficiency, generality, and accountabil-
ity) in which selective retest approaches can be compared and evaluated. The first
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three measures are quantitative. Generality and accountability are qualitative. An-
drews et.al[113] extend this framework by adding safety as the sixth property of the
framework.
RT is a major component in the maintenance phase where the software system
may be corrected, adapted to new environment, or enhanced to improve its perfor-
mance. During enhancement, adaptive, or perfective maintenance, the specification
of the system is modified by introducing new functionality. However, in corrective
maintenance, the specification is not changed, but there may be new code [103]. Le-
ung and White [103] introduce the notions of progressive and corrective regression
testing. Progressive regression testing deals with adaptive maintenance and per-
fective maintenance and in general whenever the specification is modified, whereas
corrective regression testing deals with corrective maintenance. The purposes of
RT are to check that new or modified functionality works, to ensure the continuous
working of the unmodified parts of the software, and to validate that the modified
software as a whole functions correctly [103]. We are primarily interested in MBT,
specifically, black-box testing, hence are not interested in white box approaches to
RT. Leung and White [103] classify test cases into five categories after a modification
is made to the software:
1. Reusable test cases (Rt): These test cases are testing unchanged parts of the
specification. Reusable test cases need not be rerun because they will give the
same results as previous tests.
2. Retestable test cases (Tt): Those test changed code against an unchanged
specification.
3. Obsolete test cases (Ot)- This class contains test cases that can no longer be
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used. A test case may become obsolete if a test case identifies an incorrect
input/output relation because of a modification to specification.
4. New-structural test cases (St) - This category includes structural-based test
cases that test the changed software constructs. They are usually designed to
rise the structural coverage of the software. Since we deal with black box test,
we do not care about these.
5. New-specification test cases (Nt) - It includes only specification-based test
cases. These test cases test functionality related to the modified part of a
specification.
2.9.1 Model-based Regression Testing
Chen et al. [33] describe a black-box method for regression test selection. They
use UML activity diagrams for describing behaviors and to generate test cases.
Chen et al. identify two types of changes. The first consists of code changes that
do not affect the system behavior. These changes cannot be identified through the
activity diagram. The second group consists of changes that affect system behavior.
These changes represented as added/deleted nodes and edges in the activity dia-
gram. These nodes and edges are considered affected nodes and edges. The affected
edges are identified by comparing the original and the modified activity diagrams.
In addition to added/deleted edges, all edges that point to an affected node are
also considered as affected edges. Finally, test cases that traverse affected edges are
selected as targeted tests. They categorize regression tests as: i) Targeted Tests
are those that would test the modified parts of the program to guarantee correct
functionality. ii) Safety Tests, which are risk-directed, and guarantee that risks are
properly addressed. Chen et al. approach has two main steps. First they traverse
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the activity diagram to identify affected edges. Then they select test cases that ex-
ecute these affected edges to generate targeted tests. Their test selection technique
is based on risk analysis model. Chen et al. calculate risk exposure (RE) and select
safety tests. The mathematical formula is RE(f) = P (f) × C(f), where RE(f) is
the risk exposure of function f, P (f) is the probability of a fault occurring in func-
tion f and C(f) is the cost if a fault is executed in function f in operational mode.
They select test cases with the highest RE value and execute them on the modified
program. The final selected regression test suite is the union of the targeted and
safety tests. They applied their approach to three components of IBM WebSphere
Commerce 5.4 to evaluate the effectiveness, cost-efficiency, and sensitivity to risk of
their approach.
Orso et al. [123] present an investigation of whether component metadata can
be used to support and improve the cost-effectiveness of software engineering tasks
for component-based applications. They introduce an approach similar to Chen et
al. [33] approach for regression test selection, but they use a statechart diagram in-
stead. Their approach has two basic stages: (1) Identifying the differences between
the new and the old versions of statecharts. (2) Selecting test cases that exercise the
changed sections. Orso et al. suggest the use of the incremental composition and
reduction (ICR) method to construct a global statechart of the system. The ICR
method addresses the state explosion problem by avoiding all unreachable states at
the composition step and removing all replicated states from the global statechart
diagram. They use a vending machine as an example to illustrate their approach.
Briand et.al [22] [24] present regression testing technique using use case, se-
quence, and class diagrams. They provide definitions for the types of changes
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in a class diagram (e.g.added/deleted attribute, changed attribute, added/deleted
method etc.), use case diagrams, and sequence diagrams. Changes are identified
in these diagrams and their impact on the baseline test suite is analyzed. Briand
et.al categorize changes based on the associated diagrams. Each change category is
further classified and for each class of change in each category, mathematical for-
malization is provided using set operations. Each identified change is assigned to a
specific change class based on the diagram that reflected the change and the nature
of the change and each change can be related to a test case. Then each test case is
categorized into sets of obsolete, reusable, or retestable test cases. They apply their
methodology, using the RTSTool, on two versions of a real system developed by a
Telecom company.
Korel et.al [94] introduce a requirement-based regression test suite reduction ap-
proach that used dependence analysis of a given EFSM model to reduce the size of
a regression test suite (RTS). The authors construct the EFSM dependence graph
where nodes represent EFSM transitions and directed edges represent EFSM data
and control dependencies. They find the difference between the original and modi-
fied model based on a set of elementary modifications (EMs): addition or deletion
of a transition. For each EM, they used regression test reduction strategies that use
EFSM dependence analysis to reduce the RTS by eliminating repetitive tests. The
selective testing techniques (such as transition, path, constrained path coverage) are
used to selectively test each EM. The aim of testing addition of a transition is to
test whether the new (added) transition performs as expected. However, the goal
of testing deletion of a transition is to test whether the deleted transition does not
cause unintended affects and the system performs correctly in the situations when
the deleted transition was involved. The union of RTSs generated for every EM
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constitutes the regression test suite. Three interaction patterns are computed when
a model is modified: (1) affecting interaction pattern reflecting the impacts of the
EM on the EFSM model, (2) affected interaction pattern reflecting the effects of
the EFSM model on the EM, (3) side-effect interaction pattern reflecting the side-
effects introduced by the EM. These three interaction patterns of each test case are
calculated based on these modifications and the test suite is reduced based on these
interaction patterns. Interaction patterns are used to reduce the original test suite.
During the traversal of each test case in the given RTS, up to 3 × r interaction
patterns are computed, where r is the cardinality of the set of EMs. They included
only those test cases where at least one of their 3 × r interaction patterns is not
produced for any other test case in the reduced RTS. Korel et.al [94] goal is to
reduce a test suite by finding equivalent test cases (these tests exhibit the same in-
teractions or the same pattern of interactions ) with respect to the transition under
test and removing these tests from the selective test suite. They do not determine
the effectiveness of the approach and fault detection capability of the reduced test
suites. They illustrate their approach using an ATM system.
In order to reduce the cost of regression testing, researchers have proposed the use
of test-suite reduction techniques which aim to reduce the size of a test suite with
respect to some criteria. The test suite reduction becomes possible when we have
equivalent tests. These tests show the same interactions or the same pattern of
interactions.
Chen et.al [34] present a regression test suite (RTS) reduction method for a given
set of elementary modifications (i.e., additions, deletions, and changes of transitions)
on an EFSM model based on dependence analysis. Their method is an extension of
the work of Korel et al.[94] for test suite reduction. They characterize three types of
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interaction patterns and twelve types of new dependence per modification (NDPMs)
to capture the impacts of the model on the EMs, the effects of the EMs on the model,
and the side-effects caused by the EMs. The effects of the model on the modifica-
tion and the effects of the modification on the model indicate direct interactions
between the modification and the EFSM model. The side-effects indicate interac-
tions between parts of the EFSM model which are not modified. Therefore, the first
two types of regression testing ensure that the changed parts of the SUT behave as
intended, and the third type of regression testing ensures that the unchanged parts
of the SUT are not affected adversely. Chen et.al define interaction patterns as an
abstraction from interactions that repeat between transitions of the model w.r.t. a
transition that represents an EM. Their RTS reduction method eliminates test cases
that do not cover unique interaction patterns in a given EFSM model due to a given
set of EMs from a given RTS. The reduced RTS still facilitates testing both direct
effects of the EMs on the changed parts of the system under test (SUT) and indirect
effects of the EMs on the unchanged parts of the SUT. They also used the ATM
system.
Both Chen et.al [34] and Korel et.al [94] are interested in modifications to transi-
tions instead of states. Chen et.al[34] differ from Korel et.al [94] in terms of coverage.
Firstly, Korel et.al approach considers only two types of EMs ( an addition or dele-
tion of a transition.) They represent any change in a transition by a pair of deletion
of the existing transition and addition of a replacing transition. However, unless
the starting or terminating state of a transition needs to be changed, expressing
any other change in a transition by a pair of deletion and addition becomes costly.
Conversely, Chen et.al [34] consider such changes as another type of EM (change
in a transition.) Secondly, although Korel et al. defined some data and control
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dependences arising from each EM on the EFSM model, some dependence types
were not identified. However, Chen et.al adopt the notions presented in Korel et.al
work, utilize and revise some of their definitions for control and data dependences,
and define new dependences that have not been identified by Korel et al. Using
these revised and new definitions of dependences, Chen et.al refined the definitions
of interaction patterns. In addition, Korel et al. does not notice that an added
transition may also cause introduction of new control dependences (CDs) between
other transitions. Korel et al. stated that addition of a new transition cannot cause
deletion of existing dependences between parts of the model but Chen et.al do not
agree with this statement. Added transitions can cause existing CDs between other
transitions to be eliminated. As for elimination of existing data dependences (DDs),
Chen et.al agree with Korel et al. that it is not possible for existing DDs between
other transitions to be eliminated because addition of a transition can only cause
creation of new paths. Korel et al.does not notice that a deleted transition ti may
also cause elimination of existing CDs where ti was dependent on another transition.
This is captured by a new CD type Chen et.al introduce and call affecting ghost
control dependence. Also, Korel et al. does not notice that a deleted transition ti
may also cause elimination of existing CDs where some transitions were dependent
on ti. This is captured by a new CD type Chen et.al introduce and call affected
ghost control dependence. Chen et.al observe that deleting a transition can cause
introduction of new CDs between other transitions which was not noticed by Korel
et al. Moreover, they observe that a deleted transition may also cause existing CDs
between other transitions to be eliminated. In order to capture the elimination of
existing CDs related to a deleted transition ti, Chen et.al need to revise the defini-
tion of Activation ghost control dependence(GCD). Chen et.al only deal with minor
changes on a transition ( changes to an input variable (i), condition (c),output (o),
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or action (a) of a transition.) Since they only deal with trivial changes on tran-
sition, a changed transition will not introduce new paths, or cause existing paths
to be deleted in a modified EFSM model. Therefore, it cannot introduce new CDs
nor cause elimination of existing CDs. On the other hand, a changed transition
may cause introduction of new DDs, or cause existing DDs to be eliminated because
minor changes to a transition alter defs or uses of variables.
Farooq et al. [79] introduce a methodology for regression test selection using
UML state machines and class diagrams. Their approach concentrates on finding
the effect of changes in class diagram on state machines and finally on the test
suite. They have defined changes in baseline and delta versions of the class diagram
(Class-driven Changes) and state machine (State-driven Changes). They applied
their method on a case study of Student Enrolment System to prove the applicabil-
ity of their approach.
Andrews et al. [6] propose a cost-benefit tradeoff framework to find whether
brute force regression or selective regression testing is better. Their framework
takes into account various cost factors that are associated with software artifact
analysis and technique application. They category tests into reusable, retestable,
and obsolete and classify types of changes that could occur (add, delete, and modify
node or edge). To generate test cases they used FSMWeb model as the behavioral
model. They apply the framework to an example that has various change scenarios
in the FSMWeb model and analyze the cost-benefit tradeoffs for the brute force and
selective techniques, which vary with the amount of change and the effect of model
changes.
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Andrews et al. [4] present a black-box regression testing technique for FSMWeb
for web applications. They offers selective regression testing based on FSMWeb.
They also introduce a set of rules to determine and categories regression testing
that requires to be used based on types of modifications to web applications. Air
Travel Service (ATS) example is used to show how to apply these rules by using a




We construct safety mitigation tests (SMTs) from an existing behavioral test
suite, using an explicit mitigation model for which we generate mitigation paths
which are then woven at selected failure points into the behavioral test suite to
create failure-mitigation tests (safety mitigation tests).
3.1 Process
Our goal is to provide an MBT approach to test proper mitigation of safety
failures in SCSs. Because of some scalability and complexity issues in integrating
behavioral and fault models, we decided to not integrate behavioral, fault, and mit-
igation models. This also has the advantages that one can generate a behavioral,
functional test suite as usual, using a behavioral model of choice, such as a UML
sequence diagram, activity diagram, EFSM, CEFSM, etc,. Any of a member of
graph-based testing criteria from [3] can be used. We then use a fault model and
fault-coverage criteria to determine what fault is to be injected at which point in
the behavioral test suite. Mitigation models describe mitigation patterns associated
with a fault. Mitigation test criteria describe required coverage. Mitigation test
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paths are then generated and woven into the behavioral test similar to aspect ori-
ented modeling [147]. Weaving rules describe how a mitigation test path is woven
into the original behavioral test. The test generation process is illustrated in Figure
3.1. The safety critical testing process then has the following phases:



















Generate Fail-Safe Tests/ Safety Mitigation Test (SMT)Phase 4
Weaving 
Rules (WR)
Figure 3.1: Process Model
1. Construct a behavioral test suite BT from the behavior model BM, using
behavior test criteria BC.
2. Construct mitigation test suites MT from mitigation models MM, using miti-
gation criteria MC.
3. Select positions of failure (p) in test suite (BT), and type of failure (e) (failure
scenarios). Select (p,e) using failure coverage criteria FC.
4. Construct a safety mitigation test suite SMT using the behavioral test suite
(BT), point of failure (p), type of failure (e) and mitigation test suite (MT)
according to weaving rules (WR).
We describe each phase in detail in the following subsections.
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3.2 Phase 1: Behavioral Model BM and Behav-
ioral Test BT
Although a wide range of behavioral models exist, we illustrate our approach
using communicating extended finite state machines (CEFSMs). We can also con-
sider CEFSMs as a collection of extended finite state machines that are interacting
with each other. A Communicating Extended Finite State Machine (CEFSM) is
defined as a tuple [107]: CEFSM = (EFSM, Channel), including a set of EFSMs
and a set of channels. For full formal semantics see [21]. We already have the
formal definition of CEFSM in the previous chapter. We use CEFSM to show the
interaction between behavioral processes and failure processes. Test criteria such as
edge-coverage, prime-path coverage, etc.[3] can be defined. Using any of a number
of test path generation techniques, test paths can then be generated that fulfill these
coverage criteria. Let BT= {t1, . . . tl} be the set of such paths.
A number of papers explain how to generate test cases using CEFSM. Li et
al.[107] introduce a method to generate tests automatically from system specifica-
tions modeled with CEFSMs. [73], Hessel et al. propose an algorithm that generates
a test suite that covers all feasible coverage items (a set of items to be covered) via
reachability analysis. In [19], Bourhfir et al. introduce automatic generation of test
cases for systems modeled by CEFSM. Test cases are generated for the global system
( set of several CEFSMs) by performing a complete reachability analysis.
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3.3 Phase 2: Determine Points of Failure
Let the set of failures F be defined as {f1, f2, f3, . . . fk}. A failure is injected
into the system by manipulating parameters that indicate to the Software Under
Test (SUT) that a particular failure has occurred (obviously, we do not want a
failure event like a gas leak to occur in Vivo). This is modeled by inserting a failure
injection action directly at the point of failure in the test suite. Let CT be the
concatenation of test paths in BT. That is CT= t1 ◦ t2 ◦ t3 . . . tl. Let len(t) be the
number of nodes in t. Then I = len(CT)=
∑l
i=1 len(ti). The position of failure p
(see Figure 3.2) is a node in a test in the behavioral test suite where the system has
failed and indicates a point of failure (1≤ p ≤ I ). We are also selecting failure type
e (1 ≤ e ≤ |E| ) to apply at the point of failure p. Hence we are selecting (p, e) such
that node-failure coverage criteria are met. Note that not all combinations (p, e) are
applicable since not all failures are possible or relevant in every node. Therefore, we
define a node-failure applicability matrix A(i,j).
A(i,j)=

1, if failure type j applies in node i in S
0, otherwise
Let si = node(p) that is si is the behavioral node in the test suite at position
p. Obviously there has to be at least one state in the behavioral model where a
given fault applies. Hence no row in the failure applicability matrix can have all
zeros. Hence for a given failure type j there must be some node s such that A(i,j) is
true. Failure coverage criteria FC for selecting (p, e) need to be defined next. What










Figure 3.2: Position of Failure in Behavioral Test
1. Criteria 1: All combinations, i.e. all positions p, all applicable failure types e
(test everything). This is clearly infeasible for all but the smallest models. It
would require |I| × |F | pairs if A contains all ”1”s.
2. Criteria 2: All unique nodes, all applicable failures. This only requires∑k
j=1
∑|S|
i=1 (A(i,j)=1) combinations i.e. the number of one entries in the
applicability matrix. When some nodes occur many times in a test suite only
one needs to be selected by some scheme. This could lead to not testing failure
recovery in all tests. A stronger test criterion is to require covering each test
as well.
3. Criteria 3: All tests, all unique nodes, all applicable failures. Here we simply
require that when unique nodes need to be covered they are selected from tests
that have not been covered. A weaker criterion is not to require covering all
applicable failures for each selected position.
4. Criteria 4: All tests, all unique nodes, some failures(only one failure per posi-
tion, but covering all failures). Some failure means that collectively all failures
must be paired with a position at least once, but not with each selected posi-
tion as in Criteria 3.
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AlgorithmForSelecting (p, e) Pairs






PESET= PESET ∪ (p,e)
Return PESET
End
Example: This example shows the differences between the four types of cover-
age criteria for all combinations (p, e). Suppose we have a test suite that has three
test cases T= {t1,t2,t3} where each test case contains a path.
t1 = {s1, s2, s3, s4}
t2 = {s1, s2, s1, s3, s1, s4}
t3 = {s2, s4, s3, s2, s3, s4}.
CT= t1 ◦ t2 . . . tl = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s1, s2, s1, s3, s1, s4, s2, s4, s3, s2, s3, s4}. I= [1,16].
Assume we have four applicable failures F= {f1, f2, f3, f4}. |F | =4 failures and we
have four failure types E=[1,4]. The applicability matrix is shown in Table 3.1.
Tables 3.2-3.5 show (p, e) pairs marked with ”1” that, if selected, would collectively
meet the associated test criteria.
Table 3.2 required combinations for all positions, all applicable failures. Criteria
1 would need |I| × |F | minus the zeros entries (not applicable) in Table 3.2. This
requires 16 × 4 - 12 =64-12=52 pairs. For a tiny model with only 4 nodes and 4
failure types this is clearly too much.
For Criteria 2 consider Table 3.3. The options selected (marked 1) provide the
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Table 3.1: Applicability Matrix
F/S s1 s2 s3 s4
f1 1 1 1 1
f2 1 0 0 1
f3 1 1 1 0
f4 1 1 1 1
Table 3.2: all position, all applicable failures
F/S s1 s2 s3 s4 s1 s2 s1 s3 s1 s4 s2 s4 s3 s2 s3 s4
f1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
f2 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
f3 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
f4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
desired coverage, but only test t1 is used to fulfill this coverage. A total of 13 pairs
is needed. According to Table 3.3 the following position-failure pairs (p, e) are se-
lected:{(1,1),(1,2),(1,3),
(1,4),(2,1),(2,3),(2,4),(3,1),(3,3),(3,4),(4,1),(4,2),(4,4)}. A large portion of our test
suite is unused. Random selection of nodes in I can improve this somewhat.
Criteria 3 requires to use all behavioral tests. Table 3.4 shows an example of a
Table 3.3: all unique nodes, all applicable failures
F/S s1 s2 s3 s4 s1 s2 s1 s3 s1 s4 s2 s4 s3 s2 s3 s4
f1 1 1 1 1
f2 1 0 0 1
f3 1 1 1 0
f4 1 1 1 1
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Table 3.4: all tests, all unique nodes, all applicable failures
F/S t1 t2 t3
s1 s2 s3 s4 s1 s2 s1 s3 s1 s4 s2 s4 s3 s2 s3 s4
f1 1 1 1 1
f2 1 1
f3 1 1 1
f4 1 1 1 1
Table 3.5: all tests, all unique nodes, some failures
F/S t1 t2 t3





set of position-failure pairs (p, e) that fulfills this criterion {(1,1),(1,2),(1,3),(1,4),
(6,1),(6,3),(6,4),
(10,1),(10,2),(10,4),(13,1),(13,3),(13,4)}. As in option 2, 13 pairs are needed, but
the selection of unique nodes is spread over all three tests.
Criteria 4 does not require that all failures be applied at every selected position
although each failure must be selected at least once. Table 3.5 shows an exam-
ple of selecting position-failure pairs (p, e). This is the weakest criterion, since it
only requires selecting each failure at least once and each unique node at least
once. The four position-failure pairs in Table 3.5 that fulfill this criterion are
{(1,1),(6,3),(10,2),(13,4)}.
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3.4 Phase 3: Generate Mitigation Test (MT)
Safety critical systems (SCSs) require mitigation of failures to prevent adverse
effects. This can take a variety of actions. Figure 3.3 shows some common mitigation
















Go to fail-safe state 
Mitigation patterns 
Weaving Rules 
Figure 3.3: BT, Failure,Weaving Rules,and Mitigation Patterns
1. Rollback brings the system back to a previous state before the failure oc-
curred. A mitigation action may occur and the system may stop or proceed
to re-execute the remainder of the test.
2. Rollforward mitigates the failure, fixes and proceeds with execution .
3. Try other alternatives deals with decisions about which of several alterna-
tives to pursue.
4. Immediate(partial) fixing when a failure is noted, an action is taken to
deal with the problem that caused this failure prior to continuing with the
remainder of the process.
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5. Deferred (partial) fixing when a failure is noted, an action must be per-
formed to record the situation and deal with the failure either partially or
temporarily because handling the failure completely is not possible.
6. Retry when a failure is detected immediately after the execution of the activ-
ity causing the problem, an action is performed to solve the failure and then
the activity that caused the problem is tried again.
7. Compensate means the system contains enough redundancy to allow a failure
to be masked.
8. Go to fail-safe state a system is transferred into a mitigation state to avoid
dangerous effects and stops.
These mitigation patterns can be expressed in the form of mitigation models. For









Figure 3.4: Try Other Alternatives: Mitigation Model
Each failure fi is associated with a corresponding mitigation model MMi where
i = 1, . . . , k. We assume that the models are of the same type as the behavioral
model BM (e.g. an CEFSM). Graph-based test criteria [3], mitigation criteria MCi
can be used to generate mitigation test paths MTi = mti1 , . . . ,mtiki for failure
fi. Figure 5.3 shows an example of a mitigation model of type ”Try alternatives”.
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Assuming MC as “edge coverage”, the following three mitigation test paths fulfill
MC: MT={mt1,mt2,mt3} where
mt1 ={n1, n2, n5}
mt2 ={n1, n3, n5}
mt3 ={n1, n4, n5}
Mitigation models can be very small for some failures and the mitigation can be an
”empty action”. For example, if there is a rollback to state sb with immediate stop,
the mitigation action only consists of adding a transition from sb to sf , the final
state. Hence, mt={sb, sf}. The weaving rule would specify what node to rollback to,
in this case sb. An “empty” action can occur when the mitigation of a failure requires
an automatic switch to a back-up and this switch does not require additional input,
i.e. is not transparent to the user. On the other hand, some mitigation models may
consist of a full set of alternative behaviors that completely replace the remainder
of the original test. We will illustrate this in the next section.
3.5 Phase 4: Generate Fail-Safe Tests/Safety Mit-
igation Tests using Weaving Rules
Assume that we have t ∈ BT , p ∈ I, e ∈ E and mt ∈ MTe. We now build a
safety mitigation test smt ∈ SMT using this information and the weaving rules wre
∈ WR as follows:
• keep path represented by t until failure position p.
• apply failure of type e (fe) in p.
• select appropriate mt ∈ MTe.
• apply weaving rule wre to construct smt.
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We now explain weaving rules more formally for each type of mitigation. Let t=
{s1 . . . sb . . . node(p) . . . sf . . . sk}
Example: Figure 3.5 is used to show how to implement weaving rules at position
of failure (p) in the behavioral test path where the initial state is s1 and final state is
s6. t= {s1, s2, s3, s2, s3, s4, s1, s4, s5, s6 }. Let node(p)=s5 which is located at position
9 in t. s5 is the behavioral state in the behavioral test path where failure occur.
 
S1 S2 
S3 S4 S5 S6 
Figure 3.5: Simple Example of Behavior Model
1. Fix
(a) Option 1: Compensate ( (Partial) Fix and proceed ) mitigates a failure
and continues with the remainder of the behavioral test. So,
smt =s1 . . .node(p) mt node(p) . . . sk.
mt may be zero, if mitigation does not require user involvement (inputs).
See rule 4.
We use the mitigation model shown in figure 3.6 to mitigate the failure
that occurs in the state s5 in t. smt11=s1, s2, s3, s2, s3, s4, s1, s4, s5, n1, n2,
n4, s5, s6













MT1= {mt11, mt12} 
mt11= {n1, n2, n4} 








Figure 3.6: Mitigation Model of fix and proceed
SMT1= { smt11,smt12}
(b) Option 2: Go to fail-safe state (Fix and stop) mitigates a failure and
ignores the remainder of t: smt=s1 . . .node(p) mt.
Figure 3.7 shows the mitigation model we use to mitigate the failure that
occurs in the state s5.
 
 
     
 
                       mt2= {n5, n6} 
n5 n6 
Stop=true 
Figure 3.7: Mitigation Model of Fix and Stop
smt2=s1, s2, s3, s2, s3, s4, s1, s4, s5, n5, n6
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2. Rollforward
(a) Option 1: Rollforward mitigates the failure, and proceeds.
smt=s1 . . .node(p) mt sf . . . sk where sf is the node in t to which we
rollforward. If only rollforward and no other actions are required mt is
empty and smt=s1. . .node(p) sf . . . sk.
t= {s1, s2, s3, s2, s3, s4, s1, s4, s5, s6 }. Let node(p)=s3. s3 is located at
position 3, and sf= s5.
smt3=s1, s2, s3, n7, n8, n9, s5, s6.
    
     
 
 
                           mt3= {n7, n8, n9} 
a 
n7 n8 n9 
b a 
Figure 3.8: Mitigation Model of Fix and Proceed
(b) Option 2: Deferred fixing. If the failure can only be fixed after reaching
the rollforward node sf then smt becomes:
smt= s1 . . .node(p) sf mt sf+1 . . . sk.
Note that further variants of this weaving rule can exist, like a state sdf
between sf and sk at which the failure mitigation mt is inserted. t= s1
. . . sb . . .node(p) . . . sf . . . sdf . . . sk.
smt = s1 . . .node(p)sf . . . sdf mt . . . sk.
Let node(p)=s3 and sf= s5, and we use the formula smt= s1 . . .node(p)
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sf mt sf+1 . . . sk.
smt4=s1, s2, s3, s2, s3, s4, s1, s4, s5, n7, n8, n9, s5, s6.
3. Rollbackward
(a) Option 1: Rollbackward. Apply mitigation path mt from point of failure
and rollback to node before failure occurred and continue with remainder
of behavioral test.
smt = s1. . .node(p) mt sb . . . sk where sb is a node before node (p).
Let node(p)= s3 at position 3. sb= s2 is the behavior state before failure
occur. The failure in the position 3 is mitigated by using the mitigation
model shown in Figure 3.9 where n10 is the initial and final state in the
mitigation model.
smt5= s1, s2, s3, n10, n11, n10, s2, s3, s2, s3, s4, s1, s4, s5, s6.








Figure 3.9: Mitigation Model of Rollbackward
(b) Option 2: Rollbackward and stop.
smt=s1. . .node(p) mt sb.
We use the same mitigation model defined in Figure 3.9. Let node(p)=
s3. sb= s2.
smt6= s1, s2, s3, n10, n11, n10, s2.
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4. Internal compensate (no user action required). Test immediate system fix. For
example, this can happen if a system switches to backup/redundant sensors.
To test this merely requires applying the failure and continuing to execute the
original test t. In this case, we do not have to modify the original test at all
(note that the assumption is that the system deals with the failure internally
without any change in black-box behavior).
While weaving rules in this section are representative, they are not meant to be
comprehensive. We expect that, over time, we may find some more or find that
some are more common than others.
104
Chapter 4
Validation and Applicability Case Studies
In this chapter, we show the applicability of our approach by applying it into a
different application domains, such as aerospace Launch, medical devices, and trans-
portation systems. All these case studies have different model sizes (the number of
states and transitions ). Each case study has different number of states, transitions,
failure types, and mitigation types as show in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Comparison between different Application Domains





Domain Aerospace Medical devices Transportation
Failure Types 14 4 4
States 21 15 14
Transitions 34 23 19
Mitigation Types 2 3 3
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4.1 Case Study 1: Preliminary Results of Aerospace
Launch System
4.1.1 Description of Launch System
1 A launch system consists of a launch conductor, ground system, launch pad,
mobile launch platform and a launch vehicle which is comprised of a booster, upper
stage and a payload. The booster and upper stage are fueled by cryogenic fuels
which can only be liquefied at extremely low temperatures. Cryogenic fuels are
chosen because they generate a high specific impulse, which defines their efficiency
of fuel relative to the amount consumed. A medium lift vehicle is capable of lofting
a payload weighing between 4000 and 40,000 lbs. into low earth orbit. The launch
controller is responsible for initiating the launch sequence and verifying the safety
and security of the launch control system throughout the launch. The launch con-
ductor communicates to the vehicle through the ground system. The ground system
is physically connected to the launch vehicle via Ethernet cables, serial cables, 1553
data cables and fuel lines.
The sequence begins about 24 hours before a launch when the launch conductor
initiates the countdown clock. The launch conductor then clears the area of non-
essential personnel using a public announcement system. The mobile launch pad
(MLP) is prepared for jacking. The launch conductor initiates the environmental
control system (ECS) on the launch pad, solicits a weather briefing, and turns on
both search lights and amber warning lights. The MLP and vehicle are moved to
the launch pad. Cryogenic tanking begins on the launch vehicle and an instrumen-
1This model was developed with the help of Seana Hagerman and Ahmed Gario.
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tation check is performed. A test to detect hazard gas is performed. The launch
vehicle’s Liquid Oxygen (LO2) is verified as well as the upper stage’s Liquid Hydro-
gen (LH2). The launch conductor periodically conducts polls of the stakeholders to
get concurrence to continue the sequence. When concurrence is received, the launch
conductor initiates the chill down procedures and flight pressures. The safe arm
device (SAD) is initiated. The SAD is used to terminate the flight, should there
be a problem after launch. The launch conductor commands the launch vehicle to
switch to internal power and the vehicle lifts off the launch pad. Figure 4.1 shows
the CEFSM model of the launch system including transitions, variables, events, and
messages.
4.1.2 Launch System Failure
Aerospace launch system failures include initialization, fire, preflight, and launch
fail. Initialization failure is the first fault that can occur in the system, this fault
is less extreme. Failures during the initialization sequence include connection fail,
countdown clock fail and hazard lights fail. Any of these can be mitigated with a
retry or an abort command. The fire failure contains the most critical failures that
could result in explosion of the system. These failures are LO2, helium and LH2
fail. Preflight failures are the faults that can occur before a launch command is
issued. Preflight fail includes battery check, initialize fuel and battery switch fail.
Launch failure is the final set of faults that can occur after the launch command
has been issued. It includes environmental control system (ECS) and preflight fail.
ECS includes the air conditioning failures and Nitro Purge failures. Preflight fail
includes the Instrument, cryotesting and chill down failures. The fire, preflight and
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Figure 4.1: CEFSM Model for a Launch System
108
The description of initialization fail causes is as follows:
• Connection fail. The first step in the launch sequence requires that a con-
nection is made between the launch vehicle, upper stage, launch platform and
ground system. This connection consists of an ethernet cable to establish the
ground network and 1553 cables for commanding and getting status from the
launch vehicle. Failure of one of the networks to communicate would result
in the launch being cancelled or delayed. A retry action could be taken to
attempt to establish the connection or abort the launch.
• CountDownClk fail. The launch vehicle and the ground system heavily rely
on the countdown clock to synchronize time between them. If the countdown
clock fails to start, pauses or stops the result could lead to synchronization
failure and cause a tank to be over/under filled, or an explosion. If the fault
were caught early on, the ground operator could retry to sync them or abort
the launch.
• HazardLight fail. Hazard Lights are used for safety around a launch vehicle.
They consist of flashing or strobe lights to warn people in the area to keep
away. The launch should not be conducted with a failure in the safety light
mechanism.
The description of fire fail causes is as follows:
• LO2 fail. Liquid oxygen is cryogenic liquid oxidizer propellant for a launch
vehicle. It creates a high specific impulse. The launch vehicle tank is made
of thin material which is filled with LO2 to pressurize it. However, LO2 will
boil off and must be replenished before launch. Liquid Oxygen is fed into the
engine using valves. Faults associated with LO2 include: failure to pressurize,
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failure to top off tank, stuck valve, or defective structural integrity of the
tank. The faults if not mitigated in time would result in a fire or explosion.
Therefore, to protect the payload, mitigated with abort is essential.
• Helium fail. Helium is used by the upper stage to purge fuel and as an oxi-
dizer from ground support equipment, and pre-cool liquid hydrogen. A failure
from helium would result in liquid oxygen overheating and an explosion of the
system. Abort action is used to mitigate the failure.
• LH2 fail. Liquid Hydrogen is the upper stage cryogenic rocket propellant.
It has the lowest molecular weight of any substance and burns with extreme
intensity. Liquid hydrogen creates the highest specific impulse. The faults
associated with Liquid Hydrogen include, exposure to heat and leaking out of
tank weld seams which would cause an explosion. Use abort action to mitigate
the failure.
The description of pre-flight fail causes is as follows:
• Battery check (BAChk) fail. Battery checks are performed on the launch
vehicle by the ground system. Batteries are tested for condition, state of
charge is measured in volts, cell resistance is measured in ohms, and a percent
of life expectancy is evaluated. Faults include: bad condition, low voltage, low
cell resistance and low life expectancy. These faults if not mitigated would
result in the launch being delayed or cancelled. Therefore, internal compensate
action is required to mitigate these faults.
• Initialization fuel (InitFuel) fail. Fuel Initialization is the process of preparing
the booster LO2 system and the upper stage LH2 system. The fuel systems
are prepared by locking the valves and measuring gas pressure. Faults include
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low fuel pressures or bad valves. These faults could be mitigated with abort
action to avoid explosion.
• Battery switch (BASwitch) fail. Prior to launching, the ground system must
switch the launch vehicle from external power to internal power. This is ac-
complished by switching the power to the internal batteries. Internal battery
failures include failure to switch, bad battery condition, low voltage, low cell
resistance and low life expectancy. These faults if not mitigated would result
in the launch being delayed or cancelled. Therefore, abort action could be
taken to mitigate these faults.
The description of launch fail causes is as follows:
• Air conditioning initialization (ACInit) fail. The launch pad environmental
control system air conditioning is initialized. The system fails when the air
conditioning unit fails to power, or temperature is not within an acceptable
range. This fault could result in damaging the payload. Therefore, abort
action is required.
• Nitrogen purge (NitroPurge) fail. The launch pad environmental control sys-
tem performs a nitrogen purge of the tanks prior to launch. Nitrogen is used
to clean the tanks of impurities. It will also displace oxygen and reduce the
risk of fire or oxidation. Faults that could occur are low nitrogen pressure
or stuck valve. These faults could lead to explosion. To avoid adverse effect,
abort action is used.
• Instrument fail. Prior to launch, the vehicle’s instrumentation is verified by
running a self or BIT (built in test), the self-test verifies the instrumentation is
running properly and performs a check sum to ensure that the proper version
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of software is loaded. Instrumentation faults include self-test failure, checksum
error or telemetry data error. These faults could result in delayed the launch.
Abort action is used to mitigate these faults.
• Chilldown fail. The chilldown procedure is used to condition fuel lines to
handle the extreme cold temperatures of the cryogenic fuel. Small amounts
of fuel are released from the storage tanks into the lines that feed the vehicle.
Failures include: low chilldown pressure or ruptured fuel line. These faults
could lead to explosion. To mitigate these faults, abort action is used.
• Cryo Testing (CryoTesting) fail. Cryotesting is used to determine if the vehicle
will operate under extreme temperatures. This demonstration fills and drains
the tanks several times. Failures include: failure to pressurize tanks and valve
failure. If these failures occur, they could result in an explosion. Abort action
is used to mitigate these failures.
4.1.3 Test Generation for the Case Study
4.1.3.1 Behavioral Model(BM),Test Criteria (BC), and Test Suite (BT)
Figure 4.1 depicts the behavioral model of a launch vehicle in Communicating
Extended Finite State Machine (CEFSM) format. The model contains 21 states, S
={s1, s2, s3, s4, s5,
s6, s7, s8, s9, s10, s11, s12, s13, s14, s15, s16, s17, s18, s19, s20, s21} where the initial states
are s1, s5, s8, s14, s18 and the final states are s4, s7, s11, s17, s21. There are 34
transitions X ={x0, x1, x2, . . . , x34}. We use [73] [19] as test generation method. As-
suming edge coverage is required, the test paths in Table 4.2 fulfill this requirement.
By using reachability analysis, we find that these paths are feasible since there are
no conflict between predicates in the transitions.
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4.1.3.2 Failures, Applicability Matrix
Table 4.3 shows fourteen possible failures that could occur in a launch vehicle.
These failures are injected into a behavioral states one by one in the test path. Some
failures can only be occurred in some states but not the others. We use some of the
mitigation actions to mitigate these failures and avoid adverse effects.
The applicability matrix in table 4.4 indicates that a specific failure type fi
applies or is relevant to a particular node n and “0” depicts that the specific failure
type fi is not applicable in n. Since we have failures that only apply in certain
phases of the launch, we find “1”s for behavioral states belonging to a particular
launch phase, and “0”s for all other states. For example, a network connection (s2)
can fail (f1), hence A(1,2)=1, but an LO2 failure (f4) is not applicable during ECS
Initialization (e.g s6).
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Table 4.3: Failure Types
F Explanation
f1 Connection fail
f2 Count down CLK fail












4.1.3.3 Failure Coverage Criteria (FC)
In the next step, we select position-failure pairs (p, e) based on four test cov-
erage criteria defined earlier. There are I =
∑l
i=1 len(ti) positions p to select for
failure. Concatenating the tests gives us the number of states in test suite CT =
{s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, s17, s1, s2, s2,
s3, s3, s4, s4, s6, s7, s7, s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, s13, s12,
s11, s11, s8, s9, s9, s10, s10, s13, s13, s12, s12, s11, s11, s19, s20, s21}. There are 49 positions.
We now apply coverage criteria for positions of failure (1 ≤ p ≤ 49 ) and type of



















































































































































































































































































































































































Coverage Criteria 1: all positions, all applicable failures. The required (p, e)
combinations are shown in Table 4.5 as ”1” entries. The set of required tests are
386 pairs. This is clearly infeasible for the model. It would require |I| × |F | pairs
if applicability matrix contains all “1”.
Coverage Criteria 2: all unique nodes, all applicable failures. A set of position-
failure pairs (p,e) is shown in Table 4.6 as ”1” entries. This required 135 pairs. Note
that test path t5 is not used. This criteria does not require testing failure recovery
in all tests. A stronger test criterion is to require covering each test as well (cf.
criteria 3). The (p, e) pairs are stated in the second column in Table 4.10.
Coverage Criteria 3: all tests, all unique nodes, all applicable failures. This
criteria requires using all tests. Here we simply require that when unique nodes
need to be covered they are selected from tests that have not been covered. Table
4.7 shows the set of position-failure pairs (p, e) that fulfills this criteria. As with
criteria 2, this required 135 pairs. The (p, e) pairs are stated in the second column
in Table 4.11
Coverage Criteria 4: all tests, all unique nodes, some applicable failures. This
criteria does not require that all failures be applied at every selected position even
though each failure must be selected at least once. (p, e) combinations that meet
this requirement are shown in Table 4.8 as “1” entries. There are 17 pairs. The


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.1.3.4 Mitigation Requirements, Models, Safety Mitigation Tests
The mitigation requirements are summarized in Table 4.9 which also specifies the
corresponding mitigation models and associated weaving rules. Figures 4.2 to 4.14
show the mitigation models for failures f1, f2, f3, f4, f5, f6, f8, f9, f10, f11, f12, f13, f14.
Note that f7 do not need a model, since it is an implicit fix that do not use extra
test inputs (category 4 under weaving rules). Failures f1, f2, f3 have more than
one mitigation test paths which cause number of safety mitigation tests (SMTs) to
increase. Again, assuming edge coverage, the mitigation tests listed in Figures 4.2
to 4.14 fulfill this coverage. For criteria 2 and criteria 3, the number of pairs which
are indicated by “1” in tables 4.6 and 4.7 is the same which is 135 pairs. For criteria
4, 17 pairs are required.
For each pair (p, e), we construct as many tests as there are mitigation test paths
for failure type e. E.g. this means that for failure type 2, each pair (p,2) results in
2 tests.
                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
                        
                             
 
                                      MT1= {m11, mt12} 
                                      mt11= {n11, n12, n14} 








Figure 4.2: Mitigation Model for f1
Due to the large number of tests for C1, we will only show safety mitigation tests
for criteria C2-C4. Table 4.10 and 4.11 indicate tests for the 180 position-failure
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Table 4.9: Mitigation Requirement
MM Mitigation action Mitigation Model WR
MM1 retry or go to fail-safe state cf. Figure 4.2 3a or 1b in 3.5
MM2 retry or go to fail-safe state cf. Figure 4.3 3a or 1b in 3.5
MM3 retry or go to fail-safe state cf. Figure 4.4 3a or 1b in 3.5
MM4 go to fail-safe state cf. Figure 4.5 1b in 3.5
MM5 go to fail-safe state cf. Figure 4.6 1b in 3.5
MM6 go to fail-safe state cf. Figure 4.7 1b in 3.5
MM7 internal compensate none 4
MM8 go to fail-safe state cf. Figure 4.8 1b in 3.5
MM9 go to fail-safe state cf. Figure 4.9 1b in 3.5
MM10 go to fail-safe state cf. Figure 4.10 1b in 3.5
MM11 go to fail-safe state cf. Figure 4.11 1b in 3.5
MM12 go to fail-safe state cf. Figure 4.12 1b in 3.5
MM13 go to fail-safe state cf. Figure 4.13 1b in 3.5
MM14 go to fail-safe state cf. Figure 4.14 1b in 3.5
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
                   
                 
                             
                                             MT2= {mt21, mt22} 
                                             mt21= {n21, n22, n24} 
                                            mt22= {n21, n23, n25} 
                                                                                                                         
Send alarm=T 












                                                  
                      MT3= {mt31, mt32} 
                      mt31= {n31, n32, n33} 
                     mt32= {n31, n34, n34} 
Hazardlighton=T 





Figure 4.4: Mitigation Model for f3
      
                                                     




Figure 4.5: Mitigation Model for f4
  
           
                                                                                                    
                    mt5= {n51, n52} 
                                                      
n51 n52 
Stop=T 
Figure 4.6: Mitigation Model for f5
 
 
                     mt6= {n61, n62} 
                                                                                        
n61 n62 
Stop=T 




                                                                      




Figure 4.8: Mitigation Model for f8
 
 
                                                                                          
                     mt9= {n91, n92} 
n91 n92 
Stop=T 
Figure 4.9: Mitigation Model for f9
 
                                                         
                       mt10= {n10 1, n10 2} 
 
n10 1 n10 2 
Stop=T 
Stop=T 
Figure 4.10: Mitigation Model for f10
    
                          
                        
                          mt11= {n11 1, n11 2} 
                                     
n11 1 n11 2 
Stop=T 
Figure 4.11: Mitigation Model for f11
                                                 
                             
                          mt12= {n12 1, n12 2} 
                       
n12 1 n12 2 
Stop=T 
Stop=T 
Figure 4.12: Mitigation Model for f12
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                      mt13= {n13 1, n13 2} 
 
n13 1 n13 2 
Stop=T 
Figure 4.13: Mitigation Model for f13
       
 
           
                      mt14= {n14 1, n14 2} 
n14 1 n14 2 
Stop=T 
Stop=T 
Figure 4.14: Mitigation Model for f14
pairs that fulfill coverage criteria 2 and coverage criteria 3. Table 4.12 indicates tests
for the 23 position-failure pairs that fulfill coverage criteria 4. These Tables 4.10,
4.11, and 4.12 have four columns. The first column contains the safety mitigation
test identifier. The second column contains pairs (p, e) that fulfill criteria 2,3, and
4. The third column contains the test paths as a sequence of nodes. Column 4
contains the behavioral test path (BT) used to construct smt.
When deciding which criteria to use, some other factors might need to be con-
sidered:
1. The likelihood that dependencies (that are not transparent in black-box test-
ing) between behavioral states and failure types could expose mitigation de-
fects in some states, but not others (this would require criteria 2 or 3).
2. The likelihood that specific execution history until the point the failure is
applied impacts the probability of uncovering a mitigation defect (this would
require criteria 3).
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3. The cost of testing and the risk of missing a mitigation defect. This could
result in applying C1 to some failure types, but not to all. In other words, the
testing criteria are flexible enough to consider them each individually.
Either of those renders criteria 4 inadequate. It would probably also be wise to con-
sider the severity of a failure not being properly mitigated and using this knowledge
to prioritize tests. However, with FT as a model used in qualitative, rather than
quantitative analysis, this information is not included in a FT. One would have to
switch to a more quantitative failure “model” such as the information available in
FMECA [128].
Table 4.10: Safety Mitigation Tests for Criteria 2
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (2,1) s5, s6, n11, n12, n14, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, s17 t1
smt2 (2,1) s5, s6, n11, n13, n15 t1
smt3 (4,1) s5, s6, s6, s7, n11, n12, n14, s7, s7, s17, s17 t1
smt4 (4,1) s5, s6, s6, s7, n11, n13, n15 t1
smt5 (6,1) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n11, n12, n14, s17, s17 t1
smt6 (6,1) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n11, n13, n15 t1
smt7 (9,1) s1, s2, n11, n12, n14, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s4 t2
Continued on next page
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s6, s7, s7
smt8 (9,1) s1, s2, n11, n13, n15 t2
smt9 (11,1) s1, s2, s2, s3, n11, n12, n14, s3, s3, s4, t2
s4, s6, s7, s7
smt10 (11,1) s1, s2, s2, s3, n11, n13, n15 t2
smt11 (13,1) s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, n11, n12, n14, s4, s4, s6, t2
s7, s7
smt12 (13,1) s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, n11, n13, n15 t2
smt13 (19,1) s18, s19, n11, n12, n14, s19, s19, s20, s21 t3
smt14 (19,1) s18, s19, n11, n13, n15 t3
smt15 (21,1) s18, s19, s19, s20, n11, n12, n14, s20, s21 t3
smt16 (21,1) s18, s19, s19, s20, n11, n13, n15 t3
smt17 (22,1) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n11, n12, n14 t3
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smt18 (22,1) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n11, n13, n15 t3
smt19 (24,1) s14, s15, n11, n12, n14, s15, s15, s16, s16, t4
s17, s17, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt20 (24,1) s14, s15, n11, n13, n15 t4
smt21 (26,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, n11, n12, n14, t4
s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt22 (26,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, n11, n13, n15 t4
smt23 (30,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, n11, n12, n14, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt24 (30,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, n11, n13, n15
smt25 (31,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, n11, n12, n14, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11
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smt26 (31,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, n11, n13, n15
smt27 (32,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, n11, n12, n14, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt28 (32,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9 t4
, s10, s13, n11, n13, n15
smt29 (33,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
s13, s12, n11, n12, n14, s12, s11, s11
smt30 (33,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
s13, s12, n11, n13, n15
smt31 (34,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, s12, s11, n11, n12, n14, s11, s11
smt32 (34,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
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s10, s13, s12, s11, n11, n13, n15
smt33 (2,2) s5, s6, n21, n22, n24, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, s17 t1
smt34 (2,2) s5, s6, n21, n23, n25 t1
smt35 (4,2) s5, s6, s6, s7, n21, n22, n24, s7, s7, s17, s17 t1
smt36 (4,2) s5, s6, s6, s7, n21, n23, n25 t1
smt37 (6,2) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n21, n22, n24, s17, s17 t1
smt38 (6,2) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n21, n23, n25 t1
smt39 (13,2) s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, n21, n22, n24, s4, s4, t2
s6, s7, s7
smt40 (13,2) s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, n21, n23, n25 t2
smt41 (19,2) s18, s19, n21, n22, n24, s19, s19, s20, s21 t3
smt42 (19,2) s18, s19, n21, n23, n25 t3
smt43 (21,2) s18, s19, s19, s20, n21, n22, n24, s20, s21 t3
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smt44 (21,2) s18, s19, s19, s20, n21, n23, n25 t3
smt45 (22,2) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n21, n22, n24, s21 t3
smt46 (22,2) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n21, n23, n25 t3
smt47 (24,2) s14, s15, n21, n22, n24, s15, s15, s16, s16, t4
s17, s17, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt48 (24,2) s14, s15, n21, n23, n25 t4
smt49 (26,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, n21, n22, n24, s16, s16, t4
s17, s17, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt50 (26,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, n21, n23, n25 t4
smt51 (30,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, n21, t4
n22, n24, s9, s10, s13, s13, s11, s11
smt52 (30,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
n21, n23, n25
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smt53 (31,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
n21, n22, n24, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt54 (31,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
n21, n23, n25
smt55 (32,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
s13, n21, n22, n24, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt56 (32,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, n21, n23, n25
smt57 (33,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, s13, s12, n21, n22, n24, s12, s11, s11
smt58 (33,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, s12, n21, n23, n25
smt59 (34,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
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s13, s12, s11, n21, n22, n24, s11, s11
smt60 (34,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, s12, s11, n21, n23, n25
smt61 (2,3) s5, s6, n31, n32, n33, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, s17 t1
smt62 (2,3) s5, s6, n31, n34, n35 t1
smt63 (4,3) s5, s6, s6, s7, n31, n32, n33, s7, s7, s17, s17 t1
smt64 (4,3) s5, s6, s6, s7, n31, n34, n35 t1
smt65 (6,3) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n31, n32, n33, s17, s17 t1
smt66 (6,3) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n31, n34, n35 t1
smt67 (11,3) s1, s2, s2, s3, n31, n32, n33, s3, s3, s4, s4, t2
s6, s7, s7
smt68 (11,3) s1, s2, s2, s3, n31, n34, n35 t2
smt69 (13,3) s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, n31, n32, n33, s4, s4, t2
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s6, s7, s7
smt70 (13,3) s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, n31, n34, n35 t2
smt71 (19,3) s18, s19, n31, n32, n33, s19, s19, s20, s21 t3
smt72 (19,3) s18, s19, n31, n34, n35 t3
smt73 (21,3) s18, s19, s19, s20, n31, n32, n33, s20, s21 t3
smt74 (21,3) s18, s19, s19, s20, n31, n34, n35 t3
smt75 (22,3) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n31, n32, n33, s21 t3
smt76 (22,3) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n31, n34, n35 t3
smt77 (24,3) s14, s15, n31, n32, n33, s15, s15, s16, t4
s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt78 (24,3) s14, s15, n31, n34, n35 t4
smt79 (26,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, n31, n32, n33, s16, t4
s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11
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smt80 (26,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, n31, n34, n35 t4
smt81 (30,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, n31, t4
n32, n33, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt82 (30,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
n31, n34, n35,
smt83 (31,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
, n31, n32, n33, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt84 (31,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
n31, n34, n35
smt85 (32,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
s13, n31, n32, n33, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt86 (32,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
s13, n31, n34, n35
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smt87 (33,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
s13, s12, n31, n32, n33, s12, s11, s11
smt88 (33,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
s13, s12, n31, n34, n35
smt89 (34,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
s13, s12, s11, n31, n32, n33, s11, s11
smt90 (34,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
s13, s12, s11, n31, n34, n35
smt91 (6,4) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n41, n42 t1
smt92 (19,4) s18, s19, n41, n42 t3
smt93 (21,4) s18, s19, s19, s20, n41, n42 t3
smt94 (22,4) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n41, n42 t3
smt95 (24,4) s14, s15, n41, n42 t4
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smt96 (26,4) s14, s15, s15, s16, n41, n42 t4
smt97 (30,4) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, n41, n42 t4
smt98 (31,4) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9 t4
, s10, n41, n42
smt99 (32,4) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
, s10, s13, n41, n42
smt100 (33,4) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
, s10, s13, s12, n41, n42
smt101 (34,4) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, s12, s11, n41, n42
smt102 (6,5) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n51, n52 t1
smt103 (19,5) s18, s19, n51, n52 t3
smt104 (21,5) s18, s19, s19, s20, n51, n52 t3
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smt105 (22,5) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n51, n52 t3
smt106 (24,5) s14, s15, n51, n52 t4
smt107 (26,5) s14, s15, s15, s16, n51, n52 t4
smt108 (30,5) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, n51, n52 t4
smt109 (31,5) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, n51, n52
smt110 (32,5) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, n51, n52
smt111 (33,5) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, s12, n51, n52
smt112 (34,5) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, s12, s11, n51, n52
smt113 (6,6) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n61, n62 t3
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smt114 (19,6) s18, s19, n61, n62 t3
smt115 (21,6) s18, s19, s19, s20, n61, n62 t3
smt116 (22,6) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n61, n62 t3
smt117 (30,6) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, n61, n62 t4
smt118 (31,6) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
n61, n62
smt119 (32,6) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, s13, n61, n62
smt120 (33,6) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, s13, s12, n61, n62
smt121 (34,6) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, n61, n62
smt122 (19,7) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
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smt123 (21,7) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt124 (22,7) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt125 (33,7) t4 (no MT added to it) t4
smt126 (34,7) t4 (no MT added to it) t4
smt127 (6,8) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n81, n82 t1
smt128 (19,8) s18, s19, n81, n82 t3
smt129 (21,8) s18, s19, s19, s20, n81, n82 t3
smt130 (22,8) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n81, n82 t3
smt131 (24,8) s14, s15, n81, n82 t4
smt132 (26,8) s14, s15, s15, s16, n81, n82 t4
smt133 (34,8) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, s12, s11, n81, n82
smt134 (19,9) s18, s19, n91, n92 t3
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smt135 (21,9) s18, s19, s19, s20, n91, n92 t3
smt136 (22,9) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n91, n92 t3
smt137 (33,9) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, s12, n91, n92
smt138 (34,9) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, s12, s11, n91, n92
smt139 (2,10) s5, s6, n101, n102 t1
smt140 (4,10) s5, s6, s6, s7, n101, n102 t1
smt141 (6,10) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n101, n102 t1
smt142 (19,10) s18, s19, n101, n102 t3
smt143 (21,10) s18, s19, s19, s20, n101, n102 t3
smt144 (22,10) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n101, n102 t3
smt145 (30,10) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17 t4
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, s9, n101, n102
smt146 (31,10) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17 t4
, s9, s10, n101, n102
smt147 (32,10) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17 t4
, s9, s10, s13, n101, n102
smt148 (33,10) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17 t4
, s9, s10, s13, s12, n101, n102
smt149 (34,10) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17 t4
, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, n101, n102
smt150 (4,11) s5, s6, s6, s7, n111, n112 t1
smt151 (6,11) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n111, n112 t1
smt152 (19,11) s18, s19, n111, n112 t3
smt153 (21,11) s18, s19, s19, s20, n111, n112 t3
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smt154 (22,11) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n111, n112 t3
smt155 (30,11) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, n111, n112 t4
smt156 (31,11) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17 t4
, s9, s10, n111, n112
smt157 (32,11) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17 t4
, s9, s10, s13, n111, n112
smt158 (33,11) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17 t4
, s9, s10, s13, s12, n111, n112
smt159 (34,11) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17 t4
, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, n111, n112
smt160 (19,12) s18, s19, n121, n122 t3
smt161 (21,12) s18, s19, s19, s20, n121, n122 t3
smt162 (22,12) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n121, n122 t3
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smt163 (30,12) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, n121, n122 t4
smt164 (31,12) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10 t4
, n121, n122
smt165 (32,12) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, s13, n121, n122
smt166 (33,12) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, s13, s12, n121, n122
smt167 (34,12) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, n121, n122
smt168 (19,13) s18, s19, n131, n132 t3
smt169 (21,13) s18, s19, s19, s20, n131, n132 t3
smt170 (22,13) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n131, n132 t3
smt171 (31,13) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
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s9, s10, n131, n132
smt172 (32,13) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, s13, n131, n132
smt173 (33,13) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, s13, s12, n131, n132
smt174 (34,13) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, n131, n132
smt175 (19,14) s18, s19, n141, n142 t3
smt176 (21,14) s18, s19, s19, s20, n141, n142 t3
smt177 (22,14) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n141, n142 t3
smt178 (32,14) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t3
s9, s10, s13, n141, n142
smt179 (33,14) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t3
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s9, s10, s13, s12, n141, n142
smt180 (34,14) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t3
s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, n141, n142
Table 4.11: Safety Mitigation Tests for Criteria 3
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (2,1) s5, s6, n11, n12, n14, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, s17 t1
smt2 (2,1) s5, s6, n11, n13, n15 t1
smt3 (4,1) s5, s6, s6, s7, n11, n12, n14, s7, s7, s17, s17 t1
smt4 (4,1) s5, s6, s6, s7, n11, n13, n15 t1
smt5 (6,1) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n11, n12, n14, s17, s17 t1
smt6 (6,1) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n11, n13, n15 t1
smt7 (9,1) s1, s2, n11, n12, n14, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s4 t2
s6, s7, s7
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smt8 (9,1) s1, s2, n11, n13, n15 t2
smt9 (11,1) s1, s2, s2, s3, n11, n12, n14, s3, s3, s4, t2
s4, s6, s7, s7
smt10 (11,1) s1, s2, s2, s3, n11, n13, n15 t2
smt11 (13,1) s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, n11, n12, n14, s4, s4, s6, t2
s7, s7
smt12 (13,1) s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, n11, n13, n15 t2
smt13 (19,1) s18, s19, n11, n12, n14, s19, s19, s20, s21 t3
smt14 (19,1) s18, s19, n11, n13, n15 t3
smt15 (21,1) s18, s19, s19, s20, n11, n12, n14, s20, s21 t3
smt16 (21,1) s18, s19, s19, s20, n11, n13, n15 t3
smt17 (22,1) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n11, n12, n14 t3
smt18 (22,1) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n11, n13, n15 t3
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smt19 (24,1) s14, s15, n11, n12, n14, s15, s15, s16, s16, t4
s17, s17, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt20 (24,1) s14, s15, n11, n13, n15 t4
smt21 (26,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, n11, n12, n14, t4
s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt22 (26,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, n11, n13, n15 t4
smt23 (30,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, n11, n12, n14, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt24 (30,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, n11, n13, n15
smt25 (32,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, n11, n12, n14, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt26 (32,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9 t4
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, s10, s13, n11, n13, n15
smt27 (34,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, s12, s11, n11, n12, n14, s11, s11
smt28 (34,1) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, s12, s11, n11, n13, n15
smt29 (2,2) s5, s6, n21, n22, n24, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, s17 t1
smt30 (2,2) s5, s6, n21, n23, n25 t1
smt31 (4,2) s5, s6, s6, s7, n21, n22, n24, s7, s7, s17, s17 t1
smt32 (4,2) s5, s6, s6, s7, n21, n23, n25 t1
smt33 (6,2) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n21, n22, n24, s17, s17 t1
smt34 (6,2) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n21, n23, n25 t1
smt35 (13,2) s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, n21, n22, n24, t2
s4, s4, s6, s7, s7
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smt36 (13,2) s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, n21, n23, n25 t2
smt37 (19,2) s18, s19, n21, n22, n24, s19, s19, s20, s21 t3
smt38 (19,2) s18, s19, n21, n23, n25 t3
smt39 (21,2) s18, s19, s19, s20, n21, n22, n24, s20, s21 t3
smt40 (21,2) s18, s19, s19, s20, n21, n23, n25 t3
smt41 (22,2) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n21, n22, n24, s21 t3
smt42 (22,2) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n21, n23, n25 t3
smt43 (24,2) s14, s15, n21, n22, n24, s15, s15, s16, s16, t4
s17, s17, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11,
smt44 (24,2) s14, s15, n21, n23, n25 t4
smt45 (26,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, n21, n22, n24, s16, s16, t4
s17, s17, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt46 (26,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, n21, n23, n25 t4
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smt47 (30,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, n21, t4
n22, n24, s9, s10, s13, s13, s11, s11
smt48 (30,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
n21, n23, n25
smt49 (32,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
s13, n21, n22, n24, s15, s12, s11, s11
smt50 (32,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, n21, n23, n25
smt51 (34,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
s13, s12, s11, n21, n22, n24, s11, s11
smt52 (34,2) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, s12, s11, n21, n23, n25
smt53 (2,3) s5, s6, n31, n32, n33, s5, s6, s7, s7, s17, s17 t1
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smt54 (2,3) s5, s6, n31, n34, n35 t1
smt55 (4,3) s5, s6, s6, s7, n31, n32, n33, s7, s7, s17, s17 t1
smt56 (4,3) s5, s6, s6, s7, n31, n34, n35 t1
smt57 (6,3) s5, s6, s6, s7, s17, n31, n32, n33, s17, s17 t1
smt58 (6,3) s5, s6, s6, s7, s17, n31, n34, n35 t1
smt59 (11,3) s1, s2, s2, s3, n31, n32, n33, s3, s3, s4, s4, t2
s6, s7, s7
smt60 (11,3) s1, s2, s2, s3, n31, n34, n35 t2
smt61 (13,3) s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, n31, n32, n33, s4, s4, t2
s6, s7, s7
smt62 (13,3) s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, n31, n34, n35 t2
smt63 (19,3) s18, s19, n31, n32, n33, s19, s19, s20, s21 t3
smt64 (19,3) s18, s19, n31, n34, n35 t3
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smt65 (21,3) s18, s19, s19, s20, n31, n32, n33, s20, s21 t3
smt66 (21,3) s18, s19, s19, s20, n31, n34, n35 t3
smt67 (22,3) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n31, n32, n33, s21 t3
smt68 (22,3) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n31, n34, n35 t3
smt69 (24,3) s14, s15, n31, n32, n33, s15, s15, s16, t4
s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt70 (24,3) s14, s15, n31, n34, n35 t4
smt71 (26,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, n31, n32, n33, s16, t4
s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt72 (26,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, n31, n34, n35 t4
smt73 (30,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, n31, n32, t4
n33, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt74 (30,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
Continued on next page
153
Continued from previous page
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
n31, n34, n35
smt75 (32,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
s13, n31, n32, n33, s13, s12, s11, s11
smt76 (32,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
s13, n31, n34, n35
smt77 (34,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
s13, s12, s11, n31, n32, n33, s11, s11
smt78 (34,3) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, s10, t4
s13, s12, s11, n31, n32, n33
smt79 (39,3) s8, s9, s9, s10, n31, n32, n33, s10, s10, t5
s13, s13, s12, s12, s11, s11, s19, s20, s21,
smt80 (39,3) s8, s9, s9, s10, n31, n34, n35 t5
smt81 (39,2) s8, s9, s9, s10, n21, n22, n24, s10, s10 t5
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, s13, s13, s12, s12, s11, s11, s19, s20, s21,
smt82 (39,2) s8, s9, s9, s10, n21, n23, n25 t5
smt83 (39,1) s8, s9, s9, s10, n11, n12, n14, s10, t5
s10, s13, s13, s12, s12, s11, s11, s19, s20, s21,
smt84 (39,1) s8, s9, s9, s10, n11, n13, n15 t5
smt85 (6,4) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n41, n42 t1
smt86 (19,4) s18, s19, n41, n42 t3
smt87 (21,4) s18, s19, s19, s20, n41, n42 t3
smt88 (22,4) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n41, n42 t3
smt89 (24,4) s14, s15, n41, n42 t4
smt90 (26,4) s14, s15, s15, s16, n41, n42 t4
smt91 (30,4) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, n41, n42 t4
smt92 (32,4) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
Continued on next page
155
Continued from previous page
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
, s10, s13, n41, n42
smt93 (34,4) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, s12, s11, n41, n42
smt94 (39,4) s8, s9, s9, s10, n41, n42 t4
smt95 (43,4) s8, s9, s9, s10, s10, s13, s13, s12, n41, n42 t4
smt96 (43,1) s8, s9, s9, s10, s10, s13, s13, s12, s10, n11, n12, t5
n14, s10, s10, s13, s13, s12, s12, s11, s11,
s19, s20, s21
smt97 (43,1) s8, s9, s9, s10, s10, s13, s13, s12, n11, n13, n15 t5
smt98 (43,2) s8, s9, s9, s10, s10, s13, s13, s12, s10, n21, n22, t5
n24, s12, s12, s11, s11, s19, s20, s21,
smt99 (43,2) s8, s9, s9, s10, s10, s13, s13, s12, s10, t5
n21, n23, n25
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smt100 (43,3) s8, s9, s9, s10, s10, s13, s13, s12, n31, n32, t5
n33, s12, s12, s11, s11, s19, s20, s21,
smt101 (43,3) s8, s9, s9, s10, s10, s13, s13, s12, t5
n31, n34, n35
smt102 (6,5) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n51, n52 t1
smt103 (19,5) s18, s19, n52 t3
smt104 (21,5) s18, s19, s19, s20, n51, n52 t3
smt105 (22,5) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n51, n52 t3
smt106 (24,5) s14, s15, n51, n52 t4
smt107 (26,5) s14, s15, s15, s16, n51, n52 t4
smt108 (30,5) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, n51, n52 t4
smt109 (32,5) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, n51, n52
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smt110 (34,5) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, s12, s11, n51, n52
smt111 (39,5) s8, s9, s9, s10, n51, n52 t5
smt112 (43,5) s8, s9, s9, s10, s10, s13, s13, s12, n51, n52 t5
smt113 (6,6) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n61, n62 t3
smt114 (19,6) s18, s19, n61, n62 t3
smt115 (21,6) s18, s19, s19, s20, n61, n62 t3
smt116 (22,6) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n61, n62 t3
smt117 (30,6) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16 t4
, s17, s17, s9, n61, n62
smt118 (32,6) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17 t4
, s9, s10, s13, n61, n62
smt119 (34,6) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
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s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, n61, n62
smt120 (39,6) s8, s9, s9, s10, n61, n62 t5
smt121 (43,6) s8, s9, s9, s10, s13, s13, s12, n61, n62 t5
smt122 (19,7) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt123 (21,7) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt124 (22,7) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt125 (34,7) t4 (no MT added to it) t4
smt126 (43,7) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt127 (6,8) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n81, n82 t1
smt128 (19,8) s18, s19, n81, n82 t3
smt129 (21,8) s18, s19, s19, s20, n81, n82 t3
smt130 (22,8) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n81, n82 t3
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smt131 (24,8) s14, s15, n81, n82 t4
smt132 (26,8) s14, s15, s15, s16, n81, n82 t4
smt133 (34,8) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, s12, s11, n81, n82
smt134 (19,9) s18, s19, n91, n92 t3
smt135 (21,9) s18, s19, s19, s20, n91, n92 t3
smt136 (22,9) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n91, n92 t3
smt137 (34,9) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, t4
s10, s13, s12, s11, n91, n92
smt138 (43,9) s8, s9, s9, s10, s10, s13, s13, s12, n91, n92 t5
smt139 (2,10) s5, s6, n101, n102 t1
smt140 (4,10) s5, s6, s6, s7, n101, n102 t1
smt141 (6,10) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n101, n102 t1
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smt142 (19,10) s18, s19, n101, n102 t3
smt143 (21,10) s18, s19, s19, s20, n101, n102 t3
smt144 (22,10) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n101, n102 t3
smt145 (30,10) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17 t4
, s9, n101, n102
smt146 (32,10) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17 t4
, s9, s10, s13, n101, n102
smt147 (34,10) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17 t4
, s9, s10, s13, s12, S11, n101, n102
smt148 (39,10) s8, s9, s9, s10, n101, n102 t5
smt149 (43,10) s8, s9, s9, s10, s10, s13, s13, t5
s12, n101, n102
smt150 (4,11) s5, s6, s6, s7, n111, n112 t1
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smt151 (19,11) s18, s19, n111, n112 t3
smt152 (21,11) s18, s19, s19, s20, n111, n112 t3
smt153 (22,11) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n111, n112 t3
smt154 (30,11) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, n111, n112 t4
smt155 (32,11) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17 t4
, s9, s10, s13, n111, n112
smt156 (34,11) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17 t4
, s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, n111, n112
smt157 (39,11) s8, s9, s9, s10, n111, n112 t2
smt158 (43,11) s8, s9, s9, s10, s10, s13, s13, s12, n111, n112 t2
smt159 (19,12) s18, s19, n121, n122 t3
smt160 (21,12) s18, s19, s19, s20, n121, n122 t3
smt161 (22,12) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n121, n122 t3
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smt162 (30,12) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, s9, n121, n122 t4
smt163 (32,12) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, s13, n121, n122
smt164 (34,12) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, n121, n122
smt165 (39,12) s8, s9, s9, s10, n121, n122 t5
smt166 (43,12) s8, s9, s9, s10, s10, s13, s13, s12, n121, n122 t5
smt167 (19,13) s18, s19, n131, n132 t3
smt168 (21,13) s18, s19, s19, s20, n131, n132 t3
smt169 (22,13) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n131, n132 t3
smt170 (32,13) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, s13, n131, n132
smt171 (34,13) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
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s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, n131, n132
smt172 (39,13) s8, s9, s9, s10, n131, n132 t5
smt173 (43,13) s8, s9, s9, s10, s10, s13, s13, s12, n131, n132 t5
smt174 (19,14) s18, s19, n141, n142 t3
smt175 (21,14) s18, s19, s19, s20, n141, n142 t3
smt176 (22,14) s18, s19, s19, s20, s21, n141, n142 t3
smt177 (32,14) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, s13, n141, n142
smt178 (34,14) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, n141, n142
smt179 (43,14) s8, s9, s9, s10, s10, s13, s13, t5
s12, n141, n142
smt180 (6,11) s5, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, n111, n112 t1
As can be seen in Tables 4.10 4.11, The number of safety mitigation tests for
criteria 2 and criteria 3 is the same, 180 tests. However, they differ in the way how
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to select (p, e) pairs. In criteria 2, we do not use all the behavior test paths such as
t5 because we pick the first occurrance of state. However, In criteria 3, we have to
use all the test paths to generate (p, e) pairs.
Table 4.12: Safety Mitigation Tests for Criteria 4
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (2,2) s5, s6, n21, n22, n24, s6, s6, s7, s7, s17, s17 t1
smt2 (2,2) s5, s6, n21, n23, n25 t1
smt3 (4,3) s5, s6, s6, s7, n31, n32, n33, s7, s7, s17, s17 t1
smt4 (4,3) s5, s6, s6, s7, n31, n34, n35 t1
smt5 (9,1) s1, s2, n11, n12, n14, s2, s2, s3, t2
s3, s4, s4, s6, s7, s7
smt6 (9,1) s1, s2, n11, n12, n14 t2
smt7 (19,9) s18, s19, n91, n92 t3
smt8 (21,10) s18, s19, s19, s20, n101, n102 t3
smt9 (24,8) s14, s15, n81, n82 t4
smt10 (30,4) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
Continued on next page
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s9, n41, n42
smt11 (33,7) t4 (no MT added to it) t4
smt12 (34,6) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, s13, s12, s11, n61, n62
smt13 (39,5 s8, s9, s9, s10, n51, n52 t5
smt14 (41,12) s8, s9, s9, s10, s10, s13, n121, n122 t5
smt15 (49,11) s8, s9, s9, s10, s10, s13, s13, s12, s12, t5
s11, s11, s19, s20, s21, n111, n112
smt16 (47,14) s8, s9, s9, s10, s10, s13, s13, s12, s12, t5
s11, s11, s19, n141, n142
smt17 (31,13) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, n131, n132
smt18 (13,1) s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, t2
Continued on next page
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, n11, n12, n14, s4, s4, s6, s7, s7,
smt19 (13,1) s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, n11, n13, n15 t2
smt20 (11,3) s1, s2, s2, s3, , n31, n32, n33, t2
s3, s3, s4, s4, s6, s7, s7,
smt21 (11,3) s1, s2, s2, s3, , n31, n34, n35, t2
smt22 (26,5) s14, s15, s15, s16, n51, n52, t4
smt23 (31,10) s14, s15, s15, s16, s16, s17, s17, t4
s9, s10, n101, n102
To sum up, the numbe of safety mitigation tests (SMTs) varies between criteria
(c2, c3, and c4). In this case study, the number of the behavior test paths is 5 paths
and the safety mitigation tests (SMTs) 180 for criteria 2 and criteria 3. This is
quite large. For criteria 4, we have 23 (SMTs). We use only two types of mitigation
patterns (retry and go to fail-safe). The total number of mitigation tests (MT )
that we have is 16. Some failures require more than one mitigation test paths (2
test paths), such as (f1, f2, f3) which cause the number of safety mitigation tests
(SMTs) to increase. This case study is relatively large so we expect that increases
number of SMTs.
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4.2 Case Study 2: Preliminary Results of A portable
Insulin Pump System
An insulin pump is a medical system that supports the operation of the pan-
creas. The software controlling this system is an embedded system, which collects
information from a sensor and controls a pump that delivers a controlled dose of in-
sulin to a patient. The system is used by people who suffer from diabetes. Diabetes
is a common condition where the human pancreas is unable to produce sufficient
quantities of a hormone called insulin. The cure of diabetes requires regular injec-
tions of insulin [148]. A portable, automated, embedded insulin pump system is
used to measure the level of blood sugar at regular intervals and to deliver doses of
insulin depending on the actual level of sugar in the blood. The system can detect
abnormally low and high levels of blood sugar.
4.2.1 Description of an Insulin Pump
An insulin pump consists of a sensor component which measures some blood
parameter. The controller component controls the entire system. The tubed pumps
have the insulin pump worn external to the body. The pump contains a tank of
insulin that is pumped through a tube that connects to the body internally by a
cannula [127]. The pump component delivers insulin from the insulin reservoir to
the needle assembly. An insulin pump helps diabetics to keep their blood glucose
levels within their target ranges. Insulin pumps deliver rapid- or short-acting insulin
(a type of insulin that starts to lower blood glucose within 30 minutes after injection
and has its strongest effect 2 to 5 hours after injection). Insulin pumps deliver short-
acting insulin 24 hours a day through a catheter placed under the skin. Insulin
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pumps generally use rapid acting insulin, which acts very quickly to reduce the rise
in blood sugar after eating. An alarm is sounded to warn patients that they should
take some action [157].
The system works by watching blood sugar levels and sends an appropriate dose
of insulin when necessary. A software-controlled insulin delivery system works by
using a micro-sensor embedded in a patient to measure some blood parameter that
is proportional to the sugar level. This is then sent to the pump controller. The
controller computes the sugar level and the amount of insulin needed. If the sugar
level is high or very high, a special alarm sound is issued to warn a patient and
the controller sends a signal to the pump to deliver the amount of insulin needed
via a permanently attached needle. The insulin pump conveys one unit of insulin
in response to a single pulse from a controller. If the sugar level is low or very
low, a special alarm sound is issued. Clearly, this is a safety-critical system. If the
pump fails to operate or does not operate correctly, then a patient may fall into a
coma because their blood sugar levels are too high or too low. Low blood glucose
is a more dangerous condition as it can result in temporary brain malfunctioning,
unconsciousness and death. However, continual high levels of blood glucose can lead
to eye damage, kidney damage, and heart problems. Therefore, the system must
meet two essential high-level requirements [148]:
1. The system shall be existing to convey insulin when required.
2. The system shall function reliably and send the correct amount of insulin to
counteract the current level of blood sugar.
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4.2.2 Behavioral Model (BM), Test Criteria (BC), and Test
Suite (BT)
Figure 4.15 shows the behavioral model of an insulin pump system. The model
contains 15 states, S ={s0, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8, s9, s10, s11, s12, s13, s14} where the
initial states are s0,s2,s9,s13 and the final states are s0,s8,s10,s13. There are 23 transi-
tions X ={x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14, x15, x16, x17, x18, x19,
x20, x21, x22}. Assuming edge coverage is required, the test paths in Table 4.13 ful-
fill this requirement. By using reachability analysis, we find that these paths are
feasible since there are no conflicts between predicates in the transitions.
x0= s0,[sensor on =T]/s1, send(Msg1” sugar level (v)”)
x1= s1,[sensor on =F] / s0
x2= s2,[ready =F]/ s2
x3= s2,[ready =T], get(sugar level (v)) / s3
x4= s3,[sugar level (v)=N]/ s3
x5= s3,[sugar level (v)=L]/ s4, send (Msg2 “warning sound (AT=1)”)
x6= s4,[sound released=T] / s3
x7= s3,[sugar level (v)=H]/s5, send (Msg2”warning sound (AT=2)”, Msg3 “inject dose”)
x8= s5,[sound released=T] / s3
x9= s3,[previous sugar level (v)=L and current sugar level (v)= very H ]/ s6, send (Msg2”warning
sound (AT=3)”, Msg3 “inject dose”)
x10= s6,[sound released=T] / s3
x11= s3,[previous sugar level (v)=H and current sugar level (v)= very L ]/s7, send (Msg2 “warning
sound (AT=4)”)
x12= s7,[sound released=T] / s3
x13= s3,[shut off=T]/s8, send (Msg2” warning sound (AT=5)”)
x14= s9,[ready =F]/ s9
x15= s9,[ready =T]/ s10
x16= check reservoir level and battery charge
x17= s10, get (inject dose)[reservoir level ≥ L and battery charge=H] / s11, emit dose
x18= s11,[injected=T]/ s10
x19= s10 [reservoir level ≺ L or battery charge=L] /s12, send (Msg2” warning sound (AT=6)” or
“warning sound (AT=7)”)
x20= s12,[sound released=T] / s10
x21= s13, get (warning sound(AT)) / s14
x22= s14,[sound released=T] / s13
The structure of the messages (Msg) in CEFSM is shown as in Table 4.14 (Msgid,
Event, CEFSM(MsgDestination))
The system has different types of alarm sounds. It uses alarm sounds to warn


















































































Figure 4.15: Insulin Pump
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Table 4.13: Test Paths through CEFSM













































































system, to indicate a low battery and a low or empty reservoir. The (AT) is a variable
used to indicate sound type. For example, when AT=1 that means a patient has a
low blood sugar level. Table 4.15 shows all possible values of AT and sound types
of the system.
4.2.3 Failures, Applicability Matrix
Table 4.21 demonstrates four possible failures for the system. Some failures can
only occur in some states but not others. We use some of the mitigation actions to
mitigate these failures and avoid adverse effects. The applicability matrix in Table
4.17 indicates that a specific failure type fi applies or is relevant to a particular
node n and “0” depicts that the specific failure type fi is not applicable in n. Since
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Table 4.14: Structure of Messages
Msgid Event CEFSM
Msg1 Sensor on=True Controller ” monitoring”
Msg2 Sugar level=L,H,
very L,very H or
shut off=T
Alarm ”on”
Msg3 Sugar level=H or
very high
Pump ” check”
Msg4 reservoir level≺L or
battery charge=L
Alarm ”on”
Table 4.15: Alarm Types
AT variable Sound Type
1 warning sound low
2 warning sound high
3 warning sound spike
4 warning sound plunge
5 warning sound shut off
6 warning sound low battery
7 warning sound low or
empty reservoir
we have failures that only apply in certain phases of the system, we find “1”s for
behavioral states belonging to a particular insulin pump phase, and “0”s for all
other states. For example, when monitoring (s3), the alarm can fail (f1), hence
A(1,4)=1, but when low blood sugar is detected (s4), failure (f4) is not applicable.
hence A(4,4)=0
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Table 4.16: Failure Types
F Explanation
f1 alarm fails
f2 low pump battery fails
f3 monitoring fails
f4 insulin pump malfunction
Table 4.17: Applicability Matrix
F/S s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 s14
f1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
f2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
f3 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
f4 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
Basic Failure Types Descriptions:
• Alarm fails means that the light or speaker in the alarm does not operate.
• Low pump battery fails means that battery pump is low.
• Monitoring fails meaning that monitoring state in controller does not work.
• Insulin pump malfunction means that the pump can not deliver the required
amount of insulin (pump fail to work completely)
4.2.4 Failure Coverage Criteria (FC)
In the next step, we select position-failure pairs (p, e) based on four test coverage
criteria defined earlier. There are I =
∑l
i=1 len(ti) positions p to select for failure.
Concatenating the tests results in CT = {s0, s1, s0, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, s3, s7,
s3, s8, s14, s13, s9, s9, s10, s10, s11, s10, s12, s10, s9, s10, s11, s10, s12, s14, s13, s13, s14, s13, s0,
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s1, s3, s4, s14, s13, s0, s1, s3, s5, s14, s13, s0, s1, s3, s6, s14, s13, s0, s1, s3, s7, s14, s13, s0, s1,
s3, s5, s10, s11, s10, s0, s1, s3, s6, s10, s11, s10}. There are 74 positions. We now ap-
ply coverage criteria for positions of failure (1 ≤ p ≤ 74 ) and type of failures
(1 ≤ e ≤ 4).
Coverage Criteria 1: all positions, all applicable failures. The required (p, e)
combinations are shown in Tables 4.18 and 4.19 and as ”1” entries. The set of re-
quired pairs are 189 pairs. This is clearly infeasible for the model. [It would require
74 × 4 - 107 = 189 pairs]
Coverage Criteria 2: all unique nodes, all applicable failures. The set of required
position-failure pairs (p, e) is shown in Tables 4.20 and 4.21 as ”1” entries. There
are 37 pairs required. Note that test paths t4 to t11 are not used. This criteria
does not require testing failure recovery in all tests. A stronger test criterion is
to require covering each test as well (criteria 3). The (p, e) pairs are stated in the
second column in Tables 4.27.
Coverage Criteria 3: all test, all unique nodes, all applicable failures. Here we
simply require that when unique nodes need to be covered they are selected from
tests that have not been covered. Tables 4.22 and 4.23 show the set of position-
failure pairs (p, e) that fulfills this criteria. As with criteria 2, this required 37 pairs.
The (p, e) pairs are stated in the second column in Table 4.28.
Coverage Criteria 4: all test, all unique nodes, some applicable failures. This
criteria does not require that all failures be applied at every selected position even
though each failure must be selected at least once. (p, e) combinations that meet
this requirement are shown in Tables 4.24 and 4.25 as “1” entries. There are 13
pairs. The (p, e) pairs are stated in the second column in Table 4.29.
From the previous Tables 4.18, 4.19, 4.20, 4.21, 4.22, 4.23, 4.24, and 4.25, the










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2 and criteria 3 is the same, 37 pairs, criteria 4 requires 13 (p, e) pairs. The number
of (p, e) pairs in criteria 1 is so large due to taken every positions where failure is
applicable and all failures types which is incredible and expensive. The selection of
(p, e) pairs in criteria 2 and 3 is different even they have the same number of (p, e)
pairs. Criteria 4 is the weakest one because we select failure at least once.
4.2.5 Mitigation Requirements, Models, Safety Mitigation
Tests
The mitigation requirements are summarized in Table 4.26 which also specifies
the corresponding mitigation models and associated weaving rules. Figures 4.16 ,
4.17 and 4.18 show the mitigation models for failures f1, f2, and f4. Note that f3
does not need a model, since it is an implicit fix that does not use extra test inputs
(category 4 under weaving rules). Failures f1, and f4 have two mitigation test paths
which cause number of safety mitigation tests (SMTs) to increase. Again, assuming
edge coverage, the mitigation tests listed in Figures 4.16 , 4.17 and 4.18 fulfill this
coverage. For criteria 2 and criteria 3, the number of pairs which are indicated by
“1” in Tables 4.20, 4.21, 4.22 and 4.23 are the same (i.e. 37 pairs.) For criteria 4,
the number of pairs which are indicated by “1” in Tables 4.24 and 4.25 is 13 pairs.
For each pair (p, e), we construct as many tests as there are mitigation test paths
for failure type e. E.g. this means that for failure type 1 (f1), each pair (p,1) results
in 2 tests.
Next, because of the large number of tests for C1, we will only construct safety
mitigation tests for criteria C2-C4. Tables 4.27, 4.28, and 4.29 have four columns.
The first column contains the safety mitigation test identifier. The second column
contains pairs (p, e) that fulfill criteria 2,3, and 4. The third column contains test
180
path as a sequence of nodes. Column 4 contains behavioral test path (BT) used to
construct smt. The total number of SMTs for criteria 2 and criteria 3 are the same
which are 54 tests. For criteria 4, the total number of SMTs are 16 tests.
Table 4.26: Mitigation Requirement
MM Mitigation action Mitigation Model WR
MM1 Compensate; turn light on
and send maintenace re-
quest or turn speaker on
and send maintenace re-
quest
cf. Figure 4.16 1a in 3.5
MM2 Fix and proceed cf. Figure 4.17 1a in 3.5
MM3 Internal compensate none 4 in 3.5
MM4 Compensate; switch to use
needle injection and send
alarm or use backup pump
and send alarm







MT1 = {mt 11, mt12} 
mt 11= {n11, n12, n14} 
mt 12= {n11, n13, n14} 




                                 
            
n21 n22 n23 
Charge battery=T Send alarm 
  mt 2= {n21, n22, n23} 











MT4 = {mt 41, mt42} 
mt 41= {n41, n42, n44} 
mt 42= {n41, n43, n44} 
Figure 4.18: Try Other Alternative (compensate): Mitigation Model for f4
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Table 4.27: Safety Mitigation Tests for Criteria 2
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (6,1) s2, s2, s3, n11, n12, n14, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5 t2
s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt2 (6,1) s2, s2, s3, n11, n13, n14, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5 t2
s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt3 (8,1) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, n11, n12, n14, s4, s3, s5 t2
s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt4 (8,1) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, n11, n13, n14, s4, s3, s5 t2
s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt5 (10,1) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, n11, n12, n14, s5 t2
s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt6 (10,1) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, n11, n13, n14, s5 t2
s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt7 (12,1) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, n11, n12, n14, t2
Continued on next page
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s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt8 (12,1) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, n11, n13, n14, t2
s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt9 (14,1) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, s3, s7, t2
n11, n12, n14, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt10 (14,1) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, s3, s7, t2
n11, n13, n14, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt11 (16,1) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, t2
n11, n12, n14, s8, s14, s13
smt12 (16,1) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, t2
n11, n13, n14, s8, s14, s13
smt13 (17,1) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, t2
s8, s14, n11, n12, n14, s14, s13
Continued on next page
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smt14 (17,1) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, t2
s8, s14, n11, n13, n14, s14, s13
smt15 (19,1) s9, n11, n12, n14, s9, s9, s10, s10, t3
s11, s10, s12, s10
smt16 (19,1) s9, n11, n13, n14, s9, s9, s10, s10, t3
s11, s10, s12, s10
smt17 (21,1) s9, s9, s10, n11, n12, n14, s10, s10, t3
s11, s10, s12, s10
smt18 (21,1) s9, s9, s10, n11, n13, n14, s10, s10, t3
s11, s10, s12, s10
smt19 (25,1) s9, s9, s10, s10, s11, s10, s12, n11, n12, n14, t3
s12, s10
smt20 (25,1) s9, s9, s10, s10, s11, s10, s12, n11, n13, n14, t3
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s12, s10
smt21 (6,2) s2, s2, s3, n21, n22, n23, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, t2
s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt22 (10,2) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, n21, n22, n23, s5, s3, t2
s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt23 (12,2) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, n21, n22, n23, t2
s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt24 (17,2) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, t2
n21, n22, n23, s8, s14, s13
smt25 (18,2) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, t2
s14, s13, n21, n22, n23, s13
smt26 (19,2) s9, n21, n22, n23, s9, s9, s10, s10, s11, s10, t3
s12, s10
Continued on next page
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smt27 (21,2) s9, s9, s10, n21, n22, n23, s10, s10, t3
s11, s10, s12, s10
smt28 (23,2) s9, s9, s10, s10, s11, n21, n22, n23, s11 t3
s10, s12, s10
smt29 (25,2) s9, s9, s10, s10, s11, s10, s12, n21, n22, n23, t3
s12, s10
smt30 (4,3) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt31 (6,3) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt32 (8,3) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt33 (10,3) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt34 (12,3) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt35 (14,3) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt36 (17,3) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
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smt37 (19,3) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt38 (21,3) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt39 (23,3) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt40 (25,3) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt41 (6,4) s2, s2, s3, n41, n42, n44, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5 t2
s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt42 (6,4) s2, s2, s3, n41, n43, n44, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5 t2
s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt43 (10,4) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, n41, n42, n44, s5 t2
s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt44 (10,4) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, n41, n43, n44, s5 t2
s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt45 (12,4) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, n41, n42, t2
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n44, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt46 (12,4) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, n41, n43, t2
n44, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, s14, s13
smt47 (17,4) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, t2
s8, s14, n41, n42, n44, s14, s13
smt48 (17,4) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, t2
s8, s14, n41, n43, n44, s14, s13
smt49 (19,4) s9, n41, n42, n44, s9, s9, s10, s10, s11, s10 t3
, s12, s10
smt50 (19,4) s9, n41, n43, n44, s9, s9, s10, s10, s11, s10 t3
, s12, s10
smt51 (21,4) s9, s9, s10, n41, n42, n44, s10, s10, s11, s10 t3
, s12, s10
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smt52 (21,4) s9, s9, s10, n41, n43, n44, s10, s10, s11, s10 t3
, s12, s10
smt53 (23,4) s9, s9, s10, s10, s11, n41, n42, n44, s11, s10 t3
, s12, s10
smt54 (23,4) s9, s9, s10, s10, s11, n41, n43, n44, s11, s10 t3
, s12, s10
Table 4.28: Safety Mitigation Tests for Criteria 3
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (16,1) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, t2
n11, n12, n14, s8, s14, s13
smt2 (16,1) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, t2
n11, n13, n14, s8, s14, s13
smt3 (19,1) s9, n11, n12, n14, s9, s9, s10, s10, t3
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s11, s10s12, s10
smt4 (19,1) s9, n11, n13, n14, s9, s9, s10, s10, t3
s11, s10, s12, s10
smt5 (25,1) s9, s9, s10, s10, s11, s10, s12, n11, n12, n14, t3
s12, s10
smt6 (25,1) s9, s9, s10, s10, s11, s10, s12, n11, n13, n14, t3
s12, s10
smt7 (28,1) s9, s10, n11, n12, n14, t4
s10, s11, s10, s12, s14, s13
smt8 (28,1) s9, s10, n11, n13, n14, t4
s10, s11, s10, s12, s14, s13
smt9 (35,1) s13, s14, n11, n12, n14, s14, s13 t5
smt10 (35,1) s13, s14, n11, n13, n14, s14, s13 t5
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smt11 (40,1) s0, s1, s3, s4, n11, n12, n14, s4, s14, s13 t6
smt12 (40,1) s0, s1, s3, s4, n11, n13, n14, s4, s14, s13 t6
smt13 (46,1) s0, s1, s3, s5, n11, n12, n14, s5, s14, s13 t7
smt14 (46,1) s0, s1, s3, s5, n11, n13, n14, s5, s14, s13 t7
smt15 (52,1) s0, s1, s3, s6, n11, n12, n14, s6, s14, s13 t8
smt16 (52,1) s0, s1, s3, s6, n11, n13, n14, s6, s14, s13 t8
smt17 (58,1) s0, s1, s3, s7, n11, n12, n14, s7, s14, s13 t9
smt18 (58,1) s0, s1, s3, s7, n11, n13, n14, s7, s14, s13 t9
smt19 (63,1) s0, s1, s3, n11, n12, n14, s3, s5, s10, s11, s10 t10
smt20 (63,1) s0, s1, s3, n11, n13, n14, s3, s5, s10, s11, s10 t10
smt21 (19,2) s9, n21, n22, n23, s9, s9, s10, s10, s11, s10, t3
s12, s10
smt22 (25,2) s9, s9, s10, s10, s11, s10, s12, n21, n22, n23, t3
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s12, s10
smt23 (28,2) s9, s10, n21, n22, n23, t4
s10, s11, s10, s12, s14, s13
smt24 (34,2) s13, n21, n22, n23, t5
s13, s14, s13
smt25 (35,2) s13, s14, n21, n22, n23, t5
s14, s13
smt26 (46,2) s0, s1, s3, s5, n21, n22, n23, s5, s14, s13 t7
smt27 (52,2) s0, s1, s3, s6, n21, n22, n23, s6, s14, s13 t8
smt28 (63,2) s0, s1, s3, n21, n22, n23, s3, s5, s10, s11, s10 t10
smt29 (73,2) s0, s1, s3, s6, s10, s11, n21, n22, n23, s11, s10 t11
smt30 (4,3) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt31 (19,3) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
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smt32 (25,3) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt33 (28,3) t4 (no MT added to it) t4
smt34 (35,3) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt35 (40,3) t6 (no MT added to it) t6
smt36 (46,3) t7 (no MT added to it) t7
smt37 (52,3) t8 (no MT added to it) t8
smt38 (58,3) t9 (no MT added to it) t9
smt39 (63,3) t10 (no MT added to it) t10
smt40 (73,3) t11 (no MT added to it) t11
smt41 (19,4) s9, n41, n42, n44, s9, s9, s10, s10, s11, s10, t3
s12, s10
smt42 (19,4) s9, n41, n43, n44, s9, s9, s10, s10, s11, s10, t3
s12, s10
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smt43 (28,4) s9, s10, n41, n42, n44, s10, s11, s10, t4
s12, s14, s13
smt44 (28,4) s9, s10, n41, n43, n44, s10, s11, s10 t4
, s12, s14, s13
smt45 (35,4) s13, s14, n41, n42, n44, s14, s13 t5
smt46 (35,4) s13, s14, n41, n43, n44, s14, s13 t5
smt47 (46,4) s0, s1, s3, s5, n41, n42, n44, s5, s14, s13 t7
smt48 (46,4) s0, s1, s3, s5, n41, n43, n44, s5, s14, s13 t7
smt49 (52,4) s0, s1, s3, s6, n41, n42, n44, s6, s14, s13 t8
smt50 (52,4) s0, s1, s3, s6, n41, n43, n44, s6, s14, s13 t8
smt51 (63,4) s0, s1, s3, n41, n42, n44, s3, s5, s10, s11, s10 t10
smt52 (63,4) s0, s1, s3, n41, n43, n44, s3, s5, s10, s11, s10 t10
smt53 (73,4) s0, s1, s3, s6, s10, s11, n41, n42, n44, s11, s10 t11
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smt54 (73,4) s0, s1, s3, s6, s10, s11, n41, n43, n44, s11, s10 t11
Table 4.29: Safety Mitigation Tests for Criteria 4
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (16,1) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, t2
n11, n12, n14, s8, s14, s13
smt2 (16,1) s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s3, s5, s3, s6, s3, s7, s3, s8, t2
n11, n13, n14, s8, s14, s13
smt3 (40,1) s0, s1, s3, s4, n11, n12, n14, s4, s14, s13 t6
smt4 (40,1) s0, s1, s3, s4, n11, n13, n14, s4, s14, s13 t6
smt5 (19,2) s9, n21, n22, n23, s9, s9, s10, s10, s11, t3
s10, s12, s10
smt6 (25,2) s9, s9, s10, s10, s11, s10, s12, n21, n22, n23, t3
s12, s10
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smt7 (34,2) s13, n21, n22, n23, t5
s13, s14, s13
smt8 (52,2) s0, s1, s3, s6, n21, n22, n23, s6, s14, s13 t8
smt9 (63,2) s0, s1, s3, n21, n22, n23, s3, s5, s10, s11, s10 t10
smt10 (4,3) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt11 (28,3) t4 (no MT added to it) t4
smt12 (35,3) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt13 (58,3) t9 (no MT added to it) t9
smt14 (73,3) t11 (no MT added to it) t11
smt15 (46,4) s0, s1, s3, s5, n41, n42, n44, s5, s14, s13 t7
smt16 (46,4) s0, s1, s3, s5, n41, n43, n44, s5, s14, s13 t7
In conclusion, criteria (c2, c3, and c4) have different number of safety mitigation
tests (SMTs). In this case study, the number of the behavior test paths is 11 paths
and the safety mitigation tests (SMTs) 54 for criteria 2 and criteria 3. This is fairly
reasonable. For criteria 4, we have 16 (SMTs). The total number of mitigation tests
(MT ) that we have is 5 MTs. Some failures require two mitigation test paths, such
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as (f1, f4) which cause the number of safety mitigation tests (SMTs) to increase.
Therefore, we expect that the number of SMTs increases.
4.3 Comparison wrt Effectiveness and Efficiency
against A Genetic Algorithm (GA)
Instead of using test criteria, we could use GA to select (p, e) pairs. Sometimes,
when test suites are long and many failure types exist, there are thousands of possible
pairs and criteria become expensive. Boukhris et al. [5] developed a GA approach
for determing (p, e) pairs for an FSMWeb model, but the same approach could be
used for CEFSMs since it does not depend on the type of model. In this section we
describe the design, execution, and results of comparing coverage criteria and GA
search to select (p, e) pairs. We report also under which conditions one approach is
preferrable to another.
We start with the following Conjectures:
• C1 will find all defective pairs, but is not viable for more than small search
spaces (high effectiveness, low efficiency)
• C2, C3 will be more efficient, but still cease to be viable at large search spaces.
C2, C3 will be more effective in small search spaces.
• C4 will outperform GA for small search spaces, but both effectiveness and
efficiency are worse than GA.
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4.3.1 Simulator
This is Salah Boukhris’ work. It is mentioned here for clarity of how the simulator
works. The comparison results are based on a simulator written by Salah Boukhris
that takes as input:
• number of states
• number of transitions
• mitigation defect density
• number of failure types
• applicability level (proportion of ‘1’ in applicability matrix)
• length of test suite
The simulator generates the test suite and the applicability matrix. It then applies
the GA to generate (p,e) pairs. In each generation, it determines whether a (p,e)
pair found a defect or not and uses this information, as described in subsection 4.3.3
to generate the next generation.
4.3.2 Design of Experiment
Because of the tuning and experimentation results in [5], we used the same
parameters for the GA:
1. Applicability level=80% (the number of nonzero entries in SE)
2. Number of failure types=5
3. Mitigation defect density=5%. The lower the density, the more difficult is the





6. Number of runs per problem=10
Sawadpong et al. [143] performed an empirical study on exception handling defects
in six Eclipse releases and report that 19-23% of exception handling routines have
defects. If we consider mitigation code a form of exception handling, this begins to
provide an idea of what mitigation defect densities to expect. This is relatively high.
2 We thus can expect mitigation defect density in mitigation handlers of around
20%. The independent variables are:
• applicability level=80% (number of ones in SE).
• the search space varies between 200 and 2000 for the large search space, and
between 10 and 100 for the small one.
• mitigation defect density. We use a low mitigation defect density of 5% (with
weights wr = 1, ws = 3) and a higher mitigation defect density of 20 % ( with
weights wr = 3, ws = 1). The lower mitigation defect density represents a
more difficult search problem. For the small search space we only used a 20%
mitigation defect density, since the lower one would have resulted in less than
1 mitigation defects.
• number of nodes in the behavioral model. We used 10 nodes for the large
search space and 5 nodes for the small one.
• number of failure types. We use 5 failure types for the large search space and
2 failure types for the small one.
2Note that this is not the same as defect density
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• length of test suite. It is determined by dividing search space size by number
of failure types.
The dependent variables are:
• number of pairs (p,e) needed to find all mitigation defects.
• number of mitigation defects found.
• mitigation defect coverage: the percentage of mitigation defects found=number
of mitigation defects found/total number of mitigation defects.
We measure the efficiency of the technique based on number of pairs (p,e) needed.
For effectiveness, we report mitigation defect coverage as defined above.
4.3.3 Results
We first compare GA against criteria C1. C1 guarantees 100% mitigation defect
coverage, but the number of pairs (p,e) increases quickly. Table 4.30 shows results
for a mitigation defect density of 5%. Column 1 states the size of the search space,
column 2 shows the number of pairs needed to achieve the coverage in column
3. Column 4 states the number of pairs needed to achieve C1 coverage (and find
all mitigation defects), and column 5 shows the percentage of mitigation defects
uncovered by C1. Clearly, C1 is much less efficient. Even for the smallest search
space of 200, it requires an order of magnitude more pairs than the GA, while the
number of pairs needed for 100% mitigation defect coverage only varies between
31-39 for the GA.
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Table 4.30: Effectiveness of GA vs. C1 - 5% Defect Density
Search Space GA GA C1 C1
# of pairs Defect coverage % coverage defect coverage
pairs required %
200 31 100% 153 100%
400 34 100% 328 100%
600 39 100% 492 100%
800 34 100% 642 100%
1000 38 100% 794 100%
1200 38 100% 962 100%
1400 39 100% 1119 100%
1600 32 100% 1274 100%
1800 32 100% 1430 100%
2000 35 100% 1614 100%
Table 4.31 shows results for a mitigation defect density of 20%. Meeting criteria
C1 requires the same number of pairs as before. The GA needs fewer pairs, since
the larger mitigation defect density makes for a simpler search problem. Clearly,
the GA is more efficient. Both C1 and GA achieve 100% mitigation defect coverage,
hence are equally effective.
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Table 4.31: Effectiveness of GA vs. C1 - 20% Defect Density
Search Space GA GA C1 C1
# of pairs Defect coverage % coverage defect coverage
pairs required %
200 27 100% 153 100%
400 29 100% 328 100%
600 27 100% 492 100%
800 28 100% 642 100%
1000 28 100% 794 100%
1200 29 100% 962 100%
1400 27 100% 1119 100%
1600 27 100% 1274 100%
1800 27 100% 1430 100%
2000 27 100% 1614 100%
Table 4.32 shows results for the small search space (varying between 10 and 100)
for a mitigation defect density of 20 %. The GA does not reach 100% effectiveness
until the search space reaches 80, hence for search space sizes 10-70 C1 is more
effective. However, even with the small search space C1 requires more pairs, hence
is less efficient.
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Table 4.32: Efficiency: GA vs. C1 - 20% Defect Density
Search Space GA GA C1 C1
# of pairs Defect coverage % coverage defect coverage
pairs required %
10 5 50% 9 100%
20 8 50% 17 100%
30 7 50% 26 50%
40 8 50% 29 50%
50 7 50% 42 50%
60 7 50% 49 0%
70 6 50% 52 0%
80 7 100% 64 0%
90 7 100% 72 0%
100 7 100% 83 0%
Next, we compare C2 and C3 against GA. Tables 4.33, and 4.34 show the results
for the large search space for a mitigation defect density of 5% and 20% respectively.
C2 and C3 require 40 pairs to achieve 100% mitigation defect coverage. This is not
much more than the GA needs (31-39) for the same effectiveness. Hence C2/C3
and GA are equally effective, with the GA being slightly more efficient. With a
mitigation defect density of 20%, the GA is more efficient.
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Table 4.33: Effectiveness of GA vs. C2 & C3 - 5% Defect Density
Search Space GA GA C2 & C3 C2 & C3
# of pairs Defect coverage % coverage defect coverage
pairs required %
200 31 100% 40 100%
400 34 100% 40 100%
600 39 100% 40 100%
800 34 100% 40 100%
1000 38 100% 40 100%
1200 38 100% 40 100%
1400 39 100% 40 100%
1600 32 100% 40 100%
1800 32 100% 40 100%
2000 35 100% 40 100%
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Table 4.34: Effectiveness of GA vs. C2 & C3 - 20% Defect Density
Search Space GA GA C2 & C3 C2 & C3
# of pairs Defect coverage % coverage defect coverage
pairs required %
200 27 100% 40 100%
400 29 100% 40 100%
600 27 100% 40 100%
800 28 100% 40 100%
1000 28 100% 40 100%
1200 29 100% 40 100%
1400 27 100% 40 100%
1600 27 100% 40 100%
1800 27 100% 40 100%
2000 27 100% 40 100%
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Table 4.35 shows results for the small search spaces ranging from 10-100 and
a mitigation defect density of 20%. GA does not reach 100% effectiveness until a
search space of 80, showing C2/C3 is more effective for search spaces ranging from
10-70. The number of pairs is comparable: C2/C3 needs 8, GA ranges from 5-8.
Table 4.35: Efficiency: GA vs. C2 & C3
Search Space GA GA C2 & C3 C2 & C3
# of pairs Defect coverage % coverage defect coverage
pairs required %
10 5 50% 8 100%
20 8 50% 8 100%
30 7 50% 8 100%
40 8 50% 8 100%
50 7 50% 8 100%
60 7 50% 8 100%
70 6 50% 8 100%
80 7 100% 8 100%
90 7 100% 8 100%
100 7 100% 8 100%
Finally, Tables 4.36-4.38 compare results for GA vs. C4. Table 4.36 shows
results for large search spaces and a mitigation defect density of 5 %. Table 4.36
lists the number of pairs the GA produces and the coverage achieved, compared
to the number of pairs required by C4 and the coverage produced by them. The
GA finds all mitigation defects, while C4 finds none. While C4 needs fewer pairs,
efficiency is a moot point since there is no effectiveness. Table 4.37 repeats results for
a 20% mitigation defect density. The GA is more efficient than at the 5% density
and as effective. C4 finds no defects. Table 4.38 repeats results for small search
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spaces (10-100). As seen before, the GA does not find all mitigation defects until
the search space reaches 80. C4 is more effective, as it finds all mitigation defects.
Table 4.36: Effectiveness of GA vs. C4 - 5% Defect Density
Search Space GA GA C4 C4
# of pairs Defect coverage % coverage defect coverage
pairs required %
200 31 100% 10 0%
400 34 100% 10 0%
600 39 100% 10 0%
800 34 100% 10 0%
1000 38 100% 10 0%
1200 38 100% 10 0%
1400 39 100% 10 0%
1600 32 100% 10 0%
1800 32 100% 10 0%
2000 35 100% 10 0%
In summary, GA outperforms coverage criteria for large search spaces. For small
search spaces, the GA is less effective than coverage criteria. C1, while effective, is
very inefficient and should only be used when the search space is small. C2/C3 also
are more effective for small search spaces than GA. For large search spaces, they are
as effective, but not as efficient as the GA, although not dramatically so (as C1).
C4, the weakest criterion cannot find any mitigation defects for large search spaces
while GA finds them all. C4 is effective for small search spaces. In conclusion, we
recommend to use GA for large search spaces and C2/C3 for small ones.
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Table 4.37: Effectiveness of GA vs. C4 - 20% Defect Density
Search Space GA GA C4 C4
# of pairs Defect coverage % coverage defect coverage
pairs required %
200 27 100% 10 0%
400 29 100% 10 0%
600 27 100% 10 0%
800 28 100% 10 0%
1000 28 100% 10 0%
1200 29 100% 10 0%
1400 27 100% 10 0%
1600 27 100% 10 0%
1800 27 100% 10 0%
2000 27 100% 10 0%
4.4 End-to-End Testing Methodology for Safety
Critical Systems
The End-to-End testing3 [8] methodology shown in Figure 4.19 consists of two
phases. The first phase integrates the behavioral and fault model to produce test
cases. The second phase constructs the safety mitigation tests based on the weaving
rules and some coverage criteria.
3This portion of the work is done jointly with Mr. Ahmed Gario.
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Table 4.38: Efficiency: GA vs. C4
Search Space GA GA C4
# of pairs Defect coverage % coverage defect coverage
pairs required %
10 5 50% 10 100%
20 8 50% 10 100%
30 7 50% 10 100%
40 8 50% 10 100%
50 7 50% 10 100%
60 7 50% 10 100%
70 6 50% 10 100%
80 7 100% 10 100%
90 7 100% 10 100%
100 7 100% 10 100%
4.4.1 Test Generation Process
The test generation process is shown in Figure 4.19. It uses the behavioral
model (BM) and a FT to generate test cases. The approach consists of two phases.
The first phase generates failures and determines in which behavioral states spe-
cific failures may occur (failure applicability). Phase 1 (Mr. Ahmed Gario’s work)
starts with a compatibility transformation step for the Fault Tree wrt the behav-
ioral model. The FT produced from this step is transformed into gate CEFSMs
(GCEFSMs) according to transformation rules. Then, the model integration step
integrates the GCEFSM with the behavioral model (BM) according to the integra-
tion rules. The resultant model is the integrated communicating extended finite
state machine (ICEFSM). Any of a number of existing test case generation methods
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[107][73][41][19][95] can use this model to generate test cases based on test criteria
(IC). The second phase (chapter 3 of this dissertation) generates safety mitigation
tests. We construct the behavioral test suite (BT) from the behavioral model (BM)
using behavioral test criteria (BC). From the test paths generated from the inte-
grated model ICEFSM, we construct the applicability matrix. Then, we apply test
coverage criteria (C1-C4) to the behavioral test suite and failure types. Based on
the applicability of failures in specific behavioral states, we select states in exist-
ing test paths representing behavioral tests (positions in a test path) and combine
them with applicable failures(e) to systematically create failure situations for which
we test proper mitigation. The mitigation tests are generated from the mitigation
model (MM) based on mitigation coverage criteria (MC). After that, we construct
the safety mitigation tests (SMTs) by combining the mitigation tests (MTs) with
the behavioral tests at the failure position (p) according to weaving rules (WRs).
We provide an analysis method to link the two approaches.
4.4.2 Phase1: Generate Failures and Failure Applicability
This phase is the dissertation of Mr. Ahmed Gario’s. In this phase, we propose
an integration of the behavioral model with a fault model to take advantage of the
two for testing. The work is based on [61]. The test generation process in Figure
4.19 uses the behavioral model and a FT to generate test cases. It starts with the
compatibility transformation step. The FT́ produced from this step is transformed
into gate CEFSMs (GCEFSMs) according to the transformation rules. Then, the
model integration step integrates the GCEFSM with the behavioral model (BM)
according to the integration rules. The resultant model is the Integrated Communi-
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Figure 4.19: End-To-End Test Generation Process
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use this model to generate test cases based on test criteria (IC) that lead to failure.
A shorter version of technique described here was orginally developed in [62]. In
[63] it was applied to multiple fault trees related to an aerospace launch system.
However, it did not consider test generation for proper failure mitigation.
4.4.3 Construction of the Applicability Matrix
At the analysis stage of the system, safety analysts will have a list of every
possible failure and its ID. This list will be filled in failure types table shown in Table
4.39 at the analysis stage. At the beginning of phase1, the first two columns that
contain Failure ID and Failure Type with every possible failure in the system. The
following columns, Node in FT́, Event ID, Gate ID, and Message ID are filled during
the process of phase1. That is, Node in FT́ column is filled during the compatibility
transformation step, Event ID is filled during the transformation procedure, and
Gate ID and Message ID are filled during the integration procedure. This table
is used to map the failures in phase1 to the failures in phase2 that have the same
meaning. The connection between these phases is accomplished via the applicability
matrix.











ex. f1 Gas leak FBGasLeak.BFEventCond e1 G1 m1
The applicability matrix is a two dimensional array. Each column represents a





1 if failure type j can occur in state si,
0 if otherwise
Phase 1 determines whether a failure of type j can occur in state si or not. The
applicability matrix is then constructed from the test paths obtained from phase 1
according to the construction procedure shown in Figure 4.20
4.4.4 Phase2: Generate Safety Mitigation Tests
This is essentially chapter 3 of this thesis. Our goal in this phase is to provide
an MBT approach to test proper mitigation of safety failures in SCSs. Andrews
et al. [7] describe a similar approach for generating a safety mitigation test suite.
However, they use an EFSM instead of a CEFSM and these are not able to model the
interaction of the failure process and the behavioral process and merely assume that
a particular failure can be generated when the system is in a given behavioral state.
Mitigation models describe mitigation patterns associated with a fault. Mitigation
test criteria describe required coverage. Mitigation test paths are then generated and
woven into the behavioral test similar to aspect oriented modeling [147]. Weaving
rules describe how a mitigation test path is woven into the original behavioral test.




- Set of test paths (R )  from ICEFSM. 
- Failure types table (Q). 
Output: 
- Applicability Matrix AM(i,j). 
Begin 
   For all the paths ri in R take ri one-by-one { 
    If (path ri   R contribute to failure)  
       Then { 
       Obtain failure name (Wi) from Q 
       Check Wi  in Q  
       If (found)     //it mean that it is a failure not an event 
       then{ 
           For every behavior state si   ri 
                 Assign “1” to AM (fj , si)  
           Check the reminder test paths r’j  R that don’t  
           contribute to failure 
           If (s0   ri == s’0   r’j) 
             then 
                For all s’i   r’i  
                     Assign “1” to AM (f j, s’I )   
           } 
          else 
                  // this is a normal event 
    }  
       } 
   And assign “0” to the reminder of AM  
End 
Figure 4.20: Applicability Matrix Construction Procedure
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4.5 End-To-End Case Study: Railroad Crossing
Control System (RCCS)
In this section, we use the Railroad Crossing Control System (RCCS) to illustrate
the whole End-to-End testing methodology. This first phase is part of Mr. Gario’s
dissertation. The system description and the algorithm to find the applicability
matrix was done jointly with him.
4.5.1 Phase1: Generate Failures and Failure Applicability
4.5.1.1 Description of Railroad System
RCCS encompasses the following main components: train, railway track, sen-
sors, gates, controller, and signal lights as shown in Figure 4.21. A depiction of each
element is given below [116].
Train: A train is powered by a power supply. When the power is switched on, the
train starts moving along the track when the metallic wheels of the train receive
power. When the tracks is switched off, the train comes to a stop.
Controller: The software that controls the general operation of the RCCS is stored
in the memory of the controller. The controller continuously monitors the sensors
and controls the gate actuators, track change lever, and the signal lights.
Sensors: Are used to detect the location of the train on the tracks. Two pairs of
sensors detect the train position before and after the gates.
Gate: RCCS has two sets of gates on either side of the track layout. The gate
receives signals from the controller.
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When it receives the command to lower the gate, the gate moves down and closes.
When it receives the command to raise the gate, it moves up allowing the traffic to
pass through.
Signal Lights: RCCS contains a warning light at the crossing area to indicate that
the train is approaching when the light is on and there is no train otherwise.
A railroad crossing is an intersection where a railroad crosses a road or a path
at the same level. Because of the safety concerns at the intersection, this system
is intended to prevent normal traffic and people from using the intersection when a
train approaches and crosses. Figure 4.21 depicts the behavioral model of a Rail-
road Crossing Control System (RCCS) as a Communicating Extended Finite State
Machine (CEFSM) with one train and one track. The model specifies that gates
are to be closed and warning lights are to be turned on when a train approaches,
that they are to stay that way until the train is leaving. When the train is leaving,
the gates are opened and the lights switched off. Gates stay open and lights are off
while no train is approaching. The structure of the messages (Msg) in CEFSM is
shown as in Table 4.40 (Msgid, Event, CEFSM(MsgDestination))
Table 4.40: Structure of Messages
Msgid Event CEFSM
Msg1 Approaching=True Controller ” activate”
Msg2 Crossing=True Controller ”monitor”
Msg3 Leaving=False Controller ” deactivate”’
Msg4 Activate=True Gate ”lower gate”
Msg5 Monitor=False Gate ”raise gate”
Msg6 Activate=True Light ”on”






x13= ([lower gate = true])/() 




x14= ([gate down =true])/() 





x17= ([light on = true]) /() 
x18= ([light on = false]) /() 
Off(S13) 
x5= ([crossing =false]) / 
(“ monitor =false”) 
Train 
x6= ([leaving =true)/ () 
x0=([approaching=false]]/() 
x2=([approaching=true])/() 












 x8=([activate =true])/ 
(”lower gate”, “light on”) 
x10= ([monitor =true])/() 
x11=([monitor=false])/ 
(“raise gate”, “light off”) 
Idle (S5) 




Figure 4.21: Railroad Crossing Control System Model
4.5.1.2 Railroad Crossing Control System Failure
Basic Events Description:
• Raise Gate is an action from the controller component to the gate component
to open.
• Gate Opening means that the gate is in the opening state.
• Gate Open means that the gate is in the open state.
• Controller fail means the controller has not received any message from the
train (means sensor failed to detect the train) component and therefore it has
not sent any message to the light to switch on or the gate to close.
• Controller Deactivated means that the controller has stopped monitoring the
system as it received a message saying that a train has left the crossing area.
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• Train Approaching indicates that a train is approaching when it hits a sensor.
• Train Crossing indicates that a train is in the crossing area when it hits a
sensor.
This railroad crossing control system example has one fault tree that describes
a possible accident. This fault tree shows how some events or faults can cause an
accident when they happen as the fault tree describes. For example, if the event
Train Approaching is true and the event Controller fail is true, the top event accident
will be true, which means the hazard occurs. The fault tree shown in Figure 4.22 is
described by
Accident = (∧,(∨,(∨,(∨, Raise Gate, Gate Opening),∧,(Gate Open, Warning





















Figure 4.22: Fault Tree for Accident
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Some events such as the Train Crossing and Train Approaching of the leaf nodes
in the fault tree are normal events but they contribute to the accident when some
other faults occur. For example, if the gate is open when the train is approaching,
an accident may occur.
4.5.1.3 Compatibility Transformation Step
The first step is the compatibility transformation. At this step we create Bclass
and Fclass for the failure related entities BTrain, BController,BGate and BWarning-
Light and combine the related classes according to the compatibility transformation
procedure. These classes are shown in Figure 4.23, Figure 4.24, Figure 4.25, and
Figure 4.26. The events in the FT are substituted with the combined attributes from
the BF classes that are equivalent to these events. For example, the event Raise
Gate in the FT is equivalent to BFRaiseGate.BFEventCond in FT́. The attributes
of BGate and FRaisGate are combined in BFRaisGate. As we can see in Fig 4.25,
the attribute BState belongs to the class BGate at the behavioral model and FState
belongs to the BFRaisGate at the fault model.
After the compatibility transformation procedure is finished, the complete fault
tree Accident is represented as





   
State: Idle, Approaching,   
          Crossing, Leaving 
BTrain 
-State: Crossing: True, False 
-EventCond: Crossing= True 
FTrainCrossing 
-State: Approaching: 
           True,False 
-EventCond: Approaching  
                     =True 
FTrainApproaching 
-BState: Idle,Approaching,  




 -BState: Idle, Approaching,  
              Crossing,Leaving 




Figure 4.23: Train Approaching and Crossing Class
   
-State: Deactivate:Yes, No 
-EventCond:Deactivate=Yes 
FControllerDeactivate 
State: Idle, Monitor,  
         Activate, deactivate 
BController 




-BState: Idle, Monitor,   
             Activate, Deactivate 
-State: Deactivate:Yes, No 
-BFEventCond:FState= Yes 
BFControllerDeactivate 
-BState: Idle, Monitor,  
             Activate, Deactivate 
-FState: Idle:Yes, No 
-BFEventCond:FState= Idle 
BFControllerIdle 
Figure 4.24: Train Controller Class Diagram
   
State: Open, Closed,  
        Opening,Closing 
BGate 
-State:Opening: yes, no  
-EventCond: Opening:yes 
FGateOpening 
-State:Open:yes, no  
-EventCond:Open:yes 
FGateOpen 
-State:Rais:yes, no  
-EventCond:Raise=yes 
FRaisGate 
-BState: Open, Closed,  
              Opening, Closing  
-FState: Opening: yes, no  
-BFEventCond: FState=Opening  
                            
BFGateOpening 
-BState: Opening, Closing,  
              Open, Closed  
-FState: Raising:yes, no  
-BFEventCond:FState= Raise 
BFRaisGate 
-BState: Open, Closed,  
             Opening, Closing 
-FState: Open: yes, no 
-BFEventCond: FState= Open 
BFGateOpen 
Figure 4.25: Gate Events Class Diagram
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-State:On, Off 
-EventCond: State= Off 
FWarningLight 
 State: On, Off 
BWarningLight 





Figure 4.26: Warining Light Class Diagram
4.5.1.4 Fault Tree Transformation
The fault CEFSM is constructed according to a tree postorder traversal. The
FT is read gate by gate starting from the root node until we reach the leftmost leaf
node. The transformation starts with the leftmost leaf of the FT which is in this
example Raise Gate. The event is described in terms of class diagram as shown
in Figure 4.25. The sibling of this event is Gate Opening which is also an event
from the BM. The gate is constructed and given a number one because it is the
first gate to construct in this FT. The message id should carry the same number
as the gate. In this case the gate is given number one since it is the first gate to
transform. The numbering of the internal transition is not important since each
gate is an independent entity and no confusion will occur.
Next, we look for the right sibling of this gate which turns out to be an AND
gate between two events. Gate Open and Warning Light Off The gate is shown in
Figure 4.28. This gate is given number 2 since it is the second gate transformed.
The next step it to transform the gate that combines these two gates and we give
it number 3. The inputs to this gate are the output messages m1 from gate 1 and
message m2 from gate 2. This gate is shown in Figure 4.29.
The next step is to transform gate number 4 and then gate number 5 which is
the root for this subtree as shown in Figure 4.30. The next gate to transform is








1 OR gate 
S0 S1 







2 AND gate 
S15 S16 
















3 OR gate 
S0 S1 
mB2 mB1 mB3 mB4 
m2 m1 
m3 
Figure 4.29: GCEFSM for Gate Number 3
subtrees is transformed which is given number 7. This step is shown in Figure 4.31
The event-gate table after the whole FT is transformed is shown in Figure 4.41
Table 4.41: Event-Gate Table










































mB1 mB2 mB3 mB4 
mB5 mB6 















































7 AND gate 
S15 S16 
Figure 4.31: GCEFSMs for the Whole FT’
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4.5.1.5 Model Integration
After the fault tree is transformed into GCEFSMs, we start integrating them
into the behavioral model. At this point, every message in the BM contains an
event name that is related to an event in one of the leaf nodes of the fault tree.
We check the class diagram and the Event-Gate table to find the event ID and
the gate ID for the event. These event IDs and gate IDs are inserted into the
message at the BM. The event Raise Gate is represented in the class diagram as
BFRaiseGate.BFEventCond. This event is looked up in the event-gate table to
obtain its event ID (eB1) and the gate ID (G1) the message is sent to. The message in
the BM is modified as (mB1, eB1, G1). This procedure continues till all the messages
in the BM are linked to the FM.
Figure 4.32 illustrates the RCCS transformed into an ICEFSM model. There
are two connected models, the behavioral model and the FT model. The arrows
between the CEFSMs represent the communicating messages between them. The
transformed system shown in Figure 4.32 forms a graph to which suitable coverage
criteria can be applied. The FT gates that are directly connected to the behav-
ioral model receive messages from the behavioral model and act accordingly. The
messages m1 to m7 represent the global transitions between the GCEFSMs for the
FT part, while mI1 to mI3 represent the messages between the components of the
behavioral model and mB1 to mB8 represent the communicating messages between
the BM and FM.
4.5.1.6 Test Case Generation from CEFSM Model
If we apply the algorithm in [73] to the graph in Figure 4.32 by imposing edge





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































paths shown in Table 4.42. By using reachability analysis, we find that these paths
are feasible since there are no conflicts between predicates in transitions. Note that
we do not need to go into the details of the GCEFSMs and there for we represent
each of them as one node. e.x. the GCEFSM 1 that represents the first AND gate
is represented as “[1]” and the test path that reaches the root node of the FT,
GCEFSM 7, end with a message not a node to indicate that a hazard has occurred.
4.5.2 Construction of the Applicability Matrix
In addition to test paths r1-r14 in Table 4.42, phase1 produces Table 4.43 that
contains failure ID, Failure Type, Failure name in FT́, Event ID that carries the
failure, Gate ID that takes the failure as an input, and the Message ID of the message
that carries the failure. This information is used to map between the failures in the
test paths produced in phase1 and the failures that need to be mitigated in phase2.
The applicability matrix is build based on the information in this table.
From Table 4.42, we take the test paths through the ICEFSM one by one. We
start with r1. From Table 4.43, we find that r1 reaches the fault model via MB5.
From Table 4.43, we know that MB5 is in path r1 and it carries e5 which has
the failure ID f1. In the applicability matrix, we assign 1 to the positions indexed
(f1, s1),(f1, s2),(f1, s6),(f1, s7), and (f1, s8). These positions are taken from test path
r1. Next, we look for the behavioral state s1 which is the starting state of r1 in other
paths that don’t contribute to the failure, r5, r8, r10, r12, and r14. We assign 1 to the
position indexed (f1, s5), (f1, s6), (f1, s7), (f1, s14), (f1, s13),(f1, s3), (f1, s9), (f1, s10),
(f1, s11), (f1, s12), and (f1, s4) in the applicability matrix shown in table 4.45.
We apply the same steps to the remainder of test paths that contribute to a failure,



















































































































































































































4.5.3 Phase2: Generate Safety Mitigation Tests
4.5.3.1 Behavioral Model (BM), Test Criteria (BC), and Test Suite
(BT)
Figure 4.21 depicts the behavioral model of a Railroad Crossing Control System
(RCCS) in Communicating Extended Finite State Machine (CEFSM) format with
one train and one track. The model contains 14 states, = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8, s9,
s10, s11, s12, s13, s14} where the initial states are s1,s5,s9,s13 and the final states are
s1,s5,s9,s13. There are 19 transitions X={x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11,
x12, x13, x14, x15, x16, x17, x18}. Assuming edge coverage is required, the test paths in
Table 5.2 fulfill this requirement.
Let r1-r14 be the test paths through ICEFSM in Figure 4.32 obtained from
executing phase 1. Let t1-t11 be the paths through the CEFSM shown in Table 5.2.





























































Table 4.45: Applicability Matrix
F/S s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 s14
f1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
f2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
f3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
f4 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4.5.3.2 Failure Coverage Criteria (FC)
There are
∑|CT |
i=1 len(ti) positions p to select for failure. Concatenating the tests
results in CT. CT= t1 ◦ t2 . . . ◦t11 = {s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s4, s1, s5, s6, s7, s7, s8, s5, s9,
s10, s11, s12, s9, s13, s14, s13, s1, s2, s5, s1, s2, s3, s4, s7, s8, s5, s1, s2, s3, s7, s8, s5, s5, s6, s9,
s5, s6, s14, s13, s5, s6, s7, s8, s11, s12, s9, s5, s6, s7, s8, s13}. There are 58 positions.
We now apply coverage criteria for positions of failure (1 ≤ p ≤ 58 ) and type
of failure (1 ≤ e ≤ 4).
Coverage Criteria 1: all positions, all applicable failures. The required (p,e)
combinations are shown in Table 5.5 as ”1” entries. 138 pairs are required. This is
clearly a very large number of pairs for a model with only 14 states.
Coverage Criteria 2: all unique nodes, all applicable failures. The required
position-failure pairs (p,e) are shown in Table 4.47 as ”1” entries. This required
34 pairs. Note that behavioral test paths t5 − t11 are not used. This criterion leads
to not testing failure recovery in all tests. A stronger test criterion is to require
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1
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Coverage Criteria 3: all test, all unique nodes, all applicable failures. Here we
simply require that when unique nodes need to be covered they are selected from
tests that have not been covered. Table 4.48 shows the set of position-failure pairs
(p, e) that fulfills this criteria. As with criteria 2, this required 34 pairs. The (p, e)
pairs are stated in the second column in Table 4.52.
Coverage Criteria 4: all tests, all unique nodes, some failures. The required (p,e)
pairs are shown in Table 4.49 as ”1” entries. This requires 14 pairs. The (p,e) pairs
are also stated in the second column in Table 4.53 to indicate the associated safety
mitigation tests.
4.5.3.3 Mitigation Requirements, Mitigation Models, and Safety Miti-
gation Tests
The mitigation requirements are summarized in Table 4.50. Table 4.50 specifies
the corresponding mitigation models and associated weaving rules. Figures 4.33-
4.35 show the mitigation models for failures f2 − f4. Note that f1 does not need a
model, since it is an implicit fix that does not use additional test inputs (category
4 under weaving rules). Again, assuming edge coverage, the mitigation tests listed
in Figures 4.33- 4.35 fulfill this coverage. Note also, that only failure f4 has more






mt21 ={n21, n22, n23, n24}
n21 n22 n23 n24
Figure 4.33: Fix and Stop: Mitigation Model MM2
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MM1 compensate; switch to backup





MM2 fix and stop; close gate; send
alarm; stop
cf. Figure 4.33 1b in 3.5
MM3 fix and proceed; turn warning
light on; send alarm
cf. Figure 4.34 1a in 3.5
MM4 Try other alternative; compen-
sate; switch to back up and close
gates or turn warning light on;
send maintenance request





mt31 ={n31, n32, n33}
n31 n32 n33

















mt41= { n41, n42, n44 }
mt42= { n41, n43, n44}
Figure 4.35: Compensate: Mitigation Model MM4
239
Construct Safety Mitigation Tests: Due to the large number of tests for
C1, we will only show tests for criteria C2-C4. Table 4.51 indicates tests for the
44 position-failure pairs that fulfill coverage criteria 2. Note that because f4 has
two mitigation paths required, these are two test paths for each position failure pair
(i, 4) (i ∈ 10− 12, 14, 16− 19, 21− 22)
Table 4.51: Safety Mitigation Tests for Criteria 2
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (1,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
smt2 (3,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
smt3 (5,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
smt4 (7,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
smt5 (10,1) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt6 (11,1) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt7 (12,1) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt8 (14,1) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt9 (16,1) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt10 (17,1) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
Continued on next page
240
Continued from previous page
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt11 (18,1) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt12 (19,1) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt13 (21,1) t4 (no MT added to it) t4
smt14 (22,1) t4 (no MT added to it) t4
smt15 (10,2) s5, n21, n22, n23, n24 t2
smt16 (11,2) s5, s6, n21, n22, n23, n24 t2
smt17 (12,2) s5, s6, s7, n21, n22, n23, n24 t2
smt18 (14,2) s5, s6, s7, s7, s8, n21, n22, n23, n24 t2
smt19 (21,2) s13, n21, n22, n23, n24 t4
smt20 (22,2) s13, s14, n21, n22, n23, n24 t4
smt21 (16,3) s9, n31, n32, n33, s9, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt22 (17,3) s9, s10, n31, n32, n33, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt23 (18,3) s9, s10, s11, n31, n32, n33, s11, s12, s9 t3
Continued on next page
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SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt24 (19,3) s9, s10, s11, s12, n31, n32, n33, s12, s9 t3
smt25 (10,4) s5, n41, n42, n44, s5, s6, s7, s7, s8, s5 t2
smt26 (10,4) s5, n41, n43, n44, s5, s6, s7, s7, s8, s5 t2
smt27 (11,4) s5, s6, n41, n42, n44, s6, s7, s7, s8, s5 t2
smt28 (11,4) s5, s6, n41, n43, n44, s6, s7, s7, s8, s5 t2
smt29 (12,4) s5, s6, s7, n41, n42, n44, s7, s7, s8, s5 t2
smt30 (12,4) s5, s6, s7, n41, n43, n44, s7, s7, s8, s5 t2
smt31 (14,4) s5, s6, s7, s7, s8, n41, n42, n44, s8, s5 t2
smt32 (14,4) s5, s6, s7, s7, s8, n41, n43, n44, s8, s5 t2
smt33 (16,4) s9, n41, n42, n44, s9, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt34 (16,4) s9, n41, n43, n44, s9, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt35 (17,4) s9, s10, n41, n42, n44, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt36 (17,4) s9, s10, n41, n43, n44, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
Continued on next page
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SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt37 (18,4) s9, s10s11, n41, n42, n44, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt38 (18,4) s9, s10, s11, n41, n43, n44, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt39 (19,4) s9, s10, s11, s12, n41, n42, n44, s12, s9 t3
smt40 (19,4) s9, s10, s11, s12, n41, n43, n44, s12, s9 t3
smt41 (21,4) s13, n41, n42, n44, s13, s14, s13 t4
smt42 (21,4) s13, n41, n43, n44, s13, s14, s13 t4
smt43 (22,4) s13, s14, n41, n42, n44, s14, s13 t4
smt44 (22,4) s13, s14, n41, n43, n44, s14, s13 t4
Table 4.52 lists safety mitigation tests for the 44 position-failure pairs that fulfill
coverage criteria 3.
Table 4.52: Safety Mitigation Tests for Criteria 3
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (1,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
Continued on next page
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SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt2 (7,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
smt3 (10,1) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt4 (17,1) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt5 (19,1) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt6 (20,1) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt7 (22,1) t4 (no MT added to it) t4
smt8 (25,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt9 (29,1) t6 (no MT added to it) t6
smt10 (37,1) t7 (no MT added to it) t7
smt11 (41,1) t8 (no MT added to it) t8
smt12 (46,1) t9 (no MT added to it) t9
smt13 (51,1) t10 (no MT added to it) t10
smt14 (57,1) t11 (no MT added to it) t11
Continued on next page
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SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt15 (10,2) s5, n21, n22, n23, n24 t2
smt16 (22,2) s13, s14, n21, n22, n23, n24 t4
smt17 (37,2) s1, s2, s3, s7, n21, n22, n23, n24 t7
smt18 (41,2) s5, s6, n21, n22, n23, n24 t8
smt19 (46,2) s5, s6, s14, s13, n21, n22, n23, n24 t9
smt20 (57,2) s5, s6, s7, s8, n21, n22, n23, n24 t11
smt21 (17,3) s9, s10, n31, n32, n33, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt22 (19,3) s9, s10, s11, s12, n31, n32, n33, s12, s9 t3
smt23 (20,3) s9, s10, s11, s12, s9, n31, n32, n33, s9 t3
smt24 (51,3) s5, s6, s7, s8, s11, n31, n32, n33, s11, s12, s9 t10
smt25 (10,4) s5, n41, n42, n44, s5, s6, s7, s7, s8, s5, t2
smt26 (10,4) s5, n41, n43, n44, s5, s6, s7, s7, s8, s5, t2
smt27 (17,4) s9, s10, n41, n42, n44, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
Continued on next page
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SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt28 (17,4) s9, s10, n41, n43, n44, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt29 (19,4) s9, s10, s11, s12, n41, n42, n44, s12, s9 t3
smt30 (19,4) s9, s10, s11, s12, n41, n43, n44, s12, s9 t3
smt31 (20,4) s9, s10, s11, s12, s9, n41, n42, n44, s9 t3
smt32 (20,4) s9, s10, s11, s12, s9, n41, n43, n44, s9 t3
smt33 (22,4) s13, n41, n42, n44, s14, s13 t4
smt34 (22,4) s13, n41, n43, n44, s14, s13 t4
smt35 (37,4) s1, s2, s3, s7, n41, n42, n44, s7, s8, s5 t7
smt36 (37,4) s1, s2, s3, s7, n41, n43, n44, s7, s8, s5 t7
smt37 (41,4) s5, s6, n41, n42, n44, s6, s9 t8
smt38 (41,4) s5, s6, n41, n43, n44, s6, s9 t8
smt39 (46,4) s5, s6, s14, s13, n41, n42, n44, s13 t9
smt40 (46,4) s5, s6, s14, s13, n41, n43, n44, s13 t9
Continued on next page
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SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt41 (51,4) s5, s6, s7, s8, s11, n41, n42, n44, s11, s12, s9 t10
smt42 (51,4) s5, s6, s7, s8, s11, n41, n43, n44, s11, s12, s9 t10
smt43 (57,4) s5, s6, s7, s8, n41, n42, n44, s8, s13 t11
smt44 (57,4) s5, s6, s7, s8, n41, n43, n44, s8, s13 t11
Table 4.53 indicates tests for the 15 position-failure pairs that fulfill coverage
criteria 4.
Table 4.53: Safety Mitigation Tests for Criteria 4
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (1,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
smt2 (7,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
smt3 (19,1) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt4 (22,1) t4 (no MT added to it) t4
smt5 (25,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt6 (29,1) t6 (no MT added to it) t6
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SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt7 (51,1) t10 (no MT added to it) t10
smt8 (10,2) s5, n21, n22, n23, n24 t2
smt9 (37,2) s1, s2, s3, s7, n21, n22, n23, n24 t7
smt10 (46,2) s5, s6, s14, s13, n21, n22, n23, n24 t9
smt11 (57,2) s5, s6, s7, s8, n21, n22, n23, n24 t11
smt12 (16,3) s9, n31, n32, n33, s9, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt13 (17,3) s9, s10, n31, n32, n33, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt14 (41,4) s5, s6, n41, n42, n44, s5, s6, s9 t8
smt15 (41,4) s5, s6, n41, n43, n44, s5, s6, s9 t8
Criteria 1 would need |I| × |F | minus the zeros entries (not applicable) in Table
5.5. This requires 58×4−94 = 138 pairs and 178 tests which is clearly not desirable.
Criteria 2, criteria 3 have 44 tests, and criteria 4 has 15 tests.
To sum up, End-to-End methodology consists of two phases. In phase 1 , we
integrated the behavioral and fault models to produce test cases from the integrated
model. This phase starts with the compatibility transformation step, in which we
transformed the fault trees to become compatible with the behavioral model, fol-
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lowed by model transformation step. In this step, the fault tree was transformed
into GCEFSM according to the transformation rules. In the model integration step
where we integrate the GCEFSM with the behavioral model according to the inte-
gration rules to produce the ICEFSM model which is then used to produce 14 test
paths as shown in Table 4.42. This phase also produced the failure type Table 4.43
which was used by the applicability matrix construction procedure (Figure 4.20)
along with the test paths in (Table 4.42) to construct the applicability matrix (Ta-
ble 4.45). This table contains 4 failure types with the information that shows which
test path the failure is feasible in. The applicability matrix is taken as an input to
phase 2.
In phase 2, our aim is to provide an MBT approach to test proper mitigation
of safety failures in SCSs. We used the applicability matrix to build test criteria
from which we select the position and the type of the failure. The number of the
behavior test paths (without mitigation tests) produced from the behavioral model
is 11 paths and the total number of mitigation tests (MT) that we have is 4. Some
failures require more than one mitigation test paths (2 test paths), such as (f4)
which caused the number of safety mitigation tests (SMTs) to increase. From these
path, we generated SMTs for each criteria. The safety mitigation tests (SMTs) are
44 for criteria 2 and criteria 3. For criteria 4, we have 15 SMTs. The increase of the
number of the test paths with mitigation tests (SMTs) can be considered reasonable.
4.6 Comparison between Case Studies
Table 4.54 shows the comparison between the three case studies. By using these
different case studies, we can prove that our approach can be applied to different
application domains (areospace, medical device, and transportation systems). Also,
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the size of behavior models vary in each one. In the first case study (launch system),
the number of behavioral states is 21 states and we have 14 failure types. In the
second case study (insulin pump), the number of behavioral states is 14 states and
we have 4 failure types. In the third case study (RCCS), the number of behavioral
states is 14 states and we have 4 failure types. Also, the number of SMTs for
criteria 1, 2, 3, and 4 in the first case study is larger than the number of SMTs in
the insulin and RCCS case studies. Some of the failures has the same mitigation
patterns in all case studies. The number of mitigation test suite also varies among
them. This approach is also used with different behavior model, such as FSMWeb
for web application to test fail-safe behavior (Mr.Boukris dissertation). By using
different behavior models, we also show the generalizability of our approach. There
are some of mitigation patterns that are commom between these case studies and
FSMWeb model, such as compensate and go to fail-safe.
Table 4.54: Comparison between different Application Domains
Launch Insulin Pump RCCS
States 21 15 14
Failure Types 14 4 4
|MT | 16 5 4
|SMTsC1| 405 276 178
|SMTsC2| 180 54 44
|SMTsC3| 180 54 44




Changes to software will be reflected in changes to the models we use for MBT.
Additionally, there may be changes related to failures and how they are required
to be mitigated. Hence, selective regression testing needs to classify the types of
changes (add, delete, modify). We adopt the process of Rothermel and Harrold for
selective regression testing [139] to use for CEFSM.
1. Determine changes that occur in the model .
2. Classify the behavior test (BT ) as reusable (BTUT ), obsolete (BTOT ), and
retestable (BTRT ) tests. Eliminate all tests that are no longer applicable
(obsolete tests (BTOT )). Determine which tests will remain valid for the new
version of the model which are the retestable tests (BTRT ). BTRT ⊂ BT
3. Test modified model with BTRT .
4. If BTRT does not meet the test criterion, generate new test cases T
′′.
5. Execute the modified model with T ′′.
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5.1 Process
Note that this work was done jointly with Salah Boukris. He uses FSMWeb
for testing web application, but CEFSM is used here. The process has many types
of changes that need to be considered such as changes in behavioral model (BM),
changes in failures (add new failures), changes in applicability matrix (A), changes
in mitigation models (MMs) , and weaving rules (WRs) or a combination of these
changes. Figure 5.1 shows the regression testing process step by step. Table 5.1 has
the variable description that we use for this dissertation.
Table 5.1: Variable Description
Variable Description
p Position of Failure
e Failure Type
PE Set of (p, e) Pairs PE=(p, e) ∈ PE
(p, e) (1≤ p ≤ I ) , (1 ≤ e ≤ |E| )
BT Behavior Test
CT Cancatenation of Test Paths CT= t1◦t2◦t3 . . . tl
Continued on next page
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Variable Description
I Lenght of CT. |CT | is the Number of Nodes in
CT
A(i, j) Node-Failure Applicability Matrix
S Set of Behavior States
CC Coverage Criteria
C1 Coverage Criteria 1
C2 Coverage Criteria 2
C3 Coverage Criteria 3
C4 Coverage Criteria 4
MM Mitigation Model
MT Set of Mitigation Tests
mt Mitigation Test Path mt ∈ MT
WR Weaving Rules
SMT Safety Mitigation Tests
Continued on next page
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New tests T ′′
MTRT Retestable Mitigation Tests
MTOT Obsolete Mitigation Tests
MTUT Reusable Mitigation Tests
MTnew New Mitigation Tests
MT ′′new New MitigationTests for New Failures




Continued on next page
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Variable Description
CT ′′ Cancatenation of New Test Paths CT= t′′1 ◦ t′′2 ◦
t′′3 . . . t
′′
l
Classify the types of changes that could occur in a system:
• Changes in a behavior model (BM). When changes occur in a BM, we need
to classify the behavior test (BT) into reusable (BTUT ), obsolete (BTOT ), and
retestable (BTRT ) tests. Construct an applicability matrix (A) and a new
search space (I’), then apply coverage criteria (C1-C4) to select (p, e) pairs.
Build mitigation models (MMs) for each failure type and generate mitigation
tests (MTs) from these MMs using mitigation criteria and weave MTs into
BT using WRs to construct safety mitigation tests (SMTs) and execute them.
• Changes in failures (new failures). When we add a new failure to a system,
we need to construct a new applicability matrix (A) by adding a new row to
it. Then, construct a new search space (I’). Apply coverage criteria (C1-C4)
to select the new (p, e) pairs. Build mitigation models for each failure from
which we generate MTs that weave into BT using weaving rules (WRs) to
construct SMTs and execute them.
• Changes in the applicability matrix (A). When the applicability matrix is
modified, we have to construct a new search space (I’). Apply coverage criteria
(C1-C4) to select the new (p, e) pairs and build mitigation models (MMs) for
each failure. Generate MTs from MMs and weave these tests into BT to
generate SMTs and execute them.
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Figure 5.1: RT Process
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• Changes in mitigation models. If we have a change in a MM , we need to
classify the mitigation test as retestable mitigation tests (MTRT ), obsolete
mitigation tests (MTOT ) and reusable mitigation tests (MTUT ). Generate
new mitigation tests (MT ′′new) for new failures. So, the new MT (MTnew) is
a set of retestable MT (MTRT ) or new mitigation tests (MT
′′
new). MTnew =
MTRT ∪ MT ′′new. Then we weave this a new MT (MTnew) into position (p, e)
to construct SMTsnew. Then we need to rerun the new SMTsnew.
• Changes in weaving rules. If weaving rules are changed, we have to select
the (p, e) pair from PE pairs and reweave all mitigation tests MTe at position
(p, e) using the new WRe into BT to generate a new safety mitigation tests
for failure type e (SMT ′′e ). Then we need to rerun SMT
′′
e .
5.2 Types of Changes
Our approach to selective regression testing is based on the types of changes
to the behavioral model, the fault model, the applicability matrix, the mitigation
models, and the weaving rules to determine the retestable, reusable, and obsolete
tests.
5.2.1 Changes to Behavioral Model (BM)
Andrews et.al [4], defined rules for classifying obsolete, retestable, and reusable
test cases for the FSMWeb model. Changes to nodes and edges (add, delete, and
modify) are classified as to their effect on existing test cases. This determines
whether tests are obsolete, retestable, or reusable. The types of changes that can
occur in a BM are as follows:
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• add a new node. When we add a new node in a behavior model (BM), we
also have to add one or more transitions associated with this new node and
annotate the transition with CEFSM inputs, guards, actions, outputs, and
messages.
• delete an existing node. When we delete a node from a behavior model (BM),
we must also delete the incoming and outgoing transitions from and to this
node.
• add a new edge. When a new edge is added, we have to determine which pair of
nodes is being connected (possibly a new node is also being created), annotate
the edge with transition information (inputs, guards, actions, outputs, and
messages).
• delete an edge. When we delete an existing edge, we also have to delete the
node that the deleted edge goes to if this edge is the only edge that goes to
this node.
• modify an edge. Modifying an edge usually involves changing the inputs,
guard, or action that associate with the edge.
We adopt Andrews et.al [4] regression testing of web applications using FSMWeb
and we use this for CEFSM. We explain each process for the BM changes in more
detail algorithmically in the following subsections. If the behavior model (BM) is
changed, we have to classify the behavior test (BT) into reusable (BTUT ), obsolete
(BTOT ), and retestable (BTRT ) tests. Then, rerun the retestable tests (BTRT ).
Determine new nodes and edges in the model that need to be covered, create new
tests (T ′′), and execute them.
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5.2.1.1 Classify Behavior Tests
Behavior Test (BT) ClassificationAlgorithm () {
If (BM changed) then {




Obsolete Test Cases (BTOT )
We adopt Andrews et.al [4] rules for defining obsolete abstract test cases based on
type of change: Node deletion impacts all paths that visit the deleted node, ren-
dering it obsolete. Node modification changes target node to an existing node or to
new node based on modifying input, guard, or action in the transition. This type
of change also impacts the paths, because either the node needs to be replaced by
another node or a sequence of nodes. Hence, both node deletions and node modi-
fications render abstract tests obsolete that visit these nodes: Let No ={n| n ∈ N;
n is deleted or modified }, then the set of obsolete abstract test cases due to node
changes is given by
ON ={ta| ∃ n ∈ No : ta visits n}. Where ta is an abstract test case.
Similarly, edge deletion makes any abstract test that visits the edge obsolete. Edge
modification requires changes in the inputs, guards, actions, outputs, and messages
associated with it. Any of these will make abstract test cases obsolete that tour the
modified edge.
Let Eo ={e| e ∈ E; e is deleted or modified}, then the set of obsolete abstract test
cases due to edge changes is given by
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OE ={ta | ta tours e ∈ Eo }. Therefore, the set of obsolete abstract test cases is
given by
OAT = ON ∪ OE.
Additionally, let the set of abstract test cases be AT = {ta1, . . . , tal}. Let Tai be the
set of executable tests associated with tai (i = 1, . . . , k). Consequently, the obsolete
test cases are given by
BTOT= {t|∃ta ∈ OAT : t ∈ Ta}
ObsoleteTestCasesAlgorithm()
Inputs
Behavioral Test (BT )
Obsolete Node (NO)
Obsolete Edge (EO)
Abstract Test Case (ta)
Output
Obsolete Behavioral Test (BTOT )
begin
For all ta
If ta contains NO or EO then
BTOT = BTOT ∪ ta
Return BTOT
end
Retestable Test Cases (BTRT )
These are test cases that are still valid and test parts of the application that may be
affected by the change. These are abstract test cases that tour parts of the model
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that are close to the changes. Closeness is determined by different ways, depending
on different test criteria. For instances, assume we use edge coverage as a coverage
criteria, we consider how any node n that is one edge away from a modified or
deleted node must be retested, except for the source and sink nodes of the model:
Nrnode ={n| ∃ e : (n, n̂) or (n̂, n); n̂ ∈ No;n 6= nsource; n 6= nsink }. When edges are
changed, the set of retestable edges depends on the type of change. When edges are
deleted or modified, we assume that the starting and ending nodes of the changed
edges are potentially impacted and hence nonobsolete tests that visit these nodes
are retestable (except for the source and sink nodes of the model):
Nredm = {n|ê ∈ Eo; ê = (ni, n) or ê = (n, ni);n 6= nsource;n 6= nsink}
Likewise, when we add new edges or nodes, existing nodes at which these new edges
start or end are considered potentially affected by the modification and hence non-
obsolete tests that visit these nodes are retestable (Except for the source and sink
nodes of the model):
Nrea = {n|∃n′ ∈ N ′ : e′ = (n, n′)ore′ = (n′, n);n 6= nsource;n 6= nsink}
The set of retestable nodes is then given by Nr = Nrnode ∪Nredm ∪Nrea
and the set of retestable abstract test cases is
RAT = {ta | ta visits n ∈ Nr} \ OAT
Corresponding executable retestable tests are determined as a function of RAT as
before. BTRT = {t|∃ ta ∈ RAT : t ∈ Ta }
RetestableTestCasesAlgorithm()
Inputs
Behavioral Test (BT )
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Retestable Node (Nrnode)
Retestable Node that has deleted or modified edge (Nredm)
Retestable Node that has new edge(Nrea)
Abstract Test Case (ta)
Output
Retestable Behavioral Test (BTRT )
begin
For all ta contains Nrnode or Nredm or Nrea
BTRT = BTRT ∪ ta
Return BTRT
end
Reusable Tests (BTUT )
Those that are neither obsolete nor retestable tests.
UAT = AT \ (OAT ∪RAT )
Corresponding executable reusable tests are determined as a function of UAT . BTUT =
T \ (BTOT ∪BTRT )
ReusableTestCasesAlgorithm()
Inputs
Behavioral Test (BT )
Obsolete Behavioral Test (BTOT )
Retestable Behavioral Test ( BTRT )
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Output
Reusable Behavioral Test (BTUT )
begin
(BTUT ) = BT − {(BTOT ) ∪ ( BTRT )}
Return BTUT
end
New Tests (T ′′)
These are determined for edges that are not covered. We need to generate new test
cases since the current test cases do not cover every change, particularly node and
edge additions. Obsolete test cases also leave gaps in coverage; therefore, we need
to address them with one or more new tests.
5.2.1.2 Construct New Applicability Matrix (A)
We have to build a new applicability matrix if we have changes in BM (add,
delete, modify node/edge) or changes in failures. We add a new column in the
applicability matrix if we add a new state and delete a column from the applicability
matrix if we delete a state. Additionally, we delete a row from the applicability




set of states S





For every failure fi in the system
For every state sj in the BM
If ((fi) applies in sj )
Assign 1 to A (fi, sj)
else
Assign 0 to A (fi, sj)
end
5.2.1.3 Construct New Search Space (I ′)
We have to construct the new search space (I ′) if we have changes in the BM
(add, delete node/edge), changes in failures or changes in an applicability matrix.
The new search space size is determined by the length of the new test suite multi-
plied by the number of failure types. | I ′ |= | CT ′′ | × | F |. We have two options
to construct the new search space (I ′).
• Option 1: Construct the new search space I ′ using new tests (T ′′)
• Option 2: Construct the new search space I ′ by re-search retestable test suite
(BTRT ) concatenating with new tests (T
′′). I ′ =BTRT ◦ T ′′. We do not use
BTRT ◦ T ′′ to build new search space , because SMTRT built from BTRT
would be same as before due to criteria. Hence we will reuse SMTRT instead.
New SearchSpaceAlgorithm()
Inputs
CT” // concatenating of t′′1 ◦ t′′2 ◦ t′′3 . . . t′′l
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set of failures F
Output
New search space (I ′)
begin
| I’ | = | CT” | × | F |
Apply Coverage criteria (CC)
end
5.2.1.4 Apply Coverage Criteria (CC)
We defined four coverage criteria to select positions of failures and failure types
(p, e) pairs.
Criteria 1: All combinations, i.e. all positions p, all applicable failure
types e (test everything).
Criteria1Algorithm()
Inputs
Behavioral test suite (BT)





For each state sj in BT
For each failure fi in sj
If (fi = 1 in A) // 1 means that failure fi is applicable in state sj in A.




Criteria 2: All unique nodes, all applicable failures.
Criteria2Algorithm()
Inputs
Behavioral test suite (BT)





For each state sj in BT
If sj not chosen
For each failure fi in sj
PEset= PEset ∪ (p,e) // Append the (p,e) pair in PEset.
Return PEset
end
Criteria 3: All tests, all unique nodes, all applicable failures.
Criteria3Algorithm()
Inputs
Behavioral test suite (BT)






Select unique state sj from each test case tl
For each failure fi in sj
If fi = 1 in A // 1 means that failure fi is applicable in state sj in A.
PEset= PEset ∪ (p,e) // Append the (p,e) pair in PEset.
Return PEset
end
Criteria 4: All tests, all unique nodes, some failures.
Criteria4Algorithm()
Inputs
Behavioral test suite (BT)





Select unique state sj from each test case tl
If fi not chosen in sj
If fi=1 in A // 1 means that failure fi is applicable in state sj in A.
PEset= PEset ∪ (p,e)
If fi not chosen at all
If fi=1 in A




5.2.1.5 Select (p, e) Pairs
We select (p, e) pairs based on the criteria used (C1-C4) to build the safety
mitigation tests (SMTs).
5.2.1.6 Build Mitigation Models (MMs) and Generate Mitigation Tests
For each failure type e, we need to build a mitigation model from which we gen-
erate mitigation tests (MTs). Classify mitigation tests (MTs) as reusable (MTUT ),
obsolete (MTOT ), and retestable (MTRT ) mitigation tests. Rerun retestable miti-
gation tests (MTRT ). New mitigation tests (MTsnew) are determined for edges in
the model that are not covered.
Mitigation Test (MT) ClassificationAlgorithm () {
If (MM changed) then {




5.2.2 Changes to Failure Types
The systems could face change in failure types (delete or add failure). Therefore,
as in changes to the BM, the same classification rules in the BM will be used.
• delete failure type e. We delete a failure if it no longer exists. For example, we
have empty battery as a failure type and we recharge this battery so that this
failure type no longer exists and we have to remove it. By deleting a failure
that no longer exists in the system, we eliminate the row that has this failure
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on it. We simply have to remove the mitigation model MMe, mitigation test
MTe, weaving rule WRe, and the safety mitigation tests that are based on
this failure type e (SMTe).
• add new failure type e′. By adding a new failure type to the system, we have
to:
– build new applicability matrix (A) by adding a new row to it.
– construct a new search space I ′
– apply test criteria or GA to select (p, e) pairs.
– add a new MM (MMnew), MT (MTnew), WR (WRnew), and a new safety
mitigation tests (SMTse) that are based on a new e .
5.2.3 Changes to Mitigation Models (MMs)
We use Andrews et.al [4] to classify test cases. Since the mitigation model is
similar to the behavioral model (CEFSM), the same concept could be applied for
the mitigation test path. The same classification will be used in terms of obsolete,
reusable, or retestable tests. We already covered this in the subsubsection 5.2.1.6
5.2.4 Changes to Weaving Rules (WRs)
Add and delete Weaving Rules (WRs) is covered under add or delete failure.
Let e be a failure type. Let WRe be the associated weaving rule. If the weaving
rule changes from type i to type j then we need to reweave all mitigation tests MTe
at position (p, e) ∈ PE using the new WR of type j. This results in a new SMT ′′e .
We need to rerun SMT ′′e .
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5.3 Example
We use the behavioral model for the train process of a Railroad Crossing Control
System (RCCS) in EFSM format that defined in Figure 5.2 taken from [7]. The
model specifies that gates are to be closed and warning lights are to be turned
on when a train approaches, and that they are to stay that way until the train is
leaving. When the train is leaving, the gates are opened and the lights switched
off. Gates stay open and lights are off while no train is approaching. The model
contains 4 states, S = {s0, s1, s2, s3} where the initial and final state are s0. There
are 6 transitions X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}. Assuming edge coverage is required,








X3= ([train leaving=true]) / 
(open gates; turn lights off) 
Train 
X1= ([approaching =true])/ 




X4= ([leaving =false)/ 
(gates open; turn light off) 
X2= ([crossing=true]]/ 




Figure 5.2: Extended Finite State Machine for RCCS
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Table 5.2: Test paths through EFSM example
Test Paths States in EFSM
t1 s0, s1, s2, s3, s0
t2 s0, s1, s2, s3, s1, s2, s3, s0
t3 s0, s1, s3, s1, s2, s3, s0
t4 s0, s1, s3, s0
5.3.1 Failures, Applicability Matrix
Table 5.3 shows four possible failures that could occur in the system . The
applicability matrix is defined as shown in Table 5.4 indicating that not all failures
are applicable in all states. We use the same applicability matrix that is defined in
[7].
Table 5.3: Failure Types
F Explanation
f1 sensor fails (to detect approaching or leaving train)
f2 warning lights fail
f3 gate stuck open
f4 controller fails
Table 5.4: Applicability matrix
F/S s0 s1 s2 s3
f1 1 1 1 1
f2 1 1 1 0
f3 0 1 1 0
f4 1 1 1 1
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5.3.2 Failure Coverage Criteria (FC)
There are
∑l
i=1 len(ti) positions p to select for failure injection. Concatenating
the tests gives CT={s0,s1,s2,s3,s0,s0,s1,s2,s3,s1,s2,s3,s0,s0,s1,s3,s1,s2,s3,s0,s0,s1,s3,s0}.
There are 24 positions. We now apply the coverage criteria (C1-C4) for positions
of failure (p) and type of failure (e). The resulting required (p, e) pairs are shown
in Table 5.5 for each criteria as ”‘1” entries. For criteria 1, we have 76 (p, e) pairs.
Criteria 2 and criteria 3 require 13 (p, e) pairs. Criteria 4 requires 4 (p, e) pairs.
5.3.3 Mitigation Requirements, Models, Safety Mitigation
Tests
We use the same mitigation requirements and the same mitigation models that
are defined in [7]. The mitigation requirements are summarized in Table 5.6 which
also specifies the corresponding mitigation models and associated weaving rules.
Figures 5.3-5.5 show the mitigation models for failures f2 − f4. Note that f1 does
not need a model, since it is an implicit fix that does not use extra test inputs
(category 4 under weaving rules). Again, assuming edge coverage, the mitigation
tests listed in Figures 5.3-5.5 fulfill this coverage. Note, that only failure f4 has






mt21 ={n21, n22, n23, n24}
n21 n22 n23 n24
Figure 5.3: Fix and Stop: Mitigation Model MM2
272
Table 5.5: ALL POSITIONS, ALL APPLICABLE FAILURES
F/S t1 t2 t3 t4
s0 s1 s2 s3 s0 s0 s1 s2 s3 s1 s2 s3 s0 s0 s1 s3 s1 s2 s3 s0 s0 s1 s3 s0
f1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
f2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
f3 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
f4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALL UNIQUE NODES, ALL APPLICABLE FAILURES
f1 1 1 1 1
f2 1 1 1 0
f3 0 1 1 0
f4 1 1 1 1
ALL TESTS, ALL UNIQUE NODES, ALL APPLICABLE FAILURES
f1 1 1 1 1
f2 1 1 1 0
f3 0 1 1 0
f4 1 1 1 1





Construct Safety Mitigation Tests
Tables 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9 show the safety mitigation tests (SMTs) for criteria 2,
criteria 3, and criteria 4 respectively.
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Table 5.6: Mitigation Requirement
MM Explanation Model WR
MM1 compensate; switch to backup sensor (inter-




MM2 fix and stop; close gate; send alarm; stop see Figure 5.3 1b
MM3 fix and proceed; turn warning light on; send
alarm
see Figure 5.4 1a
MM4 compensate; switch to back up and close
gates or turn warning light on;send mainte-
nance request





mt31 ={n31, n32, n33}
n31 n32 n33

















mt41= { n41, n42, n44 }
mt42= { n41, n43, n44}
Figure 5.5: Compensate: Mitigation Model MM4
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Table 5.7: Safety Mitigation Tests for Criteria 2
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (1,1) t1(no MT added to it) t1
smt2 (2,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
smt3 (3,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
smt4 (4,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
smt5 (1,2) s0, n21, n22, n23, n24 t1
smt6 (2,2) s0, s1, n21, n22, n23, n24 t1
smt7 (3,2) s0, s1, s2, n21, n22, n23, n24 t1
smt8 (2,3) s0, s1, n31, n32, n33, s1, s2, s3, s0 t1
smt9 (3,3) s0, s1, s2, n31, n32, n33, s2, s3, s0 t1
smt10 (1,4) s0, n41, n42, n44, s0, s1, s2, s3, s0 t1
smt11 (1,4) s0, n41, n43, n44, s0, s1, s2, s3, s0 t1
smt12 (2,4) s0, s1, n41, n42, n44, s1, s2, s3, s0 t1
smt13 (2,4) s0, s1, n41, n43, n44, s1, s2, s3, s0 t1
smt14 (3,4) s0, s1, s2, n41, n42, n44, s2, s3, s0 t1
smt15 (3,4) s0, s1, s2, n41, n43, n44, s2, s3, s0 t1
smt16 (4,4) s0, s1, s2, s3, n41, n42, n44, s3, s0 t1
smt17 (4,4) s0, s1, s2, s3, n41, n43, n44, s3, s0 t1
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Table 5.8: Safety Mitigation Tests for Criteria 3
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (1,1) t1(no MT added to it) t1
smt2 (7,1) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt3 (18,1) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt4 (23,1) t4 (no MT added to it) t4
smt5 (1,2) s0, n21, n22, n23, n24 t1
smt6 (7,2) s0, s1, n21, n22, n23, n24 t2
smt7 (18,2) s0, s1, s3, s1, s2, n21, n22, n23, n24 t3
smt8 (7,3) s0, s1, n31, n32, n33, s1, s2, s3, s0 t2
smt9 (18,3) s0, s1, s3, s1, s2, n31, n32, n33, s2, s3, s0 t3
smt10 (1,4) s0, n41, n42, n44, s0, s1, s2, s3, s0 t1
smt11 (1,4) s0, n41, n43, n44, s0, s1, s2, s3, s0 t1
smt12 (7,4) s0, s1, n41, n42, n44, s1, s2, s3, s0 t2
smt13 (7,4) s0, s1, n41, n43, n44, s1, s2, s3, s0 t2
smt14 (18,4) s0, s1, s3, s1, s2, n41, n42, n44, s2, s3, s0 t3
smt15 (18,4) s0, s1, s3, s1, s2, n41, n43, n44, s2, s3, s0 t3
smt16 (23,4) s0, s1, s3, n41, n42, n44, s3, s0 t4
smt17 (23,4) s0, s1, s3, n41, n43, n44, s3, s0 t4
Table 5.9: Safety Mitigation Tests for Criteria 4
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (1,1) t1(no MT added to it) t1
smt2 (7,2) s0, s1, n21, n22, n23, n24 t2
smt3 (18,3) s0, s1, s3, s1, s2, n31, n32, n33, s2, s3, s0 t3
smt4 (23,4) s0, s1, s3, n41, n42, n44, s3, s0 t4
smt5 (23,4) s0, s1, s3, n41, n43, n44, s3, s0 t4
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Note that because f4 has two mitigation paths required, there are two test paths
for pair (p,4) resulting in 2 test paths in SMTs.
5.3.4 Deleting and Adding Edges
We delete the two edges (x5 and x6) from the Figure 5.2 and add four new edges
(x7, x8, x9, and x10) . Figure 5.6 depicts the modified behavior model of RCCS after
deletion and addition of edges has occurred.
 
x5= ([crossing =false]) / 
(open gates; turn lights off) 
Train 




x1= ([approaching =true])/ 





x7= ([leaving =false)/ 
(gates open; turn light off) 
x3= ([crossing=true]]/ 




Figure 5.6: Modified Extended Finite State Machine for RCCS
Table 5.10 indicates the two test paths derived from the modified BM of RCCS.
The test paths t2, t3, and t4 are obsolete tests.
Table 5.10: Test paths through modified RCCS
Test Paths States in EFSM Classification of Tests
t1 s0, s1, s2, s3, s0 Retestable Test
t5 s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 New Test
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5.3.4.1 Failures, Applicability Matrix
We have the same four failures defined in Table 5.3. We use the same applicability
matrix defined in Table 5.4 since we do not add a new node or a failure.
5.3.4.2 Construct a New Search Space
We contruct the new search space by using the new test (t5) that derived from
the modified RCCS and apply coverage criteria (C1-C4) to select (p, e) pairs.
5.3.4.3 Apply Coverage Criteria
We have only one new test (t5). (t5)={s0,s0,s1,s1,s2,s2,s3,s3,s0}. There are 9
positions. We now apply coverage criteria for positions of failure (p) and type of
failure (e) on the new test (t5). The resulting required (p, e) pairs are shown in
Table 5.11, 5.12, 5.13, and 5.14 for each criteria as ”‘1” entries. Criteria 1 requires
29 (p, e) pairs. Criteria 2 and Criteria 3 require 13 (p, e) pairs. Criteria 4 requires
4 (p, e) pairs
Table 5.11: Coverage Criteria 1 (C1)
t5
F/S s0 s0 s1 s1 s2 s2 s3 s3 s0
f1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
f2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
f3 1 1 1 1
f4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 5.12: Coverage Criteria 2 (C2)
t5
F/S s0 s0 s1 s1 s2 s2 s3 s3 s0
f1 1 1 1 1
f2 1 1 1
f3 1 1
f4 1 1 1 1
Table 5.13: Coverage Criteria 3 (C3)
t5
F/S s0 s0 s1 s1 s2 s2 s3 s3 s0
f1 1 1 1 1
f2 1 1 1
f3 1 1
f4 1 1 1 1
Table 5.14: Coverage Criteria 4 (C4)
t5





5.3.4.4 Mitigation Requirements, Mitigation Models, Safety Mitigation
Tests
We have the same mitigation requirements as defined in Table 5.6 and the same
mitigation models for failures (f2, f3, f4) as defined in Figures 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5. Now,
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we will construct safety mitigation tests for each criteria. Tables 5.15, 5.16, 5.17,
and 5.18 indicate SMTs for C1, C2, C3, and C4 respectively.
Table 5.15: Safety Mitigation Tests for C1
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (1,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt2 (2,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt3 (3,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt4 (4,1 t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt5 (5,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt6 (6,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt7 (7,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt8 (8,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt9 (9,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt10 (1,2) s0, n21, n22, n23, n24 t5
smt11 (2,2) s0, s0, n21, n22, n23, n24 t5
smt12 (3,2) s0, s0, s1, n21, n22, n23, n24 t5
Continued on next page
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SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt13 (4,2) s0, s0, s1, s1, n21, n22, n23, n24 t5
smt14 (5,2) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, n21, n22, n23, n24 t5
smt15 (6,2) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, n21, n22, n23, n24 t5
smt16 (9,2) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0, n21, n22, n23, n24 t5
smt17 (3,3) s0, s0, s1, n31, n32, n33, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt18 (4,3) s0, s0, s1, s1, n31, n32, n33, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt19 (5,3) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, n31, n32, n33, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt20 (6,3) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, n31, n32, n33, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt21 (1,4) s0, n41, n42, n44, s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt22 (1,4) s0, n41, n43, n44, s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt23 (2,4) s0, s0, n41, n42, n44, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt24 (2,4) s0, s0, n41, n42, n44, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt25 (3,4) s0, s0, s1, n41, n42, n44, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
Continued on next page
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SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt26 (3,4) s0, s0, s1, n41, n43, n44, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt27 (4,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, n41, n42, n44, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt28 (4,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, n41, n43, n44, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt29 (5,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, n41, n42, n44, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt30 (5,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, n41, n43, n44, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt31 (6,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, n41, n42, n44, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt32 (6,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, n41, n43, n44, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt33 (7,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, n41, n42, n44, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt34 (7,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, n41, n43, n44, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt35 (8,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, n41, n42, n44, s3, s0 t5
smt36 (8,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, n41, n43, n44, s3, s0 t5
smt37 (9,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0, n41, n42, n44, s0 t5
smt38 (9,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0, n41, n43, n44, s0 t5
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Table 5.16: Safety Mitigation Tests for C2
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (1,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt2 (3,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt3 (5,1) t5(no MT added to it) t5
smt4 (7,1) t5(no MT added to it) t5
smt5 (1,2) s0, n21, n22, n23, n24 t5
smt6 (3,2) s0, s0, s1, n21, n22, n23, n24 t5
smt7 (5,2) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, n21, n22, n23, n24 t5
smt8 (3,3) s0, s0, s1, n31, n32, n33, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt9 (5,3) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, n31, n32, n33, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt10 (1,4) s0, n41, n42, n44, s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt11 (1,4) s0, n41, n43, n44, s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt12 (3,4) s0, s0, s1, n41, n42, n44, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt13 (3,4) s0, s0, s1, n41, n43, n44, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt14 (5,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, n41, n42, n44, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt15 (5,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, n41, n43, n44, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt16 (7,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, n41, n42, n44, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt17 (7,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, n41, n43, n44, s3, s3, s0 t5
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Table 5.17: Safety Mitigation Tests for C3
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (1,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt2 (3,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt3 (5,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt4 (7,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt5 (1,2) s0, n21, n22, n23, n24 t5
smt6 (3,2) s0, s0, s1, n21, n22, n23, n24 t5
smt7 (5,2) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, n21, n22, n23, n24 t5
smt8 (3,3) s0, s0, s1, n31, n32, n33, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt9 (5,3) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, n31, n32, n33, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt10 (1,4) s0, n41, n42, n44, s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt11 (1,4) s0, n41, n43, n44, s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt12 (3,4) s0, s0, s1, n41, n42, n44, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt13 (3,4) s0, s0, s1, n41, n43, n44, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt14 (5,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, n41, n42, n44, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt15 (5,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, n41, n43, n44, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt16 (7,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, n41, n42, n44, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt17 (7,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, n41, n43, n44, s3, s3, s0 t5
Table 5.18: Safety Mitigation Tests for C4
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (1,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt2 (3,2) s0, s0, s1, n21, n22, n23, n24 t5
smt3 (5,3) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, n31, n32, n33, s2, s2, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt4 (7,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, n41, n42, n44, s3, s3, s0 t5
smt5 (7,4) s0, s0, s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, n41, n43, n44, s3, s3, s0 t5
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5.3.5 Changes in Applicability Matrix (A)
Assume we have the same applicability matrix defined in Table 5.4. The changes
that could occur in the applicability matrix (A) are that some failures may become
applicable in some states (changes from 0 to 1 ) or not applicable (changes from 1
to 0 ).
In Table 5.19, the failure (f3) becomes applicable in states (s0 and s3) which means
that the pairs (3,1)=1 and (3,4)=1. However, in Table 5.20, the failure f1 becomes
not applicable (changes from 1 to 0 ) in state (s0) and f2 becomes not applicable in
state (s1) so the pairs (1,1)=0 and (2,2)=0.
Table 5.19: Applicability Matrix: Failures become Applicable
F/S s0 s1 s2 s3
f1 1 1 1 1
f2 1 1 1 0
f3 1 1 1 1
f4 1 1 1 1
Table 5.20: Applicability Matrix: Failures become Not Applicable
F/S s0 s1 s2 s3
f1 0 1 1 1
f2 1 0 1 0
f3 0 1 1 0
f4 1 1 1 1
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5.3.6 Changes in Mitigation Model (MM)
Previously, we assume that we have a failure (f2) which is mitigated by the miti-
gation model shown in Figure 5.3 and the generated mitigation test (mt) associated
with this failure is mt . For some reasons, this failure can not be mitigated using
mt any more. The mt becomes obsolete due to deletion of a node or an edge. So,
we need to choose another mitigation model to mitigate the failure and generate a
new mitigation test (mtnew) from this new MM . Then we weave the new mitigation
test (mtnew) into behavioral test (BT ) at a particular position to generate the new
safety mitigation test (smtnew).
5.3.7 Changes in Weaving Rules (WRs)
we assumed that the failure (f2) mitigated by the weaving rule fix and stop
but for some reason this weaving rule does not work anymore. Therefore, we have
to choose another weaving rule (wrnew) to mitigation this failure which is fix and
proceed. The weaving rule for this failure (f2) is changed. As result, we have to
weave the new weaving rule (wrnew) into BT at position p and generate the new
safety mitigation test (smtnew).
5.3.8 Disscusion of the Example
Table 5.21 illustrates the difference between the original and modified example.
As can be seen, the number of transitions in the modified model is increased (8
transitions) but the number of test paths is decreased (2 test paths) since some test
paths in the original model become obsolete (t2,t3, and t4). Additionally, the number



























































































































































the original example is 100 SMTs. However, the number of (p, e) pairs for C1 in the
modified example is 29 (p, e) pairs, and the SMTs for C1 in the modified example
is 38 SMTs. Therefore, using new test (t5) to construct new search space in the
modified example helps to reduce number of (p, e) pairs for C1 and save significant
number of tests (SMTs).
5.3.9 Disscusion
As can be seen, changes in the BM by adding more states or changes in failures by
adding a new failures will increase the total number of SMTs even if we have a small
number of behavior test paths (BT). Therefore, these changes are considered critical
changes since we need to go over the whole process again. However, the changes
to the BM by deleting some states or changes in failures by deleting some failures
will decline the total number of SMTs. Additionally, changes in the applicability
matrix (A) due to some failures become not applicable in some states (changes from
1 to 0) will decrease the total number of safety mitigation tests (SMTs). However,
if some failures become applicable in some states (changes from 0 to 1), this will
increase the number of safety mitigation tests. Therefore, the changes to (A) are
considered critical changes due to an increase or decrease in the number of SMTs.





This dissertation proposed a model-based testing technique that allows system-
atic testing of proper failure mitigation in safety-critical systems. Failures in these
systems could result in loss of life, damage to the environment or significant prop-
erty damage. Our aim is to test proper mitigation where it is required. This is an
important issue, since an empirical study [125] found that the defect rate in excep-
tion handling modules exceeds 20% (i. e. 20% of exception handling modules have
defects), a rate, they conclude, is much higher than for non-exception handling mod-
ules. Some techniques integrate safety analysis techniques (e.g. FTA) and behavior
model (such as statecharts) to generate test cases. These techniques face state space
explosion (scalability issue) due to the integration. They do not consider mitigation
modeling at all. Conversely, my technique is used to test safety critical systems with
respect to both regular functionality and fail-safe behavior. Its advantages include:
• It leverages existing behavioral test suites constructed from a behavioral model
BM (CEFSMs are used to model system behavior).
• It covers different types of failures.
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• It systematically constructs safety mitigation models based on commonly oc-
curring mitigation patterns.
• It defines failure coverage criteria.
• It provides mechanisms to construct safety mitigation tests.
• It avoids state-space explosion by keeping failure models and behavior models
separate.
• It provides a selective regression testing approach.
• In simulation experiments it has been shown to be both effective and efficient.
While no work on mitigation models for SCSs exists, exception handling patterns
have been defined for process modeling [102]. Many papers use fault tolerance
techniques and show how to mitigate failures in SCSs to reduce risks and let systems
contionue operation at a reduced level instead of failing completely. However, they
did not explain how to construct and apply the mitigation test. In my researh,
an explicit mitigation model is described for which we generate mitigation paths
which are then woven at selected failure points into the original test suite to create
failure-mitigation tests (safety mitigation test).
In this dissertation, we conducted three cases studies with different sizes and from
different application domains. The rationale behind choosing different models is to
show the applicability of our approach for three different application domains. We
used an aerospace launch system, a portable insulin pump, and a railroad crossing
control system (RCCS). In these case studies we illustrated our approach step by
step. These case studies have different behavior model sizes (the number of states
and transitions). Each case study has a different number of states, transitions, failure
types, and mitigation types. The launch system has 21 states, 34 transitions, 14
failure types, and 2 mitigation types. In the insulin pump, the model has 15 states,
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23 transitions, 4 failure types, and 3 mitigation types. In the third case study,
RCCS, the model has 14 states, 19 transitions, 4 failure types, and 3 mitigation
types. By applying our approach to these case studies, we note that the generated
safety mitigation tests vary. The SMTs for C1, C2, C3, and C4 in the launch
system are larger than in the other two case studies.
In all case studies, the safety mitigation test suite was much larger than the
functional test suite BT. This is not surprising, since system test groups in industry
tend to spend more time testing failure modes than regular behavior even for systems
that are not safety-critical [10]
Comparative evaluation wrt effectiveness and efficiency of tecting criteria against
a genetic algorithm (GA) is also presented. We could use GA to select (p, e) pairs
rather than using test criteria. When test suites are long and many failure types
exist, there are thousands of possible pairs and criteria become expensive. This work
was done with Mr. Salah Boukhris. We did a simulation to compare effectiveness
and efficieny. We used the same parameters as in [5]. The results of the simulation
show that the GA outperforms coverage criteria for large search spaces. For small
search spaces, the GA is less effective than coverage criteria. C1, while effective, is
very inefficient and should only be used when the search space is small. C2/C3 also
are more effective for small search spaces than GA. For large search spaces, they are
as effective, but not as efficient as the GA, although not dramatically so (as C1).
C4, the weakest criterion cannot find any mitigation defects for large search spaces
while GA finds them all. C4 is effective for small search spaces. In conclusion, we
recommend to use GA for large search spaces and C2/C3 for small ones.
In this dissertation, we also defined an end-to-end testing methodology for safety
critical systems. This methodology consists of two phases. Phase 1 (which is the
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dissertation of Mr Ahmed Gario) starts with a compatibility transformation step for
the fault tree wrt behavioral model. The FT produced from this step is transformed
into gate CEFSMs (GCEFSMs) according to transformation rules. Then, the model
integration step integrates the GCEFSM with the behavioral model (BM) accord-
ing to the integration rules. The resultant model is the integrated communicating
extended finite state machine (ICEFSM). Test case generation methods are used to
generate test cases based on test criteria (IC). The test cases are then used to con-
struct the applicability matrix. The second phase which is part of this dissertation ,
uses the applicability matrix defined in phase 1 to generate test cases to test proper
mitigation of failures.
This dissertation also proposed a selective regression testing approach based on
types of changes that could occur in the behavioral model (add, delete, or modify
state or edge), the fault model (add, delete, or modify failure type), the mitigation
models (add, delete, or modify MM), and the weaving rules to determine retestable,
reusable, and obsolete tests. We construct a new search space I’ when we have
changes in BM, failures, and applicability matrix (A). In the future work we plan
to,
• apply and investigate the possibility of a larger range of mitigation patterns.
In the previous case studies, we utilize some of the mitigation patterns that are
suitable to mitigate failures in these systems to avoid adverse effects. Some
of these patterns can be applied to some safety critical systems but not all
of them; however, there is a case when there are some mitigation patterns
that work for some specific applications (safety critical systems) but not for
the others. This depends on many factors such as, the type of a failure that
might occur in any safety critical systems, and how severe or dangerous it is,
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and how it can be mitigated by using one of these patterns. We plan to use
different types of mitigation patterns in other case studies to cover them all.
• use different behavior models to illustrate our approach. By using different
behavior models, we can show the generalizability of our approach. We will in-
vestigate applying our approach to other behavioral models that have the abil-
ity to describe communicating processes such as UML activity and sequence
diagrams and Petri Nets. By generalizing our approach to other modeling
languages, we will show generalizability since these modeling languages are
used in other application domains, such as aircraft flight control, weapons and
nuclear systems.
• prioritize test cases. Using prioritization techniques, let us arrange test cases so
that test cases with the highest priority, are executed earlier in the regression
testing process than lower priority test cases. By prioritizing test cases, we
will gain many benefits such as: [137]:
– raise the rate of fault detection of a test suite that is, the probability of
exposing faults earlier in a run of regression tests using the test suite.
– increase the coverage in the system under test (SUT) at a faster rate.
– raise the confidence in the reliability of the SUT.
– increase the rate at which high-risk faults are detected by a test suite.
• create a trade off cost model that assesses different testing criteria for testing
mitigation of failures against the cost of defective mitigation. The cost of
testing is proportional to the number of tests. We plan to compute the Return
On Investment (ROI) for mitigation test criteria to measure cost of failures. By
measuring ROI for the four testing criteria, we can show the trade-off relation
between the cost of testing and the cost-effectiveness in SCSs. We plan to
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calculate ROI of a set of test cases selected by each criterion, and check which
criterion is more effective in terms of testing costs and cost from damages.
We plan to use Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) to
analyze the criticality of failures quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitative
criticality analysis is an approach to rank hardware items and failure modes
according to expected failures. Qualitative criticality analysis is used to assess
risk and prioritize mitigation actions by using rate of impact of possible effects
of failure, rate of the probability of occurrence for each failure mode. The
impact is measured in dollars for different risk exposures.
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